In the history of philosophy, the problem of determinism and free will has always sparked a debate between philosophers who take opposing views on the issue. Determinism is a philosophical belief and thinking that assumes that all things which include human behavior are causally determined. On the other hand, free will is a philosophical idea that views things such as human will and behavior as free from causal determination. This topic in itself creates other issues that relate to morality and religion. On one hand, to believe in free simply does not in itself mean that human conduct is entirely accidental or uncaused. This just means, in some way, that human beings have some ability to control their behaviors. People have freedom to choose their own actions despite the internal and external factors that surround them. The fact that man is always aware of cause and effect is enough to draw a conclusion that he is responsible in the process of making decisions that affect his life. The aim of this paper will be to argue the case for determinism against the case of free will. This paper will support the case for free will through Chisholm philosophical views and the determinism case through Frankfurt’s philosophical views. This paper favors determinism view over free will view to explain actions of human beings.
For most people, the first response they have to determinism is that the choices that moral agents make have little difference to anything that happens to them since earlier causes have already predetermined or fixed their future. This view has the implication that moral agents have a destiny based on a fate such that, even though willing, cannot be changed. This argument would mean that man as a moral agent is without the knowledge and therefore powerless to make their own decisions in this life. In such a state they can be compared to a swimmer obliged to follow the currents that carry him along. Therefore, he is a free agent who can consent and sometimes does not agree in gliding with the waters but everything notwithstanding, he is always hurried forward in the direction of the currents. However, this is a mistake; proponents and critics of determinism agree human beings make choices. These choices and efforts may have earlier sufficient causes, but they are not impotent. Of importance, is to note is that determinism is consistent with choices, deliberations and efforts of human beings as part of the causal processes where their bodies move causing further effects to the world they live in. It is this cause that makes the difference in life. Suppose that a person chooses to raise their hands, then holding every other factor constant if that choice had not been made, the action of raising the hands would not have taken place. This argument is, therefore, inconsistent with the claim by Chisholm, who argues that in order for a moral agent to be considered as having moral freedom, then the claim that free events are caused by previous events must be denied. For Chisholm, moral agents have freedom when they can choose to perform an alternative. This is responded to by determinism by the argument that free events are not always random events that have no cause. Instead, free events in most cases must be noted to have causes that make them to be. Moral agents do not simply choose to make a decision randomly as Chisholm would want to make people agree.
Harry Frankfurt argues that a person who is incapable of doing or choosing otherwise is nevertheless morally responsible for their own actions because they are capable of causing and controlling their actions to the right and, therefore, self-determining ways. If they are right, the power inherent in that person to cause their own actions in a self-determining way entails the power of doing or choosing otherwise. This argument has the implication that the power to do or choose any other action and the power of self-determination is one and the same thing. From this conclusion, one can see that the power of a moral agent to choose their own destiny is not entirely hindered by their inability to do or choose otherwise. Even when human beings are unable to choose their own actions, they are nevertheless not excluded from the responsibility of making good choices of what they will pursue in life. This is to mean that even when the action of a person to do a certain thing in life is predetermined they have a responsibility of ensuring the outcomes of these actions are right and not wrong. In other words, what this claim means is that determinism does imply that actions of a person are entirely predictable. This would preclude the fact that human beings have some control over their own actions. Suppose a person reaches at a point on the road where it branches into two roads, the person has a responsibility of choosing the road option that they are to take. Either of the roads is a continuous road from the earlier road he was travelling in. The person has limited options to take but either way, the choice they make is under their control and direction for a substantive good. In the end, the choice the person takes must lead to their desired outcomes or destination.
The above argument, Frankfurt makes his point to argue that the difference that exists between a human person as a moral agent and other animals is the difference in the nature and structure of their will. Human beings have characteristics that other animals lack, in particular, he notes that human person has the ability to form desires for against their actions. That’s the reason why even when they have no alternatives to an action, they have the power to control and direct their own choices and preferences based on these desires. Frankfurt notes that animals have first-order desires while human persons form second-order desires in their choices. According to Chisholm, this notion of the moral agent by Frankfurt is false since to him a moral agent’s free will is only evaluated on the basis of whether the moral agent has the power to perform or not to perform an alternative (Chisholm 5). Chisholm considers a moral agent as having free will when they have the ability to choose free actions free from a predetermined list of options. The view by Chisholm would be problematic to Frankfurt’s notion of a moral agent as it would exclude them from the moral responsibility for the outcomes of their own actions. Using this view by Chisholm would mean that a madman cannot be held responsible for their actions since they have no free will due to their mental incapacity their condition and therefore is excluded from taking any moral responsibility for their actions. Frankfurt, on the other hand, considers an agent as morally responsible when they have the freedom to approach there can direct their actions in solving a moral dilemma.
The above problem created by Chisholm on the definition of a moral agent can be solved by addressing the question of whether chance and thus randomness exists in the world. Take this example, if the actions of human beings are caused only by nature, people lack control, and they are therefore free from being held responsible for them since their outcomes are only from random activities. However, randomness will only be responsible for generating alternative possibilities for actions and thoughts of a moral agent. Thus, it is not directly answerable for the direct cause of the actions of human beings. People are moral agents because they are knowledgeable and adequately determined to pursue their own destiny despite the internal and external factors that limit their abilities to make decisions that concern their life. If human beings were all limited through predetermination as proponents of determinism, suggest then all actions of moral agents would be consistent. Therefore, this would mean that no agent is to be held responsible for their action which is actually false. Human beings do not live in a uniform universe. On the other hand, moral responsibility is not always considered as punishment for a wrong action. Instead, punishment serves other purposes which are justifiable in deterring others from committing similar offences. The next problem that would arise from the view of justifying punishment is whether a particular moral agent deserved the punishment if they could have done otherwise. According to critics of determinism, if the moral agent could not have done it the alternative then they lack free and therefore they cannot take moral responsibility and thus could not take the punishment. This is solved by determinists in that a person has the power to direct their own actions to the right direction despite the fact that they are limited by the inherent circumstances they are in.
In response to proponents of free will claim that there are possible alternatives to every action of a moral agent, it must be noted that alternative possibilities are not necessarily probabilities. This is to mean that when a moral agent is punished for their actions that they are morally responsible for, it does not mean than the alternative action could have necessarily translated into an action that was desirable with outcomes that would have otherwise lead a reward and not a punishment. This claim would loosely mean that philosophers would oversimplify the assumption that there only two possibilities having equal or different probabilities of leading to agent’s actions. Alternative possibilities lead to an action that is followed by will, and the will is determined by the character and values of the agent. The relationship that moral agents have with the future is one where they expect many possibilities which justify their actions to labor in decision making. A determinism view would tend to be problematic in undermining the efforts of human beings since according to Chisholm, an agent lack moral freedom and resonance because they have no real freedom in choosing what they should perform. This position is countered by determinism view of Frankfurt, which states that moral agents care about their will (Frankfurt 830). He differentiates wantons from human beings in that he states that a wanton does not care about their own will and that his desires drives him to do things without being aware of who they are and prefers to be moved by the desires of other people.
The strengths of Frankfurt’s determinism view lie in that it explains in detail why human beings as moral agents are better than animals that lack the power to determine their destiny. His view further illustrates the will of an agent from desires and not power or freedom to choose possibilities and explains why human agents want freedom of will to satisfy their desires.
Work Cited
Chisholm, Roderick M. "Human Freedom And The Self". Freedom, Determinism and Responsibility (1966): 392-399. Document.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66.23 (1969): 829-839. Document.
