The “exclusionary rule” is one of the most important elements of United States criminal procedure law, but it is not found in the Constitution. Indeed, the exclusionary rule is a court created procedure that allows a judge to declare inadmissible any testimony or evidence presented at trial that was result of or otherwise obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights’ Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments. In other words, while the basis of the exclusionary rule is the Constitution, it is not a constitutional right. Rather the exclusionary rule was created as a means for the court to prevent law enforcement authorities from using illegal methods to violate ta person’s constitutionally protected rights, and to deter law enforcement authorities from conducting illegal acts in the hopes that they will lead to a successful prosecution of a suspect.
While the exclusionary rule has existed in some form or another since the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights, there had historically never been a formal framework for its understanding and, more importantly, is application (Smith, 2011). That changed with the 1914 case Weeks v. United States. Weeks was the first case in which the Supreme Court clearly identified the exclusionary rule and established its purpose. In agreeing that the exclusion of evidence in Weeks’ case on account of an invalid warrant the Court stated, that if the documents of a person can be taken by the state and used as evidence against him then “the protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value” and might as well “be stricken from the Constitution” (Weeks v. United States, 1914). In the decades after Weeks was decided the Court increased the breadth and power of the exclusionary, culminating in the 1961 case Mapp v. Ohio, in which the Court held that established that the exclusionary rule was fully applicable to state criminal cases. As the Court held, since the Fourth Amendment has been determined to be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, “it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the federal government (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961).
While the exclusionary rule’s original purpose and focus was to exclude any and all illegally obtained testimony and evidence, there was still the question of evidence that was not in and of itself illegally obtained. In other words, there was a question of whether evidence that was on its face legal but was obtained through the “exploitation or manipulation” of evidence that was originally obtained in violation of the Constitution. In considering this issue, the Court would eventually develop the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.
Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, any evidence that is derived from illegal obtained evidence is itself illegal and therefore is inadmissible for use at trial against the defendant. The Court’s decision in the 1963 case, Wong Sun v. United States is perhaps the best illustration of how the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine works. In Wong Sun, the state sought to introduce relevant evidence against the defendant Wong Sun that had been obtained through the illegally. Police had unlawfully searched the premises of third party defendant James Toy which lead Toy to implicate second party defendant Johnny. A police interrogation of Johnny resulted in implication of first party defendant Wong Sun, and Wong Sun’s eventually confession. In finding for Wong Sun, the Court emphasized that allow Wong Sun’s confession might have been correct, the only way that the police were able to get Wong Sun to confess was the result of the original illegal “search and seizure” of Toy. Under the exclusionary rule, if the case were against Toy, the evidence would have been inadmissible. Accordingly, if that case would have been inadmissible, any fruit or results that are due to the occurrence of that case are also inadmissible (Wong Sun v. United States, 1963). To be sure, just as a tree that is diseased produces diseased fruit so too does and illegal case produce illegal derivative cases. Consequently, the fruit of the poisonous trial doctrine, like the exclusionary rule, is a court created regulation that seeks to prevent and deter the unconstitutional actions of law enforcement authorities. To be sure, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is an extension of the exclusionary rule that targets derivatives of illegally obtained evidence.
In the case of “who did it”, witness Mary Ellis wakes up to find the body of her dead neighbor in her closet. After the discovery, she calls 911 and emergency as well as police personnel arrive. Ms. Ellis apparently allows the emergency and police enter her house to investigate the situation. Distraught by the death, Ms. Ellis is transported to the hospital for observation while the police continue their investigation. That investigation led them to find that Ms. Ellis’ son is a person of interest.
Whether the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are applicable depends on the assumption that Ms. Ellis originally allowed the police to enter her house and conduct an investigation, even though she was later not present. Both the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine only apply to the illegal conduct of law enforcement authorities in the obtaining of evidence. However, in this case it does not seem that the evidence implicating Ms. Ellis’s son William was obtained illegally.
First, Ms. Ellis contacted the police about the death. Upon their arrival the evidence suggests that she allowed them into her house and directed them to the spot of the dead body. The body was located in a room that should be considered under her authority to allow or oppose entry of the police. For instance, if the body was found in William’s room, an initially question of the police’s right to enter the room would be if he allowed or otherwise waived his right to privacy in his room. This point is moot since the body was found in an area under Ms. Ellis’ control. Second, once Ellis allowed the police to enter her home and observe the closest, and they recognized the scene as a possible crime scene, they had the probable cause to initiate a crime scene investigation of anywhere that credibly might produce evidence of the crime including William’s bedroom.
If the responding officers, however, wanted to eliminate the possibility that their search of William’s room might be deemed a Fourth Amendment violation there are a number of steps that they could have taken in order to guarantee any evidence obtained was valid. First, after obtaining Ms. Ellis’s consent to enter and investigate the closet and the body of the neighbor, they could have applied for a warrant to perform a wider search of the house including William’s room. Second, while waiting for the warrant, they could also have controlled who entered or left William’s room under the authority of securing a crime scene. Third, once obtaining he warrant they could then proceed to perform the investigation as described in the hypothetical. If the police took these steps, namely getting proper judicial authority and controlling who had access to the room, they would have been able to guarantee that the fingerprint and DNA would be admissible in court.
In the event, however, that a court found that the search was indeed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, in addition, to having the fingerprint and DNA evidence against William excluded from trial, he would also have the possible of bring a civil claim, under Section 1983 of the federal civil rights statute (Farber, 2010). In order for a civil claim under Section 1983, however, William would have to show that the police acting as an agent of the state and did not enjoy an immunity or exemption from liability.
References
Farber, B. (2010). Civil liability for exceeding the scope of a search warrant. Retrieved from http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Retrieved from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/367/643/case.html
Smith, J.M. (2011). The evolution of the exclusionary rule. Retrieved from http://www2.gcc.edu/orgs/GCLawJournal/articles/fall%202011/The%20evolution%20of%20the%20exclusionary%20rule%20-%20Jared%20Smith.pdf
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Retrieved from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/232/383/case.html
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Retrieved from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/371/471/case.html
