In the 1996 case, United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the state run Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) official and traditional policy of only allowing male students to be admitted was unconstitutional. According to the Court, as a state institution that barred woman from entering without a showing that the policy was furthered or was substantially related to an important government purpose, violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (United States v. Virginia, 1996). The Court came to this decision even though Virginia had decided to establish a female only school, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) that provided a program that “paralleled” that of VMI. The Court found that while VWIL might provide a similar program to VMI, it could not provide women with the same prestige, connections, and benefits, at this time, then VMI could offer a female student or graduate.
The Court decision in Virginia, was correct. First, the Constitution is absolutely clear that “no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Const. amend. XIX). Accordingly, any state action that treats a person or group of people differently from others would be unconstitutional (Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 2000). However, the Supreme Court, realizing that not all discriminatory actions are or have the same negative effect. According, the Court held that some discriminatory actions by the state can be allowed, if the state can provide a valid reason for discrimination (Railway Express v. New York, 1949). For example, it is reasonable to prohibit people under 21 years of age from drinking alcohol because, younger people are traditionally less mature than adults and allowing to drink will most likely lead the to act more immature, more times. Accordingly, the state has an interest in passing such discriminatory laws because it will help ensure the health and safety of the young. However, the Court has held, that discriminatory actions focused on or targeting some groups in society, are inherently questionable. That is to say, such actions have historically been shown to have negative goals and results.
In Virginia, there is no question that by denying qualified females admission to VMI, it is treating men differently from women. That is to say, at the most basic level, VMI’s actions are discriminatory and unconstitutional. However, as the Court has allowed, if VMI could provide a valid reason as to why it does not allow women, then it would or could be allowed. However, VMI failed to provide, as Justice Ginsberg wrote, “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discriminatory actions. To be sure, VMI’s main argument was that its goal of producing citizen soldiers and leaders of society through an “adversative” setting that focuses on “physical rigor, mental stress, and absolute equality of treatment” was not suitable for women students (United States v. Virginia, 2000). Moreover, the District Court added the argument that allowing women to attend would eliminate the unique male-only training environment. Both of these arguments are not substantiated by reality. First, throughout history women have shown themselves to be able to withstand physical rigor, and mental stress. To be sure, child-birth fits those standards. Moreover, while a male only military-like training environment might be unique; a co-ed military-like training environment would potentially be even more unique. In other words, since VMI’s admission policy was starting out from a position of being discriminatory, it had a substantial burden to provide a valid reason that it should nevertheless be allowed to remain. VMI, however, did not provide a good enough reason and therefore it was unconstitutional.
In addition, VMI argument that the creation of VWIL would provide female students with the same program for creating “citizen soldiers and leaders of society for women students also was unreasonable. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Brown V. Board of Education, the creation of a separate system does not guarantee that it will be equal (Brown v. Board of Education, 1952). To be sure, VWIL graduates would not have the prestige and connections, and notoriety of a VMI graduate. VMI was established in 1839 and has among its alumni government and military leaders. VWIL was hastily established in order the hopes of eliminating the original suit against VMI. With a history of just four years, its oldest alumni could hardly be considered the “movers and shakers” that would be available to a VMI graduate.
References
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1952). Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/347/483
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 US 106 (1949). Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/336/106
U.S. Const. amend XIX.
United States v. Virginia, 518 US 515 (1996). Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-1941.ZS.html
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 US 562 (2000). Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-1288.ZPC.html
