This case raised a question of coverage interpretation regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 24). The FLSA of 1938 was subsequently amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA) (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 24). The overarching purpose of the PPA was to limit the situations in which employers were required to extend coverage to certain employee activities under the FLSA (Langston, 2006, p. 545). In narrowing the extent of FLSA coverage, the PPA specifically excluded two activities that had previously been deemed compensable: 1) walking on the employers premises to and from the actual place of performance of the main activity of the employee, and 2) activities that are “preliminary or postliminary” to that main activity (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 27).
The principle issue in the case concerned the activities of employees who were required to wear protective clothing on the employer’s premises before engaging in the productive labor for which they were hired to perform (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 24). Specifically, the issue for the Supreme Court was whether employees could receive compensation under the FLSA for the time engaged in walking between the production area and the changing area (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 24). Petitioner IBP was a large producer of meat products and employed workers in the slaughterhouse and processing divisions (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 30). Pursuant to company policy, all workers were required to wear protective gear and to store such protective gear and other equipment in the company locker rooms (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 30).
The pay of the production workers was calculated based on the time spent bagging and cutting meat (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 30). The structure of the pay initiates with the first piece of meet and pay ends with the final piece of meat (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 30). As of 1998, IBP also paid the employees for four minutes worth of time to change clothes (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 31). IBP employees filed a class action suit seeking compensation for preproduction and postproduction labor, including the time that was spent putting on and taking off the protective gear and walking to and from the locker rooms and production areas before and after their given shifts (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 31).
The Supreme Court held that the PPA did not exclude from coverage the putting on and taking off the protective gear under the FLSA (Langston, 2006, p. 548). In holding that putting on and taking off protective gear was compensable, the Court looked to the language of the PPA. Importantly, the Court noted that the PPA did not exclude from coverage activities that are “integral and indispensable” to the “principal activity” of a particular job (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 40). Thus, the Court sided with the employee on this issue. The Court, however, disagreed that the time waiting in line to put on protective gear constituted a compensable activity. While the Court found that putting on protective gear is “always essential” to the job, the waiting time was not “integral and indispensable” and therefore, was not covered under the FLSA (IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, p. 40).
The Court’s holding was favorable to workers and employees. The decision is important for the business managerial setting because it places the onus on employers to remove barriers and access to protective gear. Employees are for the time it takes to don protective gear. Therefore, it the employer’s place of business makes it burdensome for employees to put on protective gear, the employer will bear this burden by having to pay its employees for this time spent not producing.
References
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2005, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
Langston, R. (2006). IBP v. Alvarez: Reconciling the flsa with the portal-to-portal act.
Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, 545-552.
