Investigating the processes of consciousness, in “The Hard Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers explains both the easy problems and the hard problems of consciousness. The author briefly explains the easy problem of consciousness, dedicating the rest of the article to the hard problem, as it is related with the field of experience that is a subjective process, hence cannot be applied generally to solving specific conscious issues (Chalmers n.p.). Various attempts to explain experience and to further describe the hard problem of consciousness are refuted, including Bernard Baar’s global workspace theory of consciousness.
Chalmers presents seven areas that are explained through the easy problems of consciousness, namely: discriminating, categorizing and reacting to external stimuli; integrating information by a cognitive system; reportability of mental states; accessing internal states; focusing on attention; exerting control and differentiating between wakefulness and sleep (225). These phenomena fall in the category of easy problems of consciousness, because they can be logically analyzed through cognitive and neurophysiological processes (Chalmers 226).
On the other hand, the issue of the hard problems of consciousness troubles the author, as they are based on personal experiences, encounters with specific situations, wherein the individual behavior cannot count as an empirical norm (Chalmers 226). The author indicates throughout the article that only by explaining the nature, structure and why and how experience occur, can there be understood the hard problems of consciousness. Towards the end of the article, after having refuted many modern and classical theories that tempted to define and structure the experience, the writer suggests that the physical process might be the sole explanation for experience. Chalmers concludes that experience is “an explanandum in its own right” (233). This implies that it is a rightful method for defining and elaborating on consciousness, although standard responses to hard problems of consciousness cannot be established.
One relevant theory aimed at explaining and interpreting the experience is the global workspace theory pertaining to Baar. According to this theory, consciousness is integrated in a global workspace, which intermediates communication between the specialized nonconscious processors that transmit any identified information to the workspace that further makes it available for the entire system (Baar in Chalmers 230). With this theory, Baar intends to explain the cognitive processes and the contrast and dynamics between conscious and unconscious. However, according to the information presented in the reading, Baar does not aim or consider positioning the global workspace theory as a complete theory of consciousness.
Chalmers analyzes Baar’s theory in relation with the conscious experience, and the former finds that the global workspace theory is a cognitive accessibility theory, not having the strength nor the specific focus to explain how the conscious experience forms and functions (230). Nevertheless, as Baar’s theory explains how unconscious data becomes conscious information, generating the process of conscious awareness, it is correlated with the conscious experience function. On the other hand, Chalmers previously explains that consciousness or awareness are aspects pertaining to internal processes and therefore are subjective in nature. Therefore, Baar’s theory of global workspace cannot be justified as a general standard for explaining conscious experience as an empirical process.
The disagreement between Baars and Chalmers is subjective, because Chalmers takes the defendable arguments of Baars’ theory, while the confronted theorist does not have the opportunity to explain and defend its claims. Chalmers is set on dismantling all theories that might explain the conscious experience and solve the issue of the hard problems consciousness and solely satisfies with his explanation that experience is self – explanatory, which might also be a subjective interpretation.
Works Cited
Chalmers, David. “The Hard Problem of Consciousness”. Course Material.
Chalmers, David. Reply 2. Course Material.
