Question:
Based on current concepts and amphibious capabilities, are we better prepared to conduct forcible entry operations than we were during the landing at Inchon, and subsequent liberation of Seoul?
Gauging our Prepared to Conduct Forcible Entry Operations
The success of the Allied forces under the leadership of Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur remains to be a moment of immense importance to the stakeholders involved in warfare. It was a testament to the success that can be obtained when troops land behind the enemy lines. During the battle at Incheon, opposition met the proposal that MacArthur provided, but it later proved to be successful (Rottman, US World War II Amphibious Tactics, pg. 19). Since that time, the concept of amphibious warfare has been highly debated. It can, however, be argued that the modern military approaches and amphibious capabilities place the military in a better position compared to that of 1950, in regards to forcible entry operations.
Despite the efficiency attached to amphibious warfare, the United States has not made use of such strategies since the success in Korea. It begs the question of why this is the case, given that the country has been involved in many wars since that period. The answer is that the country has set its eyes on other modern approaches that are deemed more efficient. The implication, therefore, is that though the country has not focused on the traditional amphibious operations, it has concentrated on other capabilities to make future forcible entry operations successful. A case in point here is the concept of "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" (OMFTS), which seems to have taken the place of traditional amphibious warfare doctrine. The OMFTS is built on the realization that improvement in the military capability of the enemy poses the threat of sea mines and shore-based missile. The idea, therefore, is to provide the troops with the ability to fight the enemy from the sea. The approach is seen to be safer since operations are run at least 20 miles offshore (U.S. Military, 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals, pg. 10)
An analysis of the OMFTS doctrine, however, poses a challenge to the amphibious warfare. For a start, the Navy still lacks regarding having guns that can work effectively when the enemy is about 20 miles away. Besides, there are the threats that come with aspects such as large unarmored LCACs used in amphibious operations and unarmed minesweepers. The implication here is that the OMFTS doctrine is not entirely supportive of amphibious warfare. Various scholars have looked into the issue and concluded that some aspects of amphibious operations such as amphibious probe or demonstration can be actualized through the OMFTS doctrine, but full-scale Amphibious Invasion is impossible. The military, through the new approaches to forcible entry operations have dealt with this problem, by coming up with new strategies in amphibious warfare discussed in this paper.
One of the ways through which modern approaches to war have improved the ability of the military to conduct amphibious operations is nullifying the threat posed by precision-guided missiles. Traditionally, these kinds of missiles have threatened various aspects of the amphibious operations, starting with the amphibious ships to the amphibious assault vehicle and even the landing force. The implication was that the amphibious ships had to be more offshore, thus reducing the efficiency of the whole operation. In the current setup, however, this threat has been nullified in particular through the incorporation of the air assault. The airborne component provides the landing forces more space to make advancements on land, thus yielding a more efficient operation. Besides, there has been a considerable development of the mechanisms of combating the missile threats. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) for example can be seen as a positive aspect that improves the outcomes of amphibious operations (O'Hanlon, The future of land warfare, pg. 102). Despite the advancements made, having the same traditional approach to amphibious operations as seen during the landing at Inchon may make the Marine Corps appear less prepared for amphibious operations. Many factors made the operation at Inchon successful. The fact is that these traditional methods applied at the time cannot be implemented in the modern day warfare. The implication, therefore, is that the preparedness of the Marine Corps can only be established by looking into the advancements that have been made. As pointed out earlier, the improvements point at improved preparation.
Some of the critics of the modern approaches to warfare quote the divergence of the forces from the traditional amphibious operations seen at Inchon. What the critics fail to consider is the environment under which the landing at Inchon was made. The ideas that Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur had were built around the fact that Inchon was an unfavorable location for landing, an aspect that caught the enemy by surprise. During that time, the dominant doctrine when it came to amphibious operations was conducting assaults on islands that were viewed as significant to the enemy, and these proved to be highly inefficient since the enemy anticipated the attacks. The idea by Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur was bold and unorthodox at the time, and it turned out to be decisive. This is the same situation today, given that many stakeholders call for the use of the traditional approaches to amphibious operations. The argument here, however, is that the modern day advances and current concepts of warfare are in line with the modern warfare. This makes the military more prepared to conduct forcible entry operations, though in a different way as that seen at the landing at Inchon.
Given the changing warfare environment, it takes shrewd operations as the ones employed in the landing at Inchon to stage successful forcible entry operations. It is an aspect that modern day strategies have taken into consideration and which point at increased preparedness. A point of reference here about the changing environment is that of the naval surface fire support (NSFS). This was an important aspect at Inchon since it contributed to the effective landing and advancements made by the Marine Corps. Currently, however, less focus has been on improving the NSFS, an aspect that critics point as resulting in the loss of the entry capability witnessed at Inchon. Despite the view that forcible entry operations have been compromised, the modern day advances in aspects such as smart weapons and drones show improvement (Howell, Marine Corps Gazette). These current capabilities have considerably increased the ability of the operations to be more accurate, varied and productive. The performance of the traditional amphibious machinery such as the NSFS cannot be ignored, but this equipment had shortfalls addressed through the modern weapons provided.
Another significant change has come in the form of ships that were used in forcible entry operations. Historical data points out that at least 260 ships were used at Inchon landing. It would be expected that the number of vessels the country had would have increased, but the modern day Navy only has about 280 ships (Howell, Marine Corps Gazette). The implication, therefore, is that a repeat of the Inchon landing would imply that the Navy would be forced to employ all of its vessels. Some may argue that this is a step back, but this would be faulty since advancements have been made to compensate for this. The examples of the ships and the NSFS show how the modern warfare has changed since the Inchon landing. An overview of the major aspects that contributed to the success of that operation indicates that they are not present in the modern day. This, however, does not mean that the Marine Corps are unprepared. It only shows that the aspects have been replaced with more efficient elements that improve the amphibious capabilities of the Marines. The argument, therefore, is that though the military has moved away from the strategies applied at Inchon, the modern day forcible entry operations have been made more efficient.
Some of the current concepts of warfare include the sea basing approach. The approach has enabled the Marines to conduct their operations through small specialized units. The approach allows for amphibious landing through specially planning the OMFTS. The sea basing approach, when compared to the traditional forcible entry methods, can yield better outcomes with fewer casualties and at a cheaper cost. Another successful concept is that of using unmanned aircraft, where the need for having small unit commanders is nullified. Here, small units can be released from the shores at multiple locations, leading to better outcomes. These approaches are just a representation of the new approaches to amphibious operations. Concentrating on the traditional capabilities that made the landing at Inchon may paint a picture of unpreparedness, but the embracing of these new methods shows a higher degree of preparedness for forcible entry operations.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the amphibious capabilities and concepts of the military corps have changed over time. In an environment that concentrates on austerity and minimizing the risk that comes with war, application of modern concepts has become necessary. The current concepts and amphibious capabilities have gone a long way in improving the preparedness of the Marine Corps when it comes to forcible entry operations.
