Historically the European Union and Russia have always been considered as strategical partners due to the geographical position and common interest in cooperation. The European Communities had started the cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1988 after the declaration their mutual desire to build relations in competitive areas and common interests. The first and the only one common Agreement on Trade, Commercial and Economic Cooperation was signed in 1989. After the USSR’s collapse, Russia was recognized a Soviet Union successor and the relations continued in a new post-cold war order. Since the early beginning the relations between Russia and the European Union were considered to be exclusively economic and did not have political intentions to turn Russia into the European Community member. The cooperation was based on the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) signed in 1994 that was focused on promoting trade and investment and harmonious economic relations, to provide a basis for economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation, to create the framework and conditions for the future integration for a free trade, companies’ establishment, cross-border trade in services and capital migration (Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation article 1). Since then, positive improvements had been achieved towards Russian participation in the European international relations, specifically, in 1996 the Russian Federation became a member of the Council of Europe, and in 1997 it joined the G7.
Later in 2003 the parties agreed to deepen the cooperation and to create four common spaces within the framework of the PCA: a common economic space; a space of security and freedom; a space of external security cooperation and a common space for science, education, research, and cultural development and exchange.
The EU-Russia cooperation had its ups and downs during the last decade. Quite soon the European partners became disappointed with extremely slow and conflicting pace of Russia’s reforms and democratic improvements. The western countries demonstrated their negative reaction to the operations in Chechnya as a “human rights abuses perpetrated by Russian forces against Chechen civilians» (The Guardian). At the same time the Russian government affirmed that Chechnya’s question was relevant to the Russian side and the West should rather prefer the non-interference. The EU avoided “sharp” policy towards the Chechnya question, but kept running discussions of the authoritarian governing way and neglected democratic principles.
The next surge of contradictions was driven by the Russia-Georgia war, that was commented as an escalation and violation, however, some European leaders admitted that the Russian military reaction was “an appropriate measure” in response to Georgia's invasion of South Ossetia (Deutsche Welle).
Russia soon felt also displeased with a discriminatory trade and economic policy of the EU towards Russian goods and the dominating share of oil and gas. Russia also frequently criticized European governments for NATO expansion eastward into its sphere of influence and building-up of NATO's infrastructure near Russian borders.
Further the idea of a new Eurasian integration process has been introduced as an attempt to create and develop an economic union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Russia succeeded in convincing Armenia and Ukraine to begin negotiations with Russia instead of the EU and it became the main reason of tensions between the EU and Russia as both intended to deepen their influence with several former Soviet republics. The EU started suspecting Moscow of trying to weaken the EU by a new process. While the Eurasian integration was supposed to have more grounds for success than the EU for former Soviet republics due to the common language environment, infrastructure and similar economic pattern.
The European Union, along with the rest of the western world, seemed to be worried of a “New Soviet Union rise” since Russia had started strengthening its ties with former Soviet republics. The most challenging was the fact that the main direction was chosen not towards close relations with the West, the EU, in particular, but towards creating a new multi-polar world order.
It is important to highlight, that economic ground was always indeed a significant factor of the EU-Russia relations. The EU is the dominating partner in Russian foreign trade (57 %), as well as the main provider of foreign investment in Russia (75 %). As for the European Union, Russia is the third key trade partner (8,4 %), the dominating provider of raw materials and energy to the EU - more than 70% of total raw materials imports are from Russia (“Trade in goods with Russia” 2). The bilateral trade with European largest economies demonstrates also impressive figures - $52.1 billion with the Netherlands, more than $46 billion with Germany and $34,3 billion with Italy, that comprised the largest trade volumes in the first half of 2014 (“The EU and Russia” 12). Thus the European Union and Russia are two interdependent partners whose international relations are strategically important and mutually beneficial for both. This deep dependency, however, became a heel of Achilles as the Ukraine conflict has seriously affected the future prospects and caused problems for both parties.
Western sanctions were supposed to weaken the Russian economy and to intensify already existing problems. The impact did not take long to wait, the Russian economy has deepened into recession with instable exchange rates, low oil prices (worsened also by the oil market trends), with the negative GDP growth, reduced reserves on gold and currency, increasingly rising inflation and depressing hopes for fast recovery. Sanctions demonstrated the ability of the European Unity to be a counterweight to Russia and to influence its health. Meanwhile, Russia’s reaction repulsed an attack proving that sanctions were strictly direct and personal and could not work the same way as the West experienced earlier. Russia’s economy is far compared to Iran’s and the same approach would be difficult to restrain its power (The Economist).
Anyway, Russia and the EU appeared to be two counterweights that are worth each other. Every party has its own influence area and do not miss a chance to use it. After sanctions were imposed, the embargo for food and agro-products became a fast response from Russia’s part. As a result, sanctions became damaging for every party and the European Union also suffered. Germany, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Norway and other countries complained, that sanctions were doing too much harm on their economies. Although feeling hurt, the The European Union still has to keep fluctuating between trade relations with Russia, keeping friendly climate with other western leaders.
Since the beginning the crises, the European Union took the Ukrainian position and did not recognize legal the “annexation of the Crimea” as well as "presidential and parliamentary elections" in Donetsk and Luhansk. The relations of the EU and the Ukraine started developing in a new direction with the EU deeply involved in the processes between the Ukraine and Russian Federation. The western side supported the Ukraine in the conflict by adopting restrictive measures and strengthening sanctions against persons, who were considered responsible for inappropriate actions against the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The investment restrictions for the Crimea and Sevastopol has been also adopted as the demonstration of disagreement with the Crimea's annexation. The EU appreciated the adoption of a Memorandum of Peace and Concord, supported the presidential elections held in Ukraine in May 2014 and parliamentary elections in October highlighting the importance of the respecting democratic direction along with fundamental freedoms within the international commitments. The Council insisted on fully implementing the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum thereby warning Russia of further deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia (“EU engagement in Ukraine”).
While punishing Russia and gaining the Ukraine offered more strategic benefits, the European Union did not pay much attention if not to say neglected the Western Balkans. The region did not support western sanctions, meanwhile Russia managed to maintain its influence in Montenegro (mostly due to the energy sector and investments), signed a military cooperation agreement with Serbia, proving thus its interest in the Western Balkans. As a result, the momentum of European influence in the Western Balkans not only has been lost, but also a negative direction has been set. “The power vacuum gradually filled, in different ways, by Russia, Turkey, the Gulf countries or even China” (Lasheras, Tcherneva). The European Union was extremely enthusiastic about its enlargement within the Western Balkans, however, later they realized, that countries are unable to achieve the requirements compared to Finland’s, for example. To become a part of the European Union, they need a closer emphasis on regional cooperation, socio-economics and governance based on sustained implementation of reforms, that can not be achieved in an autopilot regime chosen by the European Union while occupying the Ukraine.
EU-Russia relations are witnessing challenging times. The partnership has been seriously undermined both at the expense of economic interests of both sides for the sake of geopolitical intrigues. As a result, the damaging effect overcame the expected political gains. While the EU tried to restrain the Russia’s influence, the Russian government remained obstinate and started to find new partners, expanding the interest towards the East. The Ukraine still remains in the European area of influence, while the Balkans need more attention. Economy measures for the sake of political gains appeared to be more controversial than they were expected.
Works Cited
Agreement on partnership and cooperation. The European Community. 1997. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114138.pdf >.
American, European and Russian sanctions. The Economist. March 2014. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-21 >.
EU engagement in Ukraine since the Maidan protests. European Union External Action. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/about/maidan_protests_en.htm>.
European Union Trade in goods with Russia. The European Commission. 20 October 2015. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf >.
German Diplomat: Russian Response to Georgia Appropriate. Deutsche Welle. 24 August 2008. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://www.dw.com/en/german-diplomat-russian-response-to-georgia-appropriate/a-3590155 >.
Lasheras F., Tcherneva V. Is the EU losing the Western Balkans? What local experts think. European Council on Foreign relations. 5 August 2015. Web. 15 March 2016. <http://www.ecfr.eu/article/is_the_eu_losing_the_western_balkans_what_local_experts_think3093 >.
The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine. House of Lords. European Union Committee. 20 February 2015. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf >.
The EU's Chechnya challenge. The Guardian. 7 November 2003. Web. 15 March 2016 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/07/worlddispatch.russia>.
