Two offensive operations undertaken by Germany in Ardennes at the beginning and at the end of the WWII in Europe were conceived and executed under very different conditions and resulted in a totally opposite outcome. The 1940 campaign against the allies was an undisputed triumph of the German Blitzkrieg concept. The 1945 offensive was a desperate and illogical move of a leader that had lost touch with reality. The outcome of both actions was pre-determined by the preceding political, military and economic events. The leadership on both sides played an important role as well. Overall, it is safe to say that both offensive operations produced results that followed the logic of the historical tide of events.
The outcome of the 1940 campaign in Europe and its unprecedented success was based on the events that took place between the two wars. Germany, after the Nazi party came to power, mobilized practically all the available resources to build a modern, well-trained and well-equipped armed forces, offensive in its design. At first, the process was conducted under the cover of secrecy. Later, as the Germans built enough military strength, the conditions of the treaty of Versailles were ignored openly.
German military leadership understood the importance of air superiority in the coming conflicts. Based on this notion, they paid special attention to building Luftwaffe – German air force. Goering, one of the top Nazi leaders, directly supported this process. German Luftwaffe generals were competent and progressively minded. The result of their work was the most powerful air force in Europe. The Germans concentrated their efforts on several types of aircraft for each arm of the Luftwaffe. They possessed the best fighter in Bf 109, the best ground attack airplane in Ju 87 Stuka bomber and a modern mid-range bomber in He-111. Besides the quality of the aircraft, the Luftwaffe were superior to any other force in its mobility and the quality of the aircraft ground service. According to John Keegan “ in 1940 the Luftwaffe was burdened with none of the obsolescent or obsolete types which equipped the French and British squadrons. Moreover, its senior officers included a number of first-rate men (Keegan, 2005, p. 59)
Germany was also the leader in the armor units’ tactics. German generals understood the advantages of highly mobile independent tank formations that were the key to the Blitzkrieg strategy. Even though German tanks were not as advanced as the aircraft, their main advantage was the concentration of armor in Panzer divisions, an organizational move that proved critical in the following campaign. “The [German] Mark III was inferior in protection both to the British Infantry Tank Mark I and the French Somua” (Keegan, 2005, p. 60). “However, the German tanks were integrated into ‘all-tank’ formations which were trained to maximize the tank’s characteristics: speed maneuverability and independence of actions” (Keegan, 2005, p.60).
German military leadership was a mixture of old Prussian-school generals like von Kleist and young ambitious leaders like Guderian and Manstein. Guderian was a leading theoretician in the armored warfare tactics.
On the opposite side, France has fully embraced the strategy of defensive action. Enormous resources were spent on the famous Maginot line. The fortification line was a symbol of the French vision of the future military conflict in Europe. By accepting absolutely defense-oriented strategy they have denied themselves of any initiative or mobility. “The French army scarcely differed in character from that of 1914” (Keegan, 2005, p.60).
French air force was a collection of a large number of aircraft types, some imported from abroad. Many aircraft were obsolete. The air force units were assigned to a specific location and were devoid of any mobility. The loss of an air base automatically meant that the unit became inoperable.
British air force, deployed in Europe was more advanced than the French, but still lacked the refinement, modern tactics and experience its German opponents had obtained after participation in the Spanish civil war.
French armor units, equal or even superior to German in quality and numbers, were dispersed among infantry units and therefore lacked the speed and mobility of the German Panzer division. French tanks, like Char BI bits that were used in counter attacks against the German advance, terrified the Germans at first, until they discovered a weakness in its design and fully exploited it (Sebag-Montefiore, 2006).
French leadership, like General Gamelin, was no match for the German opponents. Gemelin, who was 68 in 1940, firmly believed in 1918 tactics. He completely lost touch with the troops he commanded (Shepperd, 1990). British Expeditionary Forces (BEF), reported to French military command, but were mostly concerned with the orders from their own government in London.
The Germans possessed the advantage of the initial surprise, the secret concentration of power at the point of attack and almost total air superiority. They have also exploited the natural weakness in the allies defenses by attacking through Belgium and Holland, both “soft spots” in the Western defense line. The French troops were easily demoralized by the surprise attack and the whole army practically disintegrated in a matter of weeks. The British had a narrow escape through Dunkirk, but had to abandon all heavy equipment in the process.
The situation was entirely different in 1945 when Germans have launched their last offensive action of the war. Surprisingly, the allied forces, represented by American and British armies this time, paid little attention to the same sector of the frontline in Ardennes that was so masterfully used by the Germans four years earlier. However, the surprise was the only similarity of the two offensive operations.
After four years of fighting, the German army was far from its 1940 state. Committed by Hitler to fight on two fronts, it had suffered irreplaceable losses. The Blitzkrieg tactics were no longer possible in the protracted war. Even though still a formidable fighting machine, the German army has lost most of its experienced personnel, most of the units were seriously understaffed and underequipped. Hitler, who entrusted the command of the operation to his generals in 1940, was taking all critical decisions himself in 1945. He refused to accept the fact that the real strength of the units he was about to throw into action was far inferior to the “paper” strength (Hastings, 2004). According to Keegan: “even such first-line formations as the 2nd and the 116th Panzer, for example, deployed only a hundred tanks each” (Keegan, 2005, p. 442).
Luftwaffe was not the same in 1945 as it was in 1940 either. Weakened by the mounting losses of the experienced pilots, critical drop in quality of replacements due to fuel shortages and overwhelming allied numerical superiority made it impossible to maintain the command of the skies over the battlefield. As a result, the advancing German units were denied close air support that proved to be critical in its 1940 success. Furthermore, the 1945 Ardennes offensive, code-named “Autumn Mist” was planned with respect to autumn and winter weather in mind, to minimize the impact of the Allied air power. Luftwaffe was also irreparably weakened by an ill-planned and executed operation Bodenplatte, an attack on allied airfields. The attack resulted in German numerous losses of irreplaceable pilots, while allied aircraft destroyed on the ground were easily replaced.
The spearhead of the attack – German Panzer units possessed the most advanced and technically superior tanks. German Mark IV Tiger and Mark V Panther outclassed American main tank – Sherman in every category (Arnold, 1990). Unfortunately for the Germans, the fuel shortages have seriously depleted their ability to deploy armor units. Each German tank carried only about 150 gallons of fuel that was enough for three days of combat (Hastings, 2004). The Germans planned to capture large allied fuel storage facilities in Belgium in the course of the offensive, but this plan has failed due to “the appearance of the US 7th Armored Division’s spearheads” (Keegan, 2005, p. 445).
Allied military leadership in 1945 was of a totally different quality as well. Field Marshal Montgomery was a charismatic leader with a proven track record of success against Germans in Northern Africa. American military commander General Eisenhower was also a modern-type leader, compared to French generals of the 1940 campaign. The allied leaders came to the Ardennes offensive with the 1944 success in Normandy under their belt. They have already defeated Germans on the battlefield. They would not break down in tears under German pressure like General Gamelin.
The German attack under the operation Autumn Mist enjoyed initial success due to the allied oversight of the weakness in that particular sector of the front. The oversight happened because allied military leaders though in logical terms. They were occupied by the offensive actions in the other sectors. Hitler’s plan was labeled as “fantasy” even by his own generals and had caught the allies by surprise.
However, the initial German success was short-lived. On the third day of action, the skies cleared and allied aircraft came to action. Timely moves of the allied generals in counter-attacking have forced the Germans to slow down and forced them to retreat. It took the allies a month to restore the front line to its original situation as of December 16, 1944 when the offensive began.
The results of the Autumn Mist have been negative for the Germans. They have depleted their last reserves of personnel, fuel, tanks and aircraft. According to John Keegan, Germany lost “100 000 men killed, wounded or captured in the Ardennes, 800 tanks and 1 000 aircraft” (Keegan, 2005, p. 447). The units lost in Ardennes were badly needed in the East, where the Soviet offensive was gaining momentum. The Blitzkrieg tactics have failed in 1945 because the factors that were in favor of Germans in 1940 were not present in 1945.
References
Arnold, James R. (1990). Ardennes 1944. Hitler’s Last Gamble in the West. Osprey Publishing
Hastings, Max (2004). Armageddon. The Battle for Germany 1944-45. Pan Books
Keegan, John. (2005). The Second World War. Penguin Books.
Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. (2006) Dunkirk. Fight for the Last Man. Penguin Books.
Shepperd, Allan (1990). France 1940. Blitzkrieg in the West. Osprey Publishing
