А summаry аnd аnаlysіs of а nеw US strаtеgy аs а rеsponsе to thе crіsіs іn thе Mіddlе Еаst
The United States’ strategy in the Middle East area shall remain among the vital interest spheres for Washington policy-makers for several reasons, although, as you know, the national interests of our country are far from its own geographical boundaries. Among these reasons are; enormous oil resources in the Middle East, making up about 40% of their total worldwide output in this region strategically important areas. The results of the implementation of this new strategy, including direct U
S military presence in order to protect national interests, deserve special attention because they can create the conditions for changing US position in the region and even total strength. (Bunn and and Holdren p.480). The reasons why this strategy is necessary are the following.
Rapidly growing aversion to America by the peoples of the Middle East countries, especially those where the USA deployed military units. The problem is that in most of these countries have undemocratic regimes, alien to autocratic values.
The US government spends $ billions annually for the military needs, but it is not able to explain to their citizens, especially the middle classes, for what purpose it is done.
The main reason for the change of American strategy is that there are several dangerous extremist groups in the region, such as those that now exist in Afghanistan (the Taliban and "Al Qaeda") and in Iraq (ISIS), as well as their influence on other countries under the the slogan of the struggle with America.
The change of strategy may increase the number of soldiers, who, after returning from the war in one of the Middle Eastern countries begin to suffer from all sorts of mental and psychological disorders are not treatable.
Because of all these reasons, it seems reasonable to assume that the United States shall adopt another strategy. In addition, taking into account the fact that it is essential to maintain liberal image for this country, the preservation of the old policy inflicts a decisive defeat, so the change of US strategy is under a good reason.
Given all these conditions, it must be said that the change of this strategy should be implemented in such a way as to preserve the course to protect their own interests for the United States required a much lower costs. It is necessary to formulate priorities as follows: 'indirect presence and the establishment of the balance of power. "These two principles should form the basis of the new US strategy in the region. The new strategy is much more difficult than the one that was used during the Cold War, because America at the same time is forced to think about the balance of forces, and the security of its own interests, but can not afford a direct military presence (“Arab Spring’ Or ‘Arab Winter’?).
On the one hand, this new strategy is aimed at strengthening of forces that support America in the Middle East region. It is clear that they will automatically be able to carry out military operations, taking into account American interests. Among these countries are Israel and Saudi Arabia. Of course, the United States will not be able to strengthen their regional players, if completely excluded from participation in all political processes. In an extremely critical situation, when these countries will not be able to implement their tasks, the United States will once again return to the previous strategy and will be directly involved in the events of the region. However, until that happens, the country under the guide of Americans are obliged to make every effort to achieve their tasks. On the other hand, it is necessary to maintain the balance of power in the region in such a way that there is a valid system has a maximum capacity to fully meet the interests of the USA. This means that while the regional countries, except Israel, are in the internal ideological and political struggle to destroy the national potential of each other, depriving themselves of the opportunity to become a regional power in the future, they will always remain dependent on the United States in terms of their own security. Of course, if possible, they will try to destroy the Shia ideology. In my opinion, the Lausanne agreement between Iran and the international mediators is just a demonstration of this strategy, since the US intends on the basis of this document, to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war with a country with which relations remained hostile throughout the past 35 years, and to create a balance of power in the region ("Expert Warns Of America's Coming 'Arab Winter'").
Other manifestations of this US strategy can be regarded as their secret agreement with the Taliban and Iraqi Shia government. Of course, there are serious doubts about the fact that America, at least outwardly, make any changes, for example, in terms of presence and plying their warships. Traditional US allies will certainly continue to instill the idea that still supports them, but in practice will directly intervene in the situation only in conditions of acute crisis. Iran has active support of the Muslim community of the regional countries and even America is aware that its influence in the Middle East is growing every day. Moreover, nothing else it is not easy ("Cornel West On Occupy Wall Street: It's The Makings Of A U.S. Autumn Responding To The Arab Spring").
Works cited
Bunn and, Matthew, and John P. Holdren. "MANAGING MILITARY URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION". Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 22.1 (1997): 403-486. Web.
CBN.com (beta),. "Expert Warns Of America's Coming 'Arab Winter'". N.p., 2016. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.
Communications, NYU. "NYU To Host “‘Arab Spring’ Or ‘Arab Winter’?—An Update On The Arab Revolutions”—Nov. 16". Nyu.edu. N.p., 2011. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.
Democracy Now!,. "Cornel West On Occupy Wall Street: It's The Makings Of A U.S. Autumn Responding To The Arab Spring". N.p., 2011. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.
Gourevitch, Philip. "The Arab Winter - The New Yorker". The New Yorker. N.p., 2011. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.
