The study of various aspects of the history of contacts between the East and the West in the political, economic and cultural fields contributes to both the development of science and the improvement of mutual understanding and beneficial cooperation between the two civilizations. Implicitly such issues carry immense political relevance. Nowadays, when the questions of self-determination of nations with looming prospects of gaining sovereignty by a large section of public entities, when political leaders often refuse to compromise, it seems timely to apply the lessons of the past. In other words, it is very important to identify what price will almost always be paid for these events. For example, let us consider India and answer the question whether there was an alternative solution to the historical events of the mid-20th century.
In August 2007, India celebrated the 60th anniversary of its independence. More than half a century ago the two hundred years of British rule ended. It is impossible to overstate the importance of this historic event that opened the prospect of free development of India, the restoration of sovereign rights of its people to self-determination and an independent choice of domestic and foreign policy. However, with independence ended the unity of India - in 1947 it was divided by the Labour government of Clement Attlee (1883-1967) using the factor of religious beliefs into two Dominions - Indian Union and Pakistan, thereby serving as a classic example of contact between the civilizations of East and West. Reasons for separation ripened for a long time when the country was still under colonial rule. Under the influence of the gradual democratization of society appeared the processes of formation and identity of many ethnic groups and religions. Their unity, once established by force of the British imperialism, felt by all of them as a common enemy, could end. Finally, the partition facilitated the fact that the Indian Union accelerated interethnic integration that anticipated the formation of a centralized federation, with a stable democratic regime.
Could it be otherwise? Was it possible under those circumstances to achieve independence in some other form? Was there an alternative to the partition of India? The search for a scientifically based answer to this question, is the aim of this study. In this paper, we do not claim to be exhaustive of our findings, but more so forward the problem, outline points of focus, start the discussion about present ready-made formulas. Based on the study of sources and scientific literature in this paper, we aim - to formulate an alternative to the problem of the partition of British India and to identify possible approaches to its resolution.
According to Stephen Cohen (2013), with the outbreak of the Second World War, the liberation movement of the Indian people has entered a decisive phase. The objectives of the country's leading political organizations in the struggle against British rule, and in the constitutional reorganization were not the same. The most authoritative and numerous secular organization the Indian National Congress (INC) advocated for a single independent India. The Muslim League, grew along confessional lines, and since 1940 has headed a part of the country wishing to achieve the creation of a single Islamic state.
Yasmin Khan (2007) does not agree with Cohen (2013), claiming that the real confrontation has started much earlier, and the Second World War was not decisive. Instead, she points out that at first the Congress did not think too much of the formed in 1906 Muslim League. Even the Lahore Resolution in 1940 aimed at creation of a pure Islamic state, the country of Pak, was subjected to criticism by the Congress, and no more (Khan 2007). Jinnah also promoted the idea of "two nations", the "two Indias", claimed that there were the Muslim and the Hindu, as based on different religions, philosophies, different ways of life, and because the supporters of Islam should have their own state.
Ian Talbot (2013) focuses on the “British aspect” of the partition of India. Going as far back as 1942, he remembers that after the seizure by Japan of almost all British possessions in the Pacific and South-East Asia the conservative Winston Churchill (1874-1965), head of the War Cabinet, in spite of his contempt for the compromises with the colonies, was forced to send a mission to India. The Speaker of the House of Commons Stafford Cripps (1889-1952) travelled there with proposals for constitutional reorganization. India was promised dominion status after the war, the provinces retained the right to self-determination. Therefore, he offers a new viewpoint that Britain was simply not able to maintain India, and thus was searching of a way to shift some of the responsibilities onto the locals (Talbot 2013).
Congress initially rejected Cripps proposal, nevertheless continued to participate in the Delhi talks. Nehru admitted in April 1942 "there are excellent chances to reach an agreement - about 75%," (Talbot 2013). However, Hajari (2015) is of another opinion. He claims that the negotiations on such a global issue failed due to the proverbial die-hard British Conservatives position of Churchill himself, who did not wish, in particular, to take into account the counter-proposals of the Congress on the admission of Indians to control the military department and the organization of the defense of India from the Japanese invasion, which threatened India (Hajari 2015). In our view, both parties here had missed a real opportunity to agree on the future transfer of power to a single India. All they had to do is to settle inter-community and inter-party disagreements. The failure of the negotiations sharply exacerbated the situation, the prospect of a mutually acceptable agreement between the metropolis and the "jewel in the crown of the British Empire" has been lost for a long time. In any case, as proven by Oldenburg (2010) this was one of the few chances India had at remaining a single and united country.
More so, Oldenburg (2010) claims that the Indians began to get rather restless and in the summer of 1942 at the initiative of Gandhi, Congress set a course for achieving immediate independence. On August 8 at the Bombay session of the All India Congress the Committee approved the resolution "Leave India", under which the British administration and the troops should have voluntarily and without delay left India," Oldenburg (2010). This act is deemed by Cohen (2013) as a rather foolish thing to do as the colonial authorities declared Congress outlawed with the party headquarters at Allahabad sealed. Yasmin (2007) is of the same opinion as the leaders of the Congress of the central, provincial and even district committees were arrested. Talbot (2013) makes an attempt to prove that it was still worthwhile, claiming that right after this the country has launched a large-scale anti-British movement under the slogan "Leave India". But Hajari (2015) counters with a fact that the British forces withdrew 57 battalions from the front and by the end of September 1942 the rebellion was suppressed.
This movement, called by historians "August Revolution", 1942, no doubt, was the brightest page in the history of the liberation struggle of the Indian people against British colonizers (Talbot). Here several scholars (Hajari, Khan, Oldenburg) agree that this rebellion significantly reduced, if not negated, the possibility in the future to preserve the unity of India. After the arrest of the leaders of the Congress, its place in the political arena of India appeared vacant (Cohen). The League could not even think of such a possibility of eliminating its main opponent, without much effort, and for such a long time. Cohen in detail describes the events as Jinnah, used up the vacuum that appeared. Over the period from August 1942 to the liberation of the Congress party in 1945, the Muslim League strengthened its influence, and was able to form a ministry in Punjab, Sindh and North West Frontier Province, as well as improve its structure and promotion system. As a result 2 more million people joined (Khan).
After the defeat of the Hitler coalition in England to power came the Labour government headed by Clement Attlee, in the wake of the general rise of the liberation movement in the East, the ruling circles of the metropolis have come to realize that to keep the Overseas Territories, especially India, is no longer possible within the empire. In May 1946, Attlee declared the intention of the British Government to implement the transfer of power in India (Talbot).
Attlee’s plan incorporated the main provisions of the draft declaration in 1942 and involved the conversion of Indian provinces to a Federation, which had the right to secede from its membership (Talbot). In 1946, these provisions have, according to Oldenburg, created a much more real possibility of non-entry or exit of the north-western and north-eastern provinces of British India, predominantly populated by Muslims from the Federation with a view to the future foundation of Pakistan, but still these were not identical to compulsory section of the country. Hajari claims that this was not the right thing to do as the League immediately adopted this plan and Congressional leaders, for about a year or so, rejected it after some hesitation. An agreement has again not been reached. Many believed that all is not lost, but the future has shown that the time factor played a major role in solving the problem of creating an alternative to the partition of India. According to Oldenburg, the Attlee government was to function as the Executive Council of the Viceroy (1943-1947), and be accountable to the British Parliament. The coalition in nature represented all the political parties of the country.
However, already in 1947, according to Khan it became evident that the British rule in India is coming to an end, and can be completed in an atmosphere of social upheaval. This is something that all scholars agree on. India's independence was especially needed by the British, and, in principle, regardless of the fact whether this ancient oriental country's integrity be dismembered or will remain (Talbot, Cohen, Oldenburg). The situation required new approaches to its resolution. February 20, 1947 in the House of Commons Attlee made a statement "about the final withdrawal of the British from India, no later than July 1948," adding that if the central government would be created by that time the power will be transferred to them (Khan).
Appointment of the exact timing of the transfer of power "has given rise to" the so-called problem of time limit (the time limit, time pressure), which caused especially active discussion of the conservative opposition in parliament. Winston Churchill said bluntly that the Labour government "destroys the ability to achieve the consent of Indian political parties, while the Conservatives have made this all possible," (Cohen). And according to Cohen he was right. In March 1947, the new Viceroy Mountbatten was sent to Delhi (1900-1979), who was to hold talks with Indian leaders and develop a plan for the transfer of power (Cohen).
The Congress welcomed the decision to hand over power to the Indians no later than July 1948, which specifically made it clear that "the constitution, which will develop the Constituent Assembly, extends only to those areas that will approve of it" (Khan). Khan points to the fact that there was no word "Partition" in this document, however Hajari makes an important observation that this was the first time Congress formally and actually gave its consent to the fact that the British called the right to self-determination of the individual components of British India. In 1947, unlike in 1942 and even in 1946, it was not a purely hypothetical assumption, but a welcome for the Muslim League, to start preparing the proper procedures for the dismemberment of the country. Whereas Forwarding the text of the resolution to Mountbatten, Nehru explained that the intention is still to persuade the League to join the Congress in the Constituent Assembly, but if this is not possible, " the partition of Bengal and Punjab is imminent" (Hajari).
Khan of course provides some information on the position of Gandhi claiming he had a plan. At the end of March - beginning of April 1947 in the framework of the negotiation process with Indian leaders, Mountbatten had five meetings with Gandhi during which Mahatma suggested the Viceroy an original plan for the transfer of power (Khan). This plan seems to us an alternative solution, demonstrating the greatness of spirit and dedication of the leader of the Indian people. Mahatma said that he hoped that "Mr. Jinnah should be given the possibility to form a government If Jinnah accept the proposal, Congress ensures voluntary and sincere cooperation as long as all measures taken by the Cabinet Jinnah will benefit all the people of India .This information is also found I the piece written by Hajari, who is of the same opinion as the viceroy was. It was pure insanity to bet one’s all on the person who wanted more than anything to tear India apart. The arbiter as to whether responsible or not Mr. Jinnah India's interests as a whole, would have been Lord Mountbatten. Jinnah, on behalf of the League must ensure that he or the League will do everything to save the world India, under specified conditions, Mr. Jinnah would be free to submit a plan for the approval of Pakistan, without waiting for the transfer of power but without the use of arms and coercion any province or part thereof. If Mr. Jinnah rejected the proposal, the right to form such a government mutatis goes to Congress," (Khan).
So, in the circumstances of the crisis in 1947, when objective reasons for the partition of India even the Congress considered as inevitable, in force entered judgment (Talbot). A virtually painless way out of the situation since the war of the political crisis has been found. Gandhi knew Jinn well enough to be aware of: such a proposal is able to find a powerful echo in his mind (Oldenburg).
After much deliberation, the negotiations with Jinnah Mountbatten yet informed him of the opportunity to become the Prime Minister of the Central Government of India united (Khan). According to the memoirs of the Viceroy, "during 35 minutes Jinn did not respond to my statement, suddenly returned to the issue of the prime minister of India. Undoubtedly, a proposal flattered his ambition, and all of these half hour Jinnah frantically pondered it." How did Mountbatten estimate the chances of success of Gandhi's proposal? Did Gandhi really intend to give him a stroke? Watching Gina in the course of their official meetings, the viceroy came to the conclusion that "the infamous plan, Mr. Gandhi may still pass solely because of the vanity of Mr. Jinnah." However, he believed that the Muslim League leader - the person "mentally balanced" without having any sense of responsibility or talents in the field of practical politics, and, moreover, "have not thought of any details of his grand scheme." Viceroy has decided not to play up the issue more, refusing to follow the logic of the theoretical constructs Gandhi, and perhaps thereby dispelled the last hope of saving the unified India.
Conclusion:
Partition of India was the natural result of economic, political, ethnic and religious processes in the country since the mid of the 19th century and before the Second World War, but in spite of the established causes and background section, the further course of the history of the Anglo-Indian relations and inter-Indian was not invariant. A more favorable combination of objective and subjective factors of the partition of India on religious lines could have been avoided.
In our opinion, the possibility of alternative development paths were opened under the following conditions:
a) if the transfer of power was not only initiated by the British government, but also more flexible methods carried out before the war or at its first stage;
b) if the Indian National Congress was not outlawed, and remained at liberty throughout the war, countering the propaganda in favor of the Muslim League;
c) at display of a greater willingness of leaders of the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress for dialogue and compromise;
d) if the method proposed by Gandhi was not so easily discarded by Mountbatten;
e) in the absence of tight deadlines and the transfer of power in this regard appeared the problem of time limit, which contributed to "a hasty escape" of the British from India, but having prevented the development of theoretical and experimental, sound, detailed verified, mutually acceptable new conditions of coexistence of Indian ethnic groups and communities.
This topic has still room for studying as it is still unclear what would have happened, had the British remained. Would there have been another social outbreak? Would their presence have consolidated the whole society and they would have started up their struggle for independence as a united front? These theories are worthy of attention and need to be studied further.
Works Cited
Cohen, Stephen P. Shooting for a century the India-Pakistan conundrum. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2013. Print.
Hajari, Nisid. Midnight's furies: the deadly legacy of India's partition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. Print.
Khan, Yasmin. The great Partition: the making of India and Pakistan. New Haven Conn. London: Yale University Press, 2007. Print.
Oldenburg, Philip. India, Pakistan, and democrac : solving the puzzle of divergent paths. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon England New York: Routledge, 2010. Print.
Talbot, Ian. The independence of India and Pakistan: new approaches and reflections. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013. Print.
