Europe's Last Summer by David Fromkin considers the origins of World War from the perspective of the alliances Germany had formed prior to the war and how those alliances affected its entry into the war. It also examines how relatively small events (such as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand) can spiral out of control and lead to a world war. In particular, Fromkin looks in detail at the European crisis that occurred in mid-1914 and pieces together his argument that it was Germany’s alliances and how poorly it handled its diplomatic relations which resulted in the terrible calamity know as World War I.
According to Fromkin, the best way to understand the outbreak of the war in 1914 is to divide it into two entirely separate wars with differing objectives. One of these wars was (he suggests) the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, while the other was the one between Germany and Russia. Austria-Hungary’s goal was to enhance its power throughout the Balkans by defeating Serbia. This would have the additional benefit of discouraging any of the Empire’s southern possessions from seeking independence (Fromkin 277). In fact, Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination gave the Austrians an excuse to go to war with Serbia. It is generally acknowledged that the ultimatum they offered to Serbia was not a genuine effort to arrive at a peaceful solution to the crisis. Naturally, there was also a chance that Russia would choose to defend Serbia, but after Austria received assurances from Germany that they would support Austria regardless of the action they chose take, the Austrians decided to move against Serbia (Fromkin 161). The only reason Germany can such a guarantee was that they believe that Russia would not intervene if they knew Germany was supporting Austria.
As the author makes clear, if the European situation had been different than it was, Austria’s move against Serbia what meant nothing more than another small war in the Balkans. Unfortunately, along with the interwoven alliances that existed (including those in Germany) there were also a number of important people within Germany who actually desired war with Russia. Such individuals (including Moltke) saw Russia’s greater size and population as a long-term threat to Germany’s position in Europe as a military power (Fromkin 87). Certainly, Russia’s military and its industries have made a good deal of progress in the decade following its defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905. For this reason, they believe that Germany should Russia before it became too powerful (Fromkin 260).
Another reason why Germany may have felt that there was no reason for them to wait to begin a large-scale European war was that other nations around Europe were also rearming. While Germany would be able to significantly increase the size of the military beyond what it possessed by 1914, this is not the case for some other nations. Thus, these leaders felt that it was not to Germany’s advantage to wait (Fromkin 93). As the author points out, the concerns that other European powers might outstrip Germany militarily was somewhat overblown. But for leaders like Moltke, it seemed better to start a war sooner rather than later (Fromkin 268).
The other aspects relating to the outbreak of World War I are less convoluted. Because more than France was less well defended, this was the route that Germany hoped to use to quickly seize Paris and the French army (Fromkin 34). In the process of carrying out this time, German forces crossed neutral Belgian territory (with one of the things that convince the British to enter the war). The Germans had mistakenly believed that the British would not enter the war for the second tiny Belgium.
As the author notes, in early 1914 the international climate did not seem likely to produce a major war (Fromkin 12). Despite this, the general mood among the public in the months and years immediately prior to WWI favored war. As the Fromkin puts it, the failures of movements and revolutions in Europe “had left Europe frustrated, and in a mood—following Nietzsche—to smash things” (Fromkin 39). In fact, to many wars were seen as good and glorious things in and of themselves. This romantic view of war would change in the nightmarish trenches and battlefields created by both sides during the war. Thus, Fromkin makes it clear that the outbreak of war was hardly the surprise many later historians believed it to be. In fact, Germany would hardly have been surprised, since it was (through its plans and alliances) the instigator of war (Fromkin 337).
Interestingly, Fromkin notes that (while Germany had an expansionist policy) it made a very deliberate decision not to expand its army. The reason for this was that the expansion of the Army would necessitate an expansion of its officer corps. In turn, this would dilute the Prussian influence on said officer corps, which is something they did not want. However, Germany’s Navy did significantly expand, to the consternation of Great Britain (Fromkin 60). When combined with the fact that Germany’s alliance with Russia had not been maintained, these actions by the Germans help to create exactly the type of encirclement that they most feared (Fromkin 61).
Worse for the Germans, they had significantly underfunded their army. This is surprising given the strength of their economy. Another internal problem that Germany faced was that Kaiser Wilhelm was not particularly popular in military circles. All too often (in their view) he chose peace when war would have been preferable. He had slowly lost control of the Army to the Junkers. In point of fact, many other monarchies throughout Europe had become less relevant and influential in the management of their respective states.
The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was hardly an unusual event during this period. Various movements throughout Europe, and in particular anarchists, had been assassinating monarchs or other heads of state on an almost yearly basis since the mid-1890s (Fromkin 121). At the same time, the Archduke was such a minor figure in the scheme of things that on the surface his assassination seemed relatively unimportant. He had been disliked by Hungarians in general and by Franz Joseph in particular. It did provide a convenient excuse for Austria to attack Serbia (particularly now that they knew they had German support). In part, this German support resulted from the fact that the only person who seemed really miss Ferdinand was Wilhelm, who actually had a close friendship with the Archduke (Fromkin 139). Otherwise, it seems unlikely they would have provided the Austrians with the “blank check” to carry out war. As Fromkin puts it, “Wilhelm and Franz Ferdinand were the two most obnoxious public figures in Europe, but they were the ones who kept hotheads in check and, in the end, always opted for peace” (Fromkin 264).
While the Germans and the Austrians had carefully laid out plans for quickly concluding this war in Serbia so that other nations intervene, things did not go to plan. Although the Austrian and German leaders managed to allay any suspicions by carrying out their activities is normal, Austria-Hungary was slow to move their forces, which meant that they were unable to present the fait accompli of an already conquered Serbia (Fromkin 168). It is perhaps surprising that the Germans themselves were surprised by this result, since Moltke himself had written, “no plan survives contact with the enemy” (Moltke 92).
In many respects, the Germans handled this situation in the most amateurish way possible. The following points by various authors, including Fromkin, make this quite clear:
Point 1: In the middle of the crisis, Germany informed France that they would not attack France in France remained neutral during any war between Germany and Russia. As a reassurance of such neutrality, Germany insisted that France allow German troops to fight the most significant fortifications France had along the German border. In short, Germany was essentially asking that the French surrendered to Germany without even putting up a fight. It’s hardly surprising that this suggestion was completely rejected by the French (Massie 891).
Point 2: Another bizarre proposal made by the Germans involved Great Britain. In this scheme, in exchange for a guarantee of neutrality by Britain, Germany would guarantee to respect on neutrality and would only seize the French colonies, rather than France itself (Fromkin 228).
Point 3: And even more bizarre plan by the Germans involved the United States and Mexico. In this plan, the Germans attempted to convince the Mexicans to launch a military attack on the United States. The Germans guaranteed that the Mexicans would be able to keep New Mexico, Arizona and Texas (although how Germany would’ve guaranteed such a result is not made clear in their proposal). The students in the of this plan was made clear by the fact that when the “Zimmerman telegram” regarding the plan became public, it was one of the deciding factors in convincing the United States to go to war against Germany.
As these examples make clear, the German government (including not only its aristocrats and bureaucrats, but its military officers) suffered from a remarkable inability to see the world through the eyes of other leaders. They were unable to appreciate how other nations would feel and react to Germany’s aggressive statements and actions. To a large extent, the German government seem to feel that force and intimidation were the only sort of diplomacy that actually mattered.
As discussed earlier, Fromkin makes it clear that support for the war varied in German society. While many in the military were very hawkish, financial circles in Germany were not so enthusiastic. The same was true in England, where Lloyd George said, “All the bankers and commercial people are begging us not to intervene. The governor of the Bank of England said to me with tears in his eyes ‘Keep us out of it. We shall all be ruined if we are dragged in’ ” (Fromkin 236). Generally speaking, these financiers were quite correct. The old European world that existed prior to World War I was entirely destroyed by the war. Following World War I, Europe no longer played the dominant role but it had prior to the war.
Of course, it may be that that such a geopolitical shift occurred in any case. In the coming decades, the expanding power of the United States would have almost certainly eclipsed that of Europe (Bönker 139). In the same way, many of the colonies lost by Europe during and following World War I might have still gained their freedom. In the same way, a decision by the British to remain neutral would have simply meant that the Germans would have had its way with France and Russia, defeating both and becoming the dominate power of Europe. In the aftermath if this, the Germans would have felt free to build a navy sufficient to overwhelm and intimidate the British.
Another symptom of the poor diplomacy of Germany during this period can be seen in its failure to fully appreciate the position of its ally Austria. Although Austria was supposed to immediately declare war on Britain, France and Russia after Germany’s declaration of war, it delayed some time before doing so. For a while, the Germans were worried that Austria would renege on its commitments and that Germany would have to sue for peace (Fromkin 250). In the end, both Germany and Austria sought to justify their decision to go to war by playing the role of the victim, rather than the aggressor (Fromkin 252).
In conclusion, the underlying motivation behind Germany’s decision to go to war against Russia was its desire to keep Russia from becoming the dominate power in Europe and threatening Germany’s interests. Austria’s concerns regarding Serbia were quite similar, albeit smaller in scale. But within months of the war starting, the goals and demands of the Germans grew in scale to include new lands and new overseas colonies. While there has been an assumption that the war could have been easily avoided, Fromkin makes clear in this work that the German ham-handedness when it came to diplomacy, their inability to understand the leaders of other nations and their overweening pride and militarism made such and outcome extremely unlikely.
Works Cited
Bönker, Dirk. Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World War I. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2012. Internet resource.
Fromkin, David. Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? New York: Knopf, 2004. Print.
Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War. New York: Random House, 1991. Print.
Moltke, Helmuth, and Daniel J. Hughes. Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993. Print.
