Images and livestream video clips of American military vehicles getting blown up and dead Americans--both military and civilian--laying dead on the ground in the vicinity have saturated both the international and media. Such images underscore the barbarity and savagery that has become so widespread in the Middle East. Often, such images are disseminated via the news and mass media as well as the internet in order to galvanize new supporters against the United States by discursively framing the American military, coalition forces, and civilians abroad as not indefatigable. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIL) is an extremist Islamist militant group that operates in and controls large parts of Iraq and Syria. Since its founding ISIS has been involved in terrorist activities across the Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan. It has also attracted substantial number of foreign fighters to join in its cause of creating a traditional Islamic state that ascribes to a particular brand of radical Islam predicated on the ideology of wahhabism.
Origins of ISIS
In order to fully understand the origins of ISIS along with how and why it germinated, it is important to understand the person who established it earliest iteration, namely, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was a Jordanian former convict who became deeply involved in militant Islam while in prison. In the late 1980s, he travelled to Afghanistan to assist in the fight against the Soviet occupation. While in Afghanistan, Zarqawi met Osama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Zarqawi returned to Jordan where he joined the radical group Bayat al-Imam, which advocated a return to traditional Islamic society and strategies that allowed for the “mass murder of Jews and Christians.” His connections with Bayat led to another period of incarceration where he befriended renowned radical Islam intellectual and al-Qaeda thought leader Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Maqdisi mentored Zarqawi and taught him the finer point of Islamic thought. Zarqawi was released in 1999.
Zarqawi eventually moved to Iraq where he founded the group and precursor to ISIS, known as Tawhid al-Jihad. Zarqawi and his groups were relatively quiet until the U.S. attack on Falluja, where Zarqawi was based, in 2004 following the killing of four American security consultants. From that point on Zarqawi and his group wage a terrorist campaign no only against U.S. forces but against anyone, including his fellow Muslims, who defied him. Within months, Zarqawi and his group became one of the most formidable terrorist organizations in Iraq. Impressed by bold if not brutal attacks, Zarqawi attracted the attention of al-Qaeda. In December 2004, Zarqawi swore his allegiance to al-Qaeda, and his group effectively became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AIQ). Zarqawi, however, was killed in June 2006.
ISIS Today
Since joining the al-Qaeda network, AIQ had never been a very loyal affiliate. Zarqawi has always been very independent, and it has been reported that he and bin Laden were never quite close. That independent tendency in AIQ deepened after Zarqawi’s death. In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was elected to lead AIQ. However, unlike the normal procedure for electing al-Qaeda affiliate leaders, Baghdadi was selected without first getting permission or approval from al-Qaeda’s central leadership. Moreover, Baghdadi had little experience fighting or in training soldiers. From al-Qaeda’s perspective the only redeeming qualities that Baghdadi had were that he claimed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and that he had a doctorate degree in Islamic Studies. Baghdadi had joined AIQ shortly after its establishment. He was captured by U.S. forced and jailed for four years. During his time in prison Baghdadi grew close to a number of other captures AIQ leaders. Upon his release Baghdadi was appointed to be AIQ’s leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s messenger and aide. When Abu Omar killed himself rather than being caught, Baghdadi became the most likely successor.
At about the same time that Baghdadi became AIQ leader, the organization was substantially weakened from its best days under Zarqawi. Accordingly, the Abu Omar and his leadership group that elected Baghdadi made two key decisions that helped AIQ regain its strength. First, they began to actively recruit former military and intelligence officers from Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party. These officers, who had once been powerful and wealthy under Saddam, were now poor, unemployed and persecuted. On the one hand, these officers agreed to join AIQ because it offered a chance to regain their lost power. On the other hand, Baghdadi wanted the, despite the fact that most were not religious , because they had knowledge, such as the weakness in Iraqi defenses; and skills, such as how to build underground networks; and connections, such as with tribal leaders, that AIQ needed if he wanted to grow AIQ. The second, decision was to actively participate in the in Syria Civil War. Syria had been a key source of supplies and manpower for Iraqi resistance groups during the American occupation, and so AIQ already had a presence there and so it was easy to transfer forces from Iraq to Syria. Most importantly, by in essence, moving their fight to Syria, AIQ was able to escape U.S. and Iraqi forces pursuing them. Moreover, having deep experience from fighting in Iraq as well as the knowledge of the Ba’ath officials they recruited AIQ in Syria quickly showed themselves to be the most effective rebel group in the Syrian Civil War. Consequently, with each success, AIQ in Syria was able to gain more prestige, funding and recruits to its cause.
In 2013, against al-Qaeda’s wishes, Baghdadi declared that AIQ groups in Iraq and Syria would merge into one group to be called ISIS. Al-Qaeda, who wanted the groups to remain separate, ordered Baghdadi to dissolve ISIS. He refused and in June 2013 declared independence from al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda followed in January 2014 by officially expelling ISIS from the al-Qaeda network. Without the backing of al-Qaeda, ISIS swiftly moved to eliminate any ISIS leaders or former AIQ units that still remained loyal to al-Qaeda. By the summer of 2014, with the purge of al-Qaeda loyalists complete, Baghdadi established a caliphate, known as the Islamic State, over areas it controlled in Iraq and Syria in June 2014. Baghdadi also declared himself as caliph of the Islamic State and that all Muslims and jihadis within the Islamic State must swear their loyalty to him or face death.
Experts and political leaders view the rapid rise of the Islamic state as a religious cognate and wildly untamed form of an ideology known as Wahhabism, which is an extreme and radicalized form of Sunni Islam. As the hegemonic religion in Saudi Arabia for the past two centuries, Wahhabism represent an austere and stringent form of Islam based on a literal interpretation of the Muslim Koran. Within this view, people who do not embrace their particular form of Islam are viewed as uncivilized heathens who are dangerous enemies of the state, which includes Shia adversaries. Such a draconian approach to Islam and the Koran has led to many proponents to misinterpret and distort the religion of Islam, which extremists such as the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden demonstrate. However, the radical precepts espoused by ISIS have left many Saudi Arabian Muslims quite disturbed, prompting many to inquire about the direction and ideology of Islam in Saudi Arabia itself as well as in the rest of the Middle East over whether or not it is closely connected to the discourses and fundamental tenets articulated by ISIS. The emergence of ISIS in Iraq can only be fully comprehended within the context of the ideology of Wahhabism and its role in cultivating extremism. ISIS members have publically stated their governing principles as rooted in the Wahhabist ideology, as they are still tethered to the Wahhabi movement associated with Sunni Islam. ISIS’ approach starkly contrasts from the mainstream Islamic episteme and the concept of jihad, which informs the genealogy of Al-Qaeda and has been critical in cultivating diverse manifestations of violence. Although Al-Qaeda germinated from an extremist tradition that viewed Islamic states and societies as having been degraded into “sinful disbelief,” which is why the use of violence has served as a mechanism for redemption, the Wahhabi tradition charges those who believe in it to execute any and all non-believers as a first and rudimentary step towards preserving and purifying the sanctity of the religious community. Therefore, ISIS has embedded violence into its fundamental ideology not as a means to an end but for an end in itself, which is reified by the sensationalized media coverage of savage, violent, barbaric, and uncouth beheadings and executions as a visual and widespread way to threaten the United States along with other western countries. This tactic has also effectively galvanized and recruited potential sympathizers to better confront its manifold enemies, including the governments in countries such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq
The Future of the Islamic State
Understanding how to best collect and disseminate information about ISIS is necessary, which research shows is best conducted through a Human Intelligence approach. Known as HUMINT, human intelligence ensures that the most meticulous yet accurate information on special interest groups associated with ISIS is collected. A summary of intelligence information in light of the information about ISIL is necessary for homeland security measures and how to combat the vagaries of the ISIL threat. 2014 marked a year in which a paradigm shift took place in terrorism because of the Islamic State. Political unrest in Syria and Egypt because of the Arab Spring events inspired the next generation of Muslims to join the ISIS cause. As such, countless crimes against humanity have been spawned. The emergence of the psychology of terror and have exploited the mass media to galvanize potential followers. Indeed, there have been countless reports about kidnappings, rapes, a nd beatings of women while mass public beheadings have been publicized for the world to see, a tactic that has drawn in several western sympathizers to their cause.
Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS does not seem to be tied to the idea of a religious war against its enemies. Particularly since the establishment of the caliphate, ISIS has seemed less focused on running a global terror campaign. On the contrary, its moves to date suggest a traditional nation-state’s want to expand its territory, and tightly control the territory that it has under its control. Even ISIS attacks that have occurred outside of its territory suggest area that ISIS eventually wants to expand to eventually. According to reports, ISIS’s plan is to extend its territory over the next five years to include North Africa, Spain, the Middle East, south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Indian subcontinent. Control and governing land provides a number of benefits for ISIS. First, as long as ISIS leaders stay in ISIS controlled areas, they need not worry about being captured or hunted like al-Qaeda leaders. Second, ISIS can provide safe haven (as long as they agree to abide by ISIS regulations) to others wanted by the U.S. and other nations. This has the added benefit of making ISIS attractive to jihadis across the globe. Third, it allows ISIS to fund its own operations. This is especially true if it were to capture oil rich areas. Fourth, it creates obstacles for its opponents. For instance, it would be much harder for the U.S. to eliminate ISIS if it requires a whole-scale invasion and occupation of ISIS controlled territory. Fifth, as time passes, and ISIS actually begins to govern and administer land, it gains legitimacy as a viable political actor rather than being seen as a terrorist organization always on the run pleading for sanctuary from friendly nations. Accordingly, it is expected that ISIS is likely to act more and more like a rogue nation in the future. On this point, it has many examples to follow including North Korea, Syria, Sudan, and Libya under the auspices of Kaddafi.
Best Intelligence Collection Disciplines
Human-sourced intelligence (HUMINT) would be the most effective data collection program to access important and sensitive information about ISIS and its operations. This is based on the fact that ISIS communications policies, mirror al-Qaeda’s avoidance of electronic communications as a default, use of encrypted communications when necessary, and a reliance on hand-carried messages. Moreover, HUMINT has proven successful in the past at providing key information about ISIS including information that revealed the location of AIQ leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Additionally, due to ISIS’s lack of air control, HUMINT should be supplemented, with Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) derived from aircrafts, drones, and satellites that fly above its positions. Lastly, when possible, Signals Intelligence (SINGINT) should be deployed against known and vulnerable vectors of attack such as ISIS members travelling abroad.
Most Effective Intelligence Community Actors
As the leading agency engaged in the collection of HUMINT and IMINT, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would be the most effective IC actor in the collection of intelligence on ISIS. Furthermore, after nearly fifteen years of experience in Iraq, and the Middle East, the CIA has a wide and deep information network that they can put to use in gathering information on ISIS. In addition, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is not normally considered a part of the IC, it can play a substantive support role for the CIA. FBI interrogation of ISIS members or recruits arrested abroad, and investigation of ISIS domestic networks, lines of finance, and overseas operations may provide crucial information about what is happening inside ISIS leadership and controlled areas. The FBI can also coordinate with international law enforcement agencies such as the United Kingdom’s MI-5 and Interpol, to gains access to information that those organizations have collected on ISIS.
Most Effective Strategies to Analyze Intelligence
Red cell or team analysis would be the most effective strategy for analyzing intelligence collected on ISIS. Until recently, the focus of most intelligence efforts was al-Qaeda. Accordingly, ISIS was able to operate without much attention. However, they are now one of the top threats in the Middle East. Red cell analysis can supplement and guide intelligence collection and analysis of ISIS by challenging assumptions, visions and emerging theories by actively attacking them to discover problems. Red cell analysis can also provide a wider and deeper understanding of ISIS behaviors, options and vulnerabilities before ISIS discovers them for itself. Lastly, red cell analysis allows analysts to understand mistakes in past analysis and lessons learned from prior gaps in intelligence collection. This will be necessary in training agents and analysts that will be called on in the future to collect and analyzes intelligence about ISIS.
Recommendations
ISIS should be considered more like a rogue state rather than a terrorist organization.
Strategies and tactics used against ISIS should focus on a comprehensive long-term containment of ISIS controlled areas.
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