Vietnam War
Vietnam War
The Vietnam War is the most famous and significant US external affairs that will remain in the history of US. In essence, it is arguable whether US lost the war or to some extent; it won. Often than not, it appears that the US lost the war as it withdrew from the battlefield before achieving its agenda. The war had a significant economic, social and political impact on the people of US. The US government was overspending on this war; thousands of soldiers were being killed and protest and thus ‘no need of drama’ (O’Brien, 2014 p 17). Walter Cronkite examination of the US policies implemented and strategies used in the war predicted a loss. He publically criticized and reviled that the war was unwinnable. His statement made it clear that it was time for US to exit and abandon the mission. The dominating factors examined from the account of the US soldiers include tactics used in the war, the terrain and climate of Vietnam, the skills of US officers and home support reveal that 1968 was the possible turning point and probably best time for US to terminate the mission.
According to Olson & Roberts (1998), the US army used the Operation rolling thunder tactic to demoralize the Viet Cong from further engagement in the war. The US army targeted large towns and bombed centers in the north. Notably, continuous bombings of the city and homes especially in the north were aimed at making the Viet Cong feel that they had lost the war such as the My Lai massacres. The US army thought that bombings will make the Viet Cong panic and surrender because their kinsmen, properties, and wealth was being destroyed just to mention the Operation Commando Hunt. On the contrary, anger from those attacks escalated over the years. Every attack and bombing gave the Viet Cong a reason to plan and execute revenge.Morever attacks such as that of ths city juncio operaion had insignificant outcomes.
Noticeably, the ‘search and destroy’ tactic was the most brutal the US army used in Vietnam. In essence, the search for Viet Cong soldiers was conducted in homes, towns, and villages. The confusion was too great to O’Brien till he expressed that there was no way to distinguish a common girl from an enemy. The presence or any suspicion that there was an opposition army within a community resulted in a complete destruction of the community. The tactic was very effective as it eliminated the opposing power. However, a number of challenges faced this tactic and were unsolvable. First, it was difficult to target the specific army without affecting the standard population. The enwmy lived among the ordinary people. O’Brien notes that their enemies mixed freely with common population in markets and streets therefore targeting only the enemy was frenzied. Secondly, the Viet Cong’s continuous recruitment ensured that there was a replacement for the loss through this attack (Olson & Roberts, 1998).
On the other hand, the Viet Cong used a number of tactics to counter their enemies. Despite the fact that their tactics were quite traditional with minimal technology, they were diverse and adaptable to the situation at hand. To start with, the Viet Cong used bait tactic to harm their enemies. Through keen observation the Viet Cong learnt that shooting some distance a head of the US helicopter could damage it and bring it down. In this scheme, they dug holes on the way where they perceived enemies were to pass. Sharp pointed objects were skillfully placed in the holes and covered shallowly with leaves. Sharp objects would injure the enemies while members were warned by a known symbol near the trap. O’Brien note the enemies built that Collin Powell was targeted through such a technique.
Mines stressed the US armies. These mines were intentionally dug randomly to disturb US armies from any attempt to find them or use such routs. O’Brien encounter a worse experience when in an operation as they can note move as planned due to the mines obstructions.
According to Mangold & Penycate (2005), Ho Chi Min Trail tactic practiced by the soldiers of the Viet Congo was secretive and unpredictable. The armies used routes that were very secretive though the thick forest and jungle. The courses frequently changed to the extent that the US and their allies could not predict followed by their attackers. In addition the jungle frightened US soldiers including O’Brien while in the mission.
A number of tannels were constructed to aid tha Viet Cong in their oparations. The largest tannel that US soldiers noticed is that of Cu’ Chi . These tannels provided save hiding place for the guerrillas. In addition the highy networked tunnels based the Viet Cong headquarters with stores offices and meeting points. The tannels were invested with poisonous insectis becoming dangerous for the US soldiers. the operation Cedar Fall marked a significant attempt to destroy the Cu Chi headquarters and accessing vital information about the VietCong and their plans.
Terrain and climate
The scenery of Vietnam would not favor the techniques and weapons the US army used. The rugged terrain made it difficult for the movement of land machines and war equipment. Moreover, the roads were inaccessible and muddy, making the movement extremely difficult especially during the rain session. Mud was too much till O’Brien at times escaped shot death by barring himself in the mud. Movement across high mountains and steep areas was only possible using air weapons . In addition, swamps and rice paddies created a barrier to accessing the enemies’ camps.
Large part of Vietnam consist of thick forest and bush. Admittedly, it became almost impossible for US soldiers to attack their enemies who were familiar with such forest and knew how to maneuver. Fear of getting lost in forest dominated in the mind of soldiers such as O’Brien. The Viet Cong more often ambushed the US soldiers in forest and bushes killing many of them. In fact, the US soldiers had little skills in dealing with the guerrilla war executed by their enemies in those dense forests (Olson & Roberts, 1998).Furthermore, the helicopters and airmobile activities needed a large landing ground. Subsequently, it was difficult to make a substantial large landing zone for the troop in such forests. The rugged landscape was problematic in landing. Sometimes, such caves provided defense sites and hiding point for enemies challenging the US soldier’s ability to locate the enemies.
Additionally, the country consists of high rainfall, low ceiling, clouds and frequent fog. The low ceiling clouds made it impossible for highflying crafts that would be used to spy the enemies. Specifically, the helicopters movement was limited to days when there was no fog. In addition, the frequent fogs restricted the use of air force operation. Both thunder and lightning frequently destroyed or severely affected communication equipment that O’Brien was in charge, a situation which made it difficult for the US soldiers to plan an attack.
September to march is characterized by monsoon winds. Frequently the winds are too strong that they can sweep away aircrafts. The winds dictate that the air forces cannot operate at this time of the year. Sometimes temperatures were too high. Such high temperatures were unsuitable for the US troops. High temperature was a severe challenge to new soldiers, and it took them time to adapt to such unfamiliar situation.
Skills of US Officers
The US forces were trained to handle a war using sophisticated equipment. The in-depth training neglected the fact that the Viet Congo soldiers recruited and involved people who could use simple and awkward techniques such as arrows and stick. The training such as that O’Brien went through was not suffecint to make him competent in handling such a technical war. More often than not, the US military were injured, and others killed in the least expected attack. Guerrillas could pretend to be attacking and then withdraw to a safety place such a mechanism confused the US soldiers who in turn followed then eventually trapped and killed. Apparently, it was clear that there was a mismatch between technology and tactics the US forces were using the tricks the Viet Cong were using in the war (Mangold & Penycate, 2005). The high mismatch meant that the whole system had to be changed for a better result.
Difficulties in management of troop units proved that the US was slowly losing control . Senior group leaders lost contrary over their juniors; suspicion among the soldiers arose, the rule of command was no more practical. According to Olson & Roberts (1998), senior officers sacrificed the younger ones for honors back at home, and every soldier was in fear of betrayal. Soon, the experienced senior soldiers were replaced by young, inexperienced soldiers such as O’Brien.Moreover, experienced officers avoided the war at expense of their career opting to go back home.
The US force’s skills in dealing with guerrilla war were limited. The soldiers often fall into the hands of their enemies. Similarly, the hugging tactic that the Viet Cong employed confused the US armies and would make them unable to use air-based technology for defense.
Learning from mistakes is a crucial skill for winning on any battlefield. The US forces did not assess their performance or adapt to the new ways that the Viet Cong were using in this battle. The US system was rigid to adapt to the situation. In fact, the enemies quickly learned their tactics and made adjustments to outweigh them.
Home Support
Home support is crucial to winning. The agenda of the US involvement in the Vietnam war, was not very clear to both the Americans and the civilians of the southern Vietnam. There was frequent criticism over the funding of the war and the continued loss of lives. Riots, citizen complaints and an outcry of the families over lost lives in that war created a mixed reaction from the US side (O’Brien, 2014). Many people including O’Brien were against US involvement in these affairs. Contrary to the expectation, the Vietnam people had perceived the US soldiers were in a process to colonise the hence civilians offered limited support. The citizen viewed the US armies as another colonial power and would sneak intelligence information to the Viet Cong camp.
Conclusion
Indispensably, by the year 1968, there was a clear indication that Vietnam war was unwinnable. The critical analysis display that tactics applied guaranteed a loss. The terrain and climate was against US soldiers while skills employed in the war was inappropriate. In addition, lack of citizen support and criticism confirmed a loss. Walters’ statement “the war is unwinnable” was justified, and an immediate intervention could have been sought to exit the mission.
References
Mangold, T., & Penycate, J. (2005). The tunnels of Cu Chi: A harrowing account of America's "tunnel rats" in the underground battlefields of Vietnam. New York: Ballantine Books.
O'Brien, T. (2014). If I die in a combat zone, box me up and ship me home. New York: Broadway Books.
Olson, J. S., & Roberts, R. (1998). My Lai: A brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford Books.
