The research problem will be to investigate whether the patrimonial political systems of Singapore and South Korea are democracies that surpass their liberal Western analogues in terms of national growth and even democratization in some ways. It appears that, contrary to the popular misperception, democracy is not necessarily a lack of restraint and complete discretion or at least a range of freedom like the right to media. Sometimes, states like Singapore being low on resources and facing external threats decide on less liberal norms and behaviors bordering on authoritarianism in specific aspects. Regulated merit-based selection practices and disciplining norms like paternalism relate to better economic growth indices associated with democratization, as seen in the numerical trends related to economic indices of Asian states. Liberal democracies fail to provide their signature equality benefits in terms of residential space provision or have government intervention in business, which deducts from liberalism.
The project starts with the presentation of the periodization of new elite formation in Singapore and their state takeover. Then follows the paragraph on the developmental indices of the country as a touchstone of measuring the success of the unique local democratic variation. Thereupon, the paper continues with the revelation of the evolution of South Korea elite, including its controversial initial phase, and that of patrimonial democracy. Next comes the chapter on South Korean path towards the emancipation of the country and its stimulation of development and democracy. One of the most salient points analyzed is the theory of correlation between democratization and the level of state’s economic growth and income. Growth is presented as an element of democratization that proves the sceptics of South Korean democratic viability wrong, with the indices of other states compared with South Korean economic variables. One of the final sections shows that both states fall under the category of minimalist democracies, which is another proof of democratic characteristics of Singapore and South Korea.
The relevance of the project is in the opportunity to prove scientifically that liberal values are not necessarily the absolute and only pillars of democracy, upon which it rests, and that countries with quasi-undemocratic statehood maintenance control mechanisms can provide people with the level of welfare and comfort, which the de jure cradle of democracy, the West, cannot at times. The project shows the pluralism of democratic models and variations whose nature often demonstrates the adjustment of the model to local mentality, culture, and historically established traditions.
Singapore: New Elites Formative Periods and State Takeover
Seifert (151) who reviewed the book of Michael Barr the Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence has traced the way the scholar portrays the evolution of state leadership. The evolution of the three-generational leadership started assuming shape in the post-independence period, which was after 1965, although the formative stage began in the years preceding autonomy achievement in a time when LKY or Lee Kuan Yew and plenty of leaders-to-be would assemble in the later-to-be-dubbed Oxley Road circle. These insiders would go on to shape the center of the People’s Action Party existing to the point of LKY disbanding. What made this group of Singaporeans atypical was that Yew gave preference to individuals he happened to know from his studying time in England. They would make up the minority of English speaking Singaporeans. With time, a well-marked model of successive elite recruitment surfaced. Whom Yew and his senior colleagues targeted were the winners of national scholarships. The high number of President’s Scholarship winners caused disproportions in selection. On a yearly basis, they handpicked 4 to 10 students in the timeframe between 1964 and 1970. Overall, they set choice on 41 students, of whom 11 proceeded to receive top positions in the elite government. In the year 1971, the establishment of the Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship supplemented the scholarship recruitment program left accessible to male National service personnel exclusively. The first group of selectees included the son of Lee Kuan Yew, serving as the prime minister, at the time of writing.
Bell (3) suggests that the national leaders started phasing in the institutionalization of mechanisms intended for the selection of the most fitting leaders in terms of qualification despite it imposing limits on the democratic process. The argument was that leaders ought to take a long-term perspective instead of trying to satisfy electoral cycles and that the political framework should be arranged in a way that precludes populists with short-term vision from executing their functions. Worse, Max Weber (42) opines that leaders brought in democratic system may order his electorate to shut up after using trust for coming to power. Thus, the Singaporean power elite may apply some authoritarianism in the realization of such possibility. According to Bell (3), the justification of the Singaporean political Establishment was that the most moral and capable individuals needed selecting in the small city-state that has hostile neighbors and resources in low supply. The ideal suits well this very unconventional city-state, which is why state model exportability may be inappropriate (Bell 3).
Such political filtering through a controlled selection process may be an attempt for the leadership to bar populist politicians feeding people with empty promises from occupying positions and disrupting social welfare in equality in specific aspects, thereby damaging the democratic processes within the state. The president seems to care to look to it that no harmful laws affect the country development. Bell (7) notes that the presidential institution has the authority to place a veto on politicians’ efforts to enforce policies doing damage to the interests of future generations. Motivated by factors like resource scarcity, the public good rationale behind less liberal and more authoritarian norms reveals itself in the single party dominance. Brems, Van der Beken, and Yimer (134) note that Singapore along with China have hegemonic single-party systems. Conversely, South Korea in company with Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand have multiple parties vying for power (Kim Y. and Kim J. 37).
Back to the post-independence state formative years, Seifert (151) noted that Yew along with senior colleagues had solidified power in the country exerting control over parts of social and commercial life all the while forming the system of elite recruitment. In spite of being mostly ethnic Chinese with the exception of several Indian colleagues, the party started accepting Malay leaders under Lee Kuan Yew. Parts of the society other than the mentioned were subject to the takeover that brought technocrats with an external education to trade unions after 1977. Chen (78) summarizes that, as of 1978, intellectuals, professionals, and trade unions constituted the basis of the power elite. Seifert (151) notes that the legislative and judiciary branches gradually grew marginalized. As of 1981, public housing was already government-run, with 80% of Singaporeans residing in such homes. Not only did the flats of the Housing Development Board implement the major welfare policy of the party, but also they allowed controlling who resided where (Seifert 151).
Analyzing democracy justice and democracy as a mechanism of securing shared public goods like sensible and just urban development, Rai (88-93) refers to the proponents of affordable housing stating that people should have the right to affordable and decent housing based on the social equality ideal of democracy. The West may reproach Asian democracies for the lack of what defines democracy, which is equality, including in terms of housing accessibility, as argued by the researcher above; however, it is in this aspect where Western democracy may prematurely end. Hayes (n.pag.) cites the critics of liberal democracy censuring the model for the prosperity of individuals that are wealthy and the disadvantageous life of those who are not lacking decent housing, healthcare, and even legal representation.
According to Seifert (151), apart from social developments, the power elite gained control of or, rather, made an incursion into the corporate world of the country. How the government and the party has pursued the police of economic development that left little room of medium and small companies and taken to controlling companies, whether directly or otherwise, was through the state funds GIC and Temasek and Chinese associations at earlier stages. The state intervention left young and ambitious residents of Singapore unable to secure attractive jobs beyond state-controlled companies or the government (Seifert 152). People should be free to choose what professional path to follow while business intervention and SMEs’ restriction practically decides the professional fate of many Singaporeans who would otherwise make excellent business owners. The Singaporean leadership resembles a caring parent predetermining the profession of the offspring arranging for children, the nation, not to be small-to-middle businessperson or trader and making them follow in their footsteps, that is, become government officials or state companies’ employees. By leaving few alternatives as undemocratic states would, the country loses the attributes of a democracy.
According to Seifert (152), with the passage of time, the government of Yew gained control over all elements of Singaporean life all the way from the corporate world and social groups to the judiciary, legislative, and executive branches. By that time, the authorities had defined a way for a person to qualify for a place among the elite. Overall, the process of selection starts at the early stages of education; thus, the elite may be said to reproduce itself. In spite of bursaries, scholarships, and other assistance initiatives developed to help gifted students from poorer families, elite streams within ordinary schools or elite schools select students largely from the mainly Chinese upper-to-middle class. The authorities grouped educational institutions laying groundwork for elite scholarship into the families of schools like the Raffles and Hwa Chong families, which they did in the 1990s. Both have since provided an estimated 70% to 80% of major elite contenders and scholarship winners (Seifert 153).
The first stipulation of the algorithm is winning a top scholarship bound individuals to the civil service, whereupon they need to put up an excellent performance excelling in competence and showing full adaptation to the needs of both political and administrative masters. Such specialists will often spend years working in close professional and physical proximity to top elite members. From want of marriage or blood relationship to the ruling elite, this is an optimal way. The years of working in proximity is a springboard catapulting technocrats to the positions like Home Affairs, Education, Defense, Trade and Industry, and Finance ministers. If Lee or his inner circle should decide that a young person has what it takes to succeed in politics, they should invite the person to join the ranks of the People’s Action Party, to run for parliament, and, if successful, to get a promotion to the Cabinet right away. The selection system remains narrow and demanding. Contrary to the addition of new members to the elite, the quantity of talent is quite small, which often leaves the government little chance except to rehire old guards for crisis management (Seifert 152-153).
Singapore is an easier country to understand if looked at through the prism of a family. Singapore is a Chinese family business, which means that at the head stands a patriarch, then comes an eldest son, guanxi or the system of social networks and influential relationships, and, of course, the matter of cross-generational continuity (Seifert 154). All it means is that the family code, norms, and hierarchical pattern are projectable on the state level. According to Seifert (154), the problem is that excessive power may end up in the hands of one person. Thus, low is the accountability of the patriarch and his closest associates. The most pressing threat is that the self-recruiting nature of this national elite governance can produce the system of groupthink (Seifert 154). Hudson (n.pag.) explains groupthink as undemocratic since democratic partaking in decision making is believed to be an antidote to this practice. The process excludes independent critical thinking about a problem. In the USA, it has already led to fatal policy blunders like the Vietnam War, the Bay of Pigs crisis, and the Iraq conflict in the days of Bush Junior (Hudson n.pag.). With this practice in place at times in the established democratic states like the USA, the presence of groupthink does not seem to make a state undemocratic.
Singaporean Worthy Indices No One Can Deny: Democratic Conditions Not Seen in the West
The history of the country may provide some clue as to why its population has rallied behind economy boosting authoritarian norms like patrimonialism regimenting relations between people and their parent, the country. The mistreatment of Singaporeans at the hands of the Japanese invaders between 1941 and 1945 was what brought them together (Tarulevicz 417). If that was the case, such common foe could have increased the collectivist mentality of Singaporeans prerequisite for power acceptance. A strong leader protecting people from such external threats in people’s perception may have increased their willingness to accept patrimonialism and a potent chain of command. More to critical historical developments, University of Canterbury (n.pag.) notes that Singapore gained the status of the major port between Asia and Europe in 1869 following the Suez Channel opening, which stimulated trade for the state. The colonial rule is likely to have provided the source of economic growth responsible for democratization, as will be demonstrated in the South Korea-related section that follows. Such source was the port linking critical trade routes at the time.
Back to the city-state, Barr (149) summarizes that Singapore is a well-managed country administered by well-organized and efficient bureaucracy these days. Singapore of today represents the world for the reason that the Indians, the Chinese, Malaysians, Brazilians, Americans, Europeans, and Russians are to be seen gracing the country with their presence (Rapaille 182). Were the country this undemocratic and oppressive, such national pluralism would hardly be the case these days. According to Rapaille (182), from humble beginnings started the city-state. It had land no more than it did gas, oil, or other resources. Lee Kuan Yew has managed to prove that a culture of success, the envy of the world, is not impossible to create. The level of unemployment has stopped dead at 2%. Francois Hollande would be better off going for an internship to the county to get the first-hand knowledge of its economic model. The rate of corruption has hit an all-time low not seen by the predominant majority of world states. India would be also be best served by sending its Prime Minister Narendra Modi getting a lesson from Singapore power elites.
The state reportedly has the most business-friendly environment and one of the lowest tax levels in the world drawing investors from across the globe. Obama with his disapproval of and aversion to business that made themselves felt in his rhetoric should also book a trip to Singapore (Rapaille 182). It is not that foreign capital is only welcome in the country. Business directory, Singapore SME (n.pag.) suggests that the country has 1050 wellness and beauty businesses, 1044 finance and business ventures, 35 financial service consultancies, as many as 3270 eateries and restaurants, 1059 fashion and accessories commercial enterprises, 3226 healthcare practices, 837 IT and electronics ventures, 308 home and appliances companies, and 602 other generalized service businesses. The number of foreign companies is placed at 6 (Singapore SME n.pag.). The situation with business is likely to have stabilized in the 21st century, as current figures show the signs of some laissez faire or less restrictive government intervention.
Although not rigidly enforce, the rule of chewing no gum is the case. At least, one can return home late in the night, without running the risk of being mugged or attacked. As follows from the confession of a Singaporean girl aged 19 who has been to San Francisco and Paris, admitted that she would like to be in Singapore by saying it is better not being able to chew gum than having personal welfare threatened by attackers (Rapaille 183). Such attitude may stem from the negative experience, based on which she may think she would rather not have been to the cities in the nighttime. With their excessively liberal models, Western countries like the USA seem to provide democracy to all, the equality of opportunities, including the chance to criminal opportunists. According to Rapaille (182), in response to individuals claiming Singapore to be no real democracy, it is worth noting that the Singaporean democracy may not be worse than American. The US model may be good to no state other than America. There are plenty of nations who eagerly basket this model as such that runs counter to their group identities and national beliefs (Rapaille 182). What is good to some countries is not to others. This argument seems to echo the earlier presented claim of the in-exportability of specific types of democracy models like Singaporean put forward by Bell (7). These democracy types seem adjusted to specific national, geopolitical, and economic conditions. National identity and cultural nuances may shape the democratic vision that excludes the public chewing of gum.
South Korea: The Controversial Evolution of its Elite and Patrimonial Democracy
Far from receiving punishment, colonial collaborators were recruited by the colonial government to take over vacant important positions in economics, politics, the military, education, literature, and women’s community, to name but four, which used to occur during the US Army Military Government between 1945 and 1948 and the Syngman Rhee regime between 1948 and 1960. Power structure was founded on these collaborators. Anticommunist nation building via the institutionalization of social, political, and economic infrastructure was a top priority in that the political stability of the country came under threat emanating from political factionalism and communist insurgencies. Conservative anticommunists were called up to fill the political vacuum in the national building process after positions being quitted by the colonial government. Law enforcers integrated into power elites in numbers (Nagel and Robb 167-168). As with Singapore, South Koreans used a filtering mechanism of elite selection, so they may be said to have used similar political elite formation tools with the difference that it was communists, not populists who needed keeping away from authority positions. Behind this somewhat undemocratic regulatory approach stands the same motive of state stability.
Bureaucratic professional elite trained in Japan seized power originally shortly after South Korea liberation. A group of English speaking intellectuals became a part of the elite at the time of the American occupation and at the nascent stage of the Rhee regime (Kim and Lee). Nagel and Robb (167) confirms that the US Army Military Government employed educated residents and technocrats who knew English to occupy positions within the government for functional merits. If there is one major goal for such selection to have taken place it was to restore order and law (Nagel and Robb 167). Such restoration usually can make for the implementation of stability-dependent democratic values. South Koreans nation-building techniques of selective recruitment and meritocracy like employing English-speaking technocrats is in exact line with the enforced vision of Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew. There is no evidence of non-technocrats having been denied their applications; thus, no undemocratic practice may be the case in South Korea, as all democracy and progress-minded and oriented states will opt for gifted professional rather than less fitting specialists if only to maintain the semblance of ultra-equality.
The preference of intellectually gifted technocrats similar to Singapore’s proclivity is anything but astonishing, as it seems inborn. Kim-Renaud, Grinker, and Larsen (n.pag.) notes that the social structure in South Korea has often allowed privileged male society members to take over power positions despite civil service examinations being instrumental in their distribution and determining the fortune and fame of families if successful. In the perception of Koreans, the ideal leader was a scholar-functionary. Speaking of the propensity for the privileged, analyzing the elite selection in the early 2000s, Seliger (n.pag.) notes that the selection of South Korean elite is ascription-based, not accomplishment-oriented. Thus, contrary to the prevalent image of meritocracy in the society strongly oriented on Confucianism, the three ties, such as region, school, and blood, are the deciding factors of selection, which is consistent with the doctrines of favoritism, ritualism, and regionalism.
Patrimonialism is still the case in modern South Korea in the shapes of nepotism, familyism, regionalism, and opportunism (Kim 41). Hamilton and Biggart (n.pag.) note that one should not reduce the outstanding economic performance of the country to the institutional strategy of patrimonialism (qtd. in Kim 42). Amsden (n.pag.) argues that the principal role of government intervention in the market system has been patrimonial to a specific degree. However, awarding subsidies by the authoritarian bureaucratic government has produced corrupt relationships between the authorities and the business sector. The modern state is powerful enough to discipline companies and employ market pressures in a selective fashion for the strategic utilization of market opportunities with qualified interventions (qtd. in Kim 42). It is economic rationality rather than patrimonialism that this conjuncture is determined (Kim 42). Government intervention is yet another feature making South Korean patrimonial state similar to its Singaporean fellow model.
In Korean nationalism, nations are viewed as extended families, and South Koreans are expected to act as filial and loyal family members in their relationship with the national community. Even business executive stress the paternalistic argumentation referring to the Confucian patriarchal family system. Their working relationship is the extension of the parent-child relations within a family (Hua and Hu 33). This vision corresponds to that of Singapore, with people expected to accept the superiority of the nation and its leadership. The collectivist mentality restraining individualism does not necessarily imply South Korea is not a democracy. Rather, it is a democracy adapted to strong patriarchal cultural and religious legacy of traditions of unconditionally admitting the leadership authority. South Korean is a regional type of democracy that may stay misunderstood, even less shared elsewhere.
The patrimonial extended concept applied in the business concept has important implications for the authoritarian ethics and norms in the labor force. Fromm (n.pag.) states that an authority formulates what is good for an individual presenting behavioral norms and laws in authoritarian ethics (House 88). In families, parents also present their children with the norms of conduct for them to follow. Since enterprises liken themselves to families, they present their workforce with ethical norms whose imposed, nay, indisputable nature makes them authoritarian, which seems to be a disciplining organizing aspects that factors in the solid economic performance. Svedin (51) suggests that the government’s pathological cooperative group conduct or groupthink conduct manifests itself in South Korea as it did at a time the financial crisis struck. In what precedes, it was mentioned that Singapore had also strong groupthink and patriarchal mentality traditions in whatever field, the economic one included. Groupthink is a clear authoritarian norm, and its application in the economic field that necessarily includes the notion of workforce demonstrates the influence of authoritarian norms on workforce contributing to national development and growth.
Interestingly, there is the view that the modern political history of the country shows the prevalence of an authoritarian rather than a patrimonial state most likely owing to there being the majority of the military in the political and economic power elite in the years of the military dictatorship (Kim 43). Such dominance must have been the case during the dictatorial rule between 1960 and 1980. Kim (43) notes that the military government found itself cornered by a false dilemma between participative civil life and a rapid economic growth. As matters are usually, economic accomplishments rest upon the capacity of a country and the power of developmental institutions to supply requisite services ad conditions. The South Korean government was using a system based on patronage that comprised an unconventional extent of organizational continuity between colonial and post-colonial administration. Even so, the values maintained through modernization were conducive to organizational commitment and bureaucratic role performance as is evident in bureaucratic technocracy. The relative political stability coupled with extraordinary economic growth are testimony to their positive cooperation. A shift to democracy has paved the path for a new galaxy of politicians who spurred the country on to regional and financial autonomy and enhanced power decentralization. The ascension of a civil society embracing social diversity and political and economic liberalization has come undoing the authoritarian mechanisms of governance.
The Path towards Country Emancipation Stimulated Development and Democracy. The Democratization & Economic Growth Theory. States’ Comparison
Bruns, Enli, Skogerbo, Larsson, and Christensen (n.pag.) notes that South Korea’s movement along the democracy trajectory towards its achievement along with state emancipation encountered the obstacle in the Japanese occupation between 1910 and 1945 and the Korean War in the years between 1950 and 1953 that left the country separated. Following the spell of development under the military ferule, the country began its modernization and development in the late 1960s when under President Park Chung-hee. Back then, the economic conglomerates composed of relatively small, family-run companies started thriving (Bruns et al. n.pag.). The selective use of market pressure described above shows restrained governmental intervention, as does the presence of small businesses, both indicating democratic trends in South Korea responsible for economic development. The presence of intervention does not make the country undemocratic inasmuch as, as suggested by Ni and Van Wart (5), although minimal, government intervention in business is the case even in the USA. Kopnina and John Blewitt (n.pag.) reveals minimal government intervention as necessary for a country to be considered neo-liberal. Following the presented train of logic, the country does have the credentials of a democracy due to it having minimal government control responsible for business development that translates into economic growth and social welfare boom through job generation, the elevated tax-paying capacity, and other benefits. Park, Hill, and Saito (93) confirm that the country made a neoliberal turn after 1987. However, this is not to say that the varying extent of intervention does not vindicate the authoritarian notes in the economic policy of the state.
OECD (n.pag.) notes that the economic politics of South Korea has laid the groundwork for the never-before-seen explosive economic growth. The annual rate of per capita GDP between 1971 and 2012 stands at 9.8% (qtd. in Bruns et al. n.pag.). The per capita GNP increased from 6.5% to 6.7% between 1965 and 1983 (Grabowski, Self, and Shields 91). At this point, the country has players of international proportions in the communications market like LG and Samsung and in the automobile market like Kia and Hyundai. Korea has excelled in social media, e-money, and smartphones even Japan (Bruns et al. n.pag.). Even so, Fukuyama (n.pag.) claims that ordinary residents felt the price of growth, as Park Chung-hee was employing aggressive control from 1962 to 1979 through the suppression of democratic values and military compulsion vis-à-vis South Koreans (qtd. in Bruns et al. n.pag.).
Fast forward to the 21st century, analysts have put to rest democracy consolidation protecting the freedom and welfare of ordinary people in part owing to the swift industry development (Bruns et al. n.pag.). But for all that, Dahl (444) summarizes that relatively authoritarian countries like South Korea, Singapore, and China have historically showed better economic growth levels than less authoritarian counterparts like Jamaica, Costa Rica, and India have. With this in view, a country does not need to embrace liberalism for democracy to take place since growth indicative of democratization was achieved through authoritarian mechanisms like patrimonialism, strict press regulation, and a rigidly regulated elite recruitment process, as is shown by not only South Korea, but also Singapore that is reported to have been showing enviable growth trends in recent years. Roy, Blomqvist, and Clark (37) agree that there is a correlation between democratization and the level of state’s economic growth and income. Since Singaporean rather than South Korean economic variables like investment rate are among the highest, the country may be said to be more democratic than European states like Italy of Spain with much worse indices are.
The correlation should be analyzed in greater depth to lend more credibility and legitimacy to the correlation theory. Subochev (207) defines economic growth and foreign investment as interrelated. Therefore, investment growth will be used for assessing the general trend of the national economic growth. In the space of several decades, South Korea underwent political and economic transformation. The post-war, liberation period shows interesting trends. Mason (36) notes that, by the concluding years of the 1960s, the investment level of South Korea had gone 15% up on the 1950s amounting to 20%. The rate rose twofold adding another 20% before 1991. The investment level in Singapore snowballed from a low of 10% in 1960 only to increase to four times the preceding rate in 10 years’ time, that is to say, in the 1970s, it was already 40%. The level has ranged from 30% to 40% since. By contrast, Taiwan with the rate estimated at 15% in the early 1960s experience an upsurge later in the decade peaking at 30% in the mid-1970s.
The identical variable in Japan did not exceed 30% in the 1970s and the 1980s, which means it was 10% as low as the comparable index in Singapore (Mason 36). As of this writing, which is 2015, Smith (n.pag.) claims the Japanese to have liberal democracy thriving in their country due to the fiasco of the Japanese Empire and the careful introduction of democratic institutions immediately the war had been over. Since South Korea and Singapore using approaches, that are more authoritarian, achieved greater economic growth linked to democratization as per the indices than Japan did, a country does not appear to require liberalism for there to be democratization. However, Mason (36) has defined the investment rate of Hong Kong as below rather low. This is an exception among the newly industrialized economies (Mason 36). The trend may contest the growth and democratization correlations; however, it should be borne in mind that, since Hong Kong has retained autonomy within China enjoying it, the Chinese authoritarian economic policies and tools most likely do not apply to the Special Administrative Region. If they did, growth would probably be sufficient giving reason enough to talk about the high level of democratization. The theory remains incontestable since China has traditionally been atop the standings in terms of growth in recent decades, which is an axiom.
In line with the economic growth and democratization argument, Singapore the country with more authoritarian mechanisms, has one of the worst indices of media freedom, the litmus paper of liberalism. This notwithstanding, it has one of the biggest developmental levels in the world, which proves again that liberalism does not necessarily have to be prerequisite to democratization since authoritarian mechanisms do not seem destined for oppression in Asia. Rather, the authorities employ them with a view to protecting the economic development and state welfare needed for democracy growth from the detrimental impact of excessive liberalism that may stem from overly democratic media publishing delicate information or undermining the reputation of important leaders in revelations, which uninitiated readers unaware of a grander political scheme may misperceive.
Minimalist Democracies
Following are the scale positions of the analyzed patrimonial states that seem to be in perfect line with general findings. The scale show the countries like Singapore applying some authoritarian mechanisms are not necessarily undemocratic at least judging by their electoral processes. Diamond, Plattner, and Chu (55) have placed Singapore and South Korea into the competitive authoritarianism and liberal democracy categories respectively. Over 65% of respondents in these countries have favored competitive and open popular elections for choosing a political leader. In South Korea, between 63% and 67% of respondents have favored the multiparty system and popular elections. What minimalist democracy, to which both relate, means is that a multiparty system and popular elections are its hallmarks (Diamond, Plattner, and Chu 55). One can apply the term multiparty to Singapore since, contrary to PAP dominance, the Worker’s Party also has parliamentary representation, albeit slim. The authoritarianism classification implies the dominant role of the major Singaporean party.
Conclusions
Meritocracy seems more apparent in Singapore than in South Korea where region, school, and blood are more relevant than accomplishments and, therefore, merit. In Singapore, technocrat emphasis, a dominant party, and populist control all seem to protect resources the state run shot of and protect from the external foe. These less liberal and more authoritarian approaches do not meant to oppress. Instead, all they do is ensure stability most likely for implementing important democratic initiatives ensuring equality and welfare even western democracies fail to provide. Ruling methods may be similar in some ways, as both states use technocrats, conduct governmental business interventions, and apply groupthink in decision-making. The paths of democracy do differ between the states, as Singapore as South Korea had military and American regimes while Singapore started its way with aboriginal elitists with Western educational backgrounds. However, taking the growth index into accounts, Singapore seems more democratized than South Korea is proving a country does not need liberalism to hold the title of a democracy. It is an un-exportable regional democracy adjusted to cultural and national beliefs and mentality. The line of argumentation presented in the project and abundant data allow confirming that the patrimonial political systems of Singapore and South Korea are democracies, although adjusted to regional mentality and socio-cultural vision. These unique democracies do surpass their liberal Western analogues in terms of national growth and even democratization in some ways. Since growth shown as significant in both states is often deemed as in important indicator of democratization, there is no reason to consider these countries undemocratic.
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