During the 1960s and the 1970s, there was high demand for compact, low cost cars in the US. Ford Motor Company was threatened by stiff competition from Volkswagen Beetle. Consequently, it rushed its then newly designed Ford Pinto into the market with blatant disregard for the safety of its customers. The car became notorious for accidents occasioned by rare-end collisions at a speed of over 30 miles per hour. The fuel tank would rupture and burst into flames leading to casualties and in some cases fatalities among the passengers (Tenbrunsel & Bazerman, 2011). It took so long for the decision to recall the said car from the market. With the benefit of hind sight and predicated on the Trevor and Nelson’s eight-step model to ethical decision making, this paper critically assesses the philosophical approaches that influenced the recall decision making of Ford Pinto and the circumstance thereof.
The second step according to the model is the definition of ethical issues. This paper takes the view that Dennis Gioia’s philosophical approach took the form of consequential perspective as opposed to deontological one (SlideShare, 2012). He appears to have focused too much on the implications of the decision to recall the vehicle on the company. Persuaded by the results of the Cost Benefit Analysis, the recall was not justifiable as the economic benefits that accrued to the society in the form of employment and revenue outweighed the cost of loss of human life to the society. Had he taken the deontological philosophical approach, he would not have put a monitory cost on the loss of human life. Consequently, he would have made the decision to recall the vehicle in 1973 as opposed to 1978 (Trevino & Nelson, 2011).
Moreover, the Field Recall Coordinator was inspired by the consequential approach in identifying the affected parties. This is implied from the fact that the company continued to make money of the vehicle despite the loss of lives that followed. He was more concerned with the reputation of the company and monetary benefits that accrued to the company and the society. Had he been inspired by the deontological perspective, he would have given deserving weight on the people affected by the accidents and their dependants (SlideShare, 2012).
In identifying the consequences, the Field Recall Coordinator was more concerned with the short-term consequences as opposed to the long-term one's symbolic ones. He chose not to recall the vehicle at first (Werhane & Moriarty, 2009). As a result, the company saved face and made more profit. Perhaps it was informed by the need to save his job since deciding otherwise would have led to him being sucked. He did not consider the possibility of losing his job or serving a sentence in future were it to be found out that he failed to recall the vehicle when he was supposed to. Furthermore, he failed to consider the symbolic implication of his decision to their customers. The decision not to recall painted the company in a bad light as the message the customers were getting was to the effect that the company did not care about their safety. Therefore, the inference that the Field Recall Coordinator was inspired by the short-term consequences, as opposed to long-term and symbolic ones, is not implausible (SlideShare, 2012).
In addition, the Field Recall Coordinator did not properly identify the obligations of the company to both the passengers and the society. Their obligation to guarantee the safety of the passengers demanded that they alter the design of the vehicle by transferring the fuel tank to safe location irrespective of the cost. However, he disregarded this obligation (Trevino & Nelson, 2011, p. 66).
More so, the decision of the Field Recall Coordinator is best explained by script processing approach (Moberg, 2015). His character and integrity find no expression in the decision. He has reportedly described himself as a typical “child of the 60’s” who held his “principles high,” “wore” his “hair long” and “espoused” his “intentions to help a troubled world.” (Trevino & Nelson, 2011, p. 102) However, these traits are inconsistent with the pattern of his decisions.
The Field Recall Coordinator did not critically think about potential actions at first. Had he, he would have spared the affected parties significant loss and pain without jeopardizing the ability of the company to make a profit yet selling safe and affordable cars (Werhane & Moriarty, 2009, p. 5).
In conclusion, the philosophical approach adopted by the Field Recall Coordinator in the Pinto fire cases was dictated by the script processing. This approach influenced Gioia to disregard deontological considerations demanded by character and integrity over consequentialist considerations. As a result, he failed to internalize all the external social costs in his decisions. If I were in his position, I would have departed from the script and recall the vehicle by sticking to deontological approach.
References
Brennan, J. A. (2013, March 23). Ethical Decision Making: An 8-Step guide. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from DrJoeBrennan: https://drjoebrennan.wordpress.com/2013/03/26/ethical-decision-making-an-8-step-guide/
Moberg, D. J. (2015, November 20). When Good People Do Bad Things at Work. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from Makkular Center for Applied Ethics: https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/business-ethics/resources/when-good-people-do-bad-things-at-work/
SlideShare. (2012). Introduction Eight Steps to Ethical Decision Making. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from SlideShare: http://www.slideshare.net/aggiepride2012/introduction-eight-steps-to-ethical-decision-making
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Bazerman, M. H. (2011, April). Ethical Breakdowns. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from Havard Business Review: https://hbr.org/2011/04/ethical-breakdowns
Trevino, L. K., & Nelson, K. A. (2011). Managing Business Ethics. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Werhane, P. H., & Moriarty, B. (2009). Moral Imaginations and Management Decision Making. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics: http://www.corporate-ethics.org/pdf/moral_imagination.pdf