Introduction
In an effort to respond to the terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 event, governmental authorities struggle to develop intelligent system that monitor and detect suspicious activities in order to be able to identify potential security threats. In this sense, security systems are developed, often at the cost of personal intimacy. Moreover, such systems are far from being perfect, being responsible of accusing innocent people of criminal activities, as the two examined articles, respectively “The Economist’s” If Looks Could Kill (2008) and Wendy Kaminer’s Trading Liberty for Illusion (2012). These two article have common perspectives on the faultiness of the security systems employed by states’ authorities to prevent terrorist or criminal activities, but while Kaminer remains convinced in the lack of practical utility of the protection devices, the article published in “The Economist” expresses confidence in their perfectibility.
Body
“The Economist” article, If Looks Could Kill, presents the technological advancements that U.S. state’s authorities developed with the participation of psychologists and scientists for identifying and mitigating the criminal and terrorist threat. Such systems as “Project Hostile Intent” or “Future Attributable Screening Technology” (FAST) are meant to spot suspicious behavior, associating it with a law abiding intention (The Economist, 2008). However, the writing further informs that these technologies are not yet culturally sensitive. This implies that innocent people belonging to diverse cultures or races could be found guilty because their facial expressions and behavior could be misinterpreted as describing criminal intent, although the initial intent would bear different cultural meaning (The Economist, 2008).
Therefore, “The Economist” article tackles specific breaches that the current safety and defense technology possess, which instead of protecting citizens can be detrimental for them. Kaminer advances similar observations, yet, in a more accusing tone.
In her article, Trading Liberty for Illusions, Wendy Kaminer (2012) raises relevant concerns about the effectiveness of the safety measures employed by the government in developed nations such as United States or Great Britain, indicating that the authorities often abuse their power and civilian protection is not guaranteed. The author further advances her critics on the governmentally controlled safety measures accusing them as being intrusive and violating personal privacy, exemplifying her claims with real life situations, such as police officers stalking innocent women for amusement and photographing civilians without their approval (Kaminer, 2012).
An alarming observation is that the bag checking at the airports are being neglected, while the current devices developed for safety purposes focus on following immigrants or members of specific ethnic groups, discriminatively associated with terrorist activities (Kaminer, 2012). While The Economist article suggests that advancements are conducted for associating human behavior with criminal intent by investigating human gaits (movement of knees, elbows, etc.), such procedures are developed by human beings and carried on by machines (2008).
Face recognition programs, such as “Project Hostile Intent” developed by Department of Homeland Security can lead to wrongly identifying persons from the crowd, which may seem nervous or impatient as a result of feeling anxious of being in another country or flying, confusing them with terrorists (The Economist, 2008). This observation confirms Kaminer’s (2012) concern about the reliability of governmental safety systems. Kaminer (2012) critically evaluates the devices utilized in identifying criminals, finding them unable to really track criminal behavior, in addition to being faulty for having the potential of confusing innocent individuals with law breakers. She expresses her reluctance regarding police systems for felons’ face recognition, stating that “Under guidelines like this, ordinary law abiding citizens who venture out in public might find themselves setting off alarms in facial recognition systems should they ever work properly” (Kaminer, 2012, p. 398).
Both articles suggest that the safety technology currently employed target and persecute immigrants and members of specific races associated with terrorist activities. “The Economist” indicates that FAST program resembles “The Minority Report” film, while in the other writing, the author notes that the surveillance camera are disproportionately focusing on different races (Kaminer, 2012; “The Economist”, 2008). On the other hand, If Looks Could Kill article suggests that the developed security programs are not racially biased, because they focus on grasping micro-expressions that presumably reflect intentions “easily missed by human eyes” (“The Economist”, 2008, para 5). However, considering, the fact that in “The Economist” (2008) text it is also clearly mentioned that the security technologies already employed in public spaces are not culturally and racially sensitive, the claim that these programs avoid racial profiling because they only study behavior is contradictory.
On a more positive note, “The Economist” (2008) shows confidence in the technological advancements. The article indicates that FAST program had only 16 months at the time of the report and was still able to identify 80% of hostile behavior expressed by volunteers involved in an exercise meant to test its accuracy (“The Economist”, 2008). In contrast, Kaminer (2012) manifests no confidence for the governmental safety measures, considering them as ineffective in actually identifying criminal behavior, but also abusive, misogynistic, racial and intrusive.
In sustaining the presented arguments, both texts use the authors’ personal voices, reflecting the fact that they are opinion articles. “The Economist” (2008) article employs secondary reviews to sustain the claims made, which gives credibility to the article. It refers to comments made by Charles Cohen, the coordinator of Cybernet Systems regarding the perfectibility of behavior – recognition systems, or Barry Steinhardt, the head of Technology and Liberty at the American Civil Rights Liberties who observes the intrusive nature of FAST system (“The Economist”, 2008). The article makes use of ethos (credibility), logos (proof) and pathos (emotion), with emphasis on ethos and logos, rather than on pathos (Jeffrey, 2014). On the other hand, the exact opposite happens in Kaminer’s (2012) writing. The writer’s personal voice and the abundant examples on how the security systems violate individual privacy and allow state abuses are meant to persuade the reading public on the wrongdoings of the system by the use of emotions. However, logos is also employed by the author, although it is much more evident in “The Economist” (2008) writing, as it presents a more objective perspective on the technologies employed for providing safety. In addition, another demonstration of pathos use in Trading Liberty for Illusion is the reference to 9/11 event in order to make appeal to human emotions and argue that the defense systems in United States are ineffective.
Conclusion
The gravity of criminal behavior or terrorist attacks is presented in both examined articles. The conducted article comparison found similarities between the two articles, but also differences. However, both “The Economist” (2008) and Kaminer (2012) seem to agree that although the threat is serious, the safety and defense technologies are not yet fitted to face the threat. On the other hand, while “The Economist” indicates a sign of hope in the perfectibility of the safety programs, Kaminer (2012) remains reluctant and negativist to such prospects.
References
Jeffrey, R. (2014) Reason and emotion in international ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kaminer, W. (2012) “Trading liberty for illusions.” Writing in the disciplines: A reader and
rhetoric for academic writers (7th Edition). By Mary Lynch Kennedy and William J.
Kennedy. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education.
The Economist If looks could kill. (2008) Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/12465303.
