Understanding the Local Society in which Counterinsurgency Operations are conducted is Critical to Mission Success. Discuss.
There has been a history in world political affairs when insurgency has forced single or joint counterinsurgency operations, organized in collaboration with the ruling government of that country to help it militarily to defeat insurgent forces. Before writing on counterinsurgency, we need to comprehend its meaning, which is an antonym of insurgency. According to Cambridge Dictionary Online, insurgency refers to a scenario when a country is taken control of by its people through the use of arms and ammunition, in other words, forcefully. Counterinsurgency is opposite in meaning to insurgency; it is: “military action taken by a government to prevent attacks by small groups of soldiers or fighters that are opposed to it” (Cambridge Dictionary Online 1).
In the context of counterinsurgency (COIN) attempts, support of the public where counterinsurgency operations are run, is the most critical element for success in the long-run. Government of a host nation (HN) may align with the counterinsurgency operations but if popular public mindset is not supportive, it reduces the possibility of successful operations. Peoples’ mentality needs to be flexible to understand why foreign troops are landing and hovering over their country. Their interests should also align with the government in function and the forces coming to aid the government to control insurgency activities. In the case of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, it was expected out of the US led combined forces that they would pay attention to local and regional political interests of the people, their grievances, causes of conflicts, and clashes among various groups. Knowledge of culture of the people helps in accurate prediction of peoples’ perspectives. COIN operations faced hardships on these counts whenever their actions had affected the feelings of the local people (US Department of the Navy 15).
Operational environment (OE) needs to be comprehended by the counterinsurgents. This comprehension of the OE should cover among other various aspects, the social aspect of the OE. A successful counterinsurgency demands distinct attention to the social and cultural aspects, providing insurgent leverages with the OE (US Department of the Navy 16).
Any discussion over this topic of counterinsurgency operations and their mission criticality without understanding the local society cannot be completed without elaborating on the American troops’ experiences in Afghanistan. For understanding the COIN scenario, it should start with local population, to be followed by insurgents and then counterinsurgents (US Department of the Navy 168).
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was basically a modern military operation organized by companies of Afghan Northern Alliance and U.S.-British Special Forces. Although the attack was largely successful, situation worsened soon after, necessitating the deployment of traditional military forces to guarantee that insurgency did not revive and get its foot firmly rooted through the Taliban and al-Qaeda (Rotmann et al. 36). Things did not happen as planned by the joint forces of Afghanistan, US, and the UK. A large number of the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces got chance to cross the border and enter Pakistan (Coss 22). The outcome of this, and later failure of ISAF and the newly-functioning Karzai government provided another opportunity to the Taliban to organize their strength after the showdown, and redefine their political agenda, the Taliban soon returned back with more energy to fight back counterinsurgency. Later, by 2006, ISAF had to fight with Taliban insurgents who had transferred their base from rural areas to organizing large scal aggressions in “more populated areas, urban centres, and main infrastructure” (Thruelsen 265).
Socio-cultural elements
It is not so that outsiders cannot make insights of the OE for appreciating socio-cultural elements but their insights are not first-hand impressions. Only a representative voice from the local people can better understand the OE and its resultant complications. Therefore, the host nation (HN) spokespersons need to be included in each aspect of a counterinsurgency operation. Extending the discussion ahead, it will help if we select COIN operations for reflecting on the importance of taking along the local people during counterinsurgency operations to ensure the success of the mission, from joint intelligent preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) to appraisal of COIN. Going deeper into these socio-cultural elements, in the COIN context, these include society, social framework, culture, influence, authority, and stakes (US Department of the Navy 170).
As society is made of groups, a robust analysis of groups needs a mechanism to peep into and evaluate the mentality and support system of people in a group that can help in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, reason being that all people are not equal in a social group. There are four kinds of people from their point-of-view of the government. Another category is that of ‘spoilers’ who strive to create anarchy with the aim of realizing their nefarious ends. They may not participate in any constructive dialog with the government for finding a political solution to the insurgency issues but won’t remain inactive by indulging in corrupt practices, threatening people through coercion and giving least consideration to their responsibility in maintaining law & order. They would discourage progressive strides and create hurdles on the path of change so that it does not put on hold their nefarious activities. Thus, people who form societies are critical players who can thwart or transform counterinsurgency operations into defeat or success (US Department of the Navy 171).
As people are primary indicators of the COIN scenario, they can be either in favor of insurgency, or against insurgency, or favoring government action against insurgency or can remain neutral. The strength of neutral people is any time greater than others. COIN strives to increase the support of neutral and anti-insurgent populations. Both opposing elements of society are related to one other at physical and psychological levels. This connection between them can provide critical inputs about who would record victory, insurgents or counterinsurgents (US Department of the Navy 173). Thus, people are the center of focus and local society insights play a definite and important role in the success of counterinsurgent operations. Knowing the historical background behind distinct behavior of people can help provide insights why they react in a particular way. Better insights into local traditions and providing support to them can help in furthering the mission. Any such support of the guest country forces needs to be relevant to its laws as well as the law of war. The US forces have not been wise enough to learn these lessons. This has been the leading cause of affecting the prestige of the US forces in host nations. Precaution has not been taken by the forces to not cross the line by not giving due consideration to local populations’ specific beliefs (Headquarters, Department of the Army Ch: 4).
As stated above, the five socio-cultural elements play the leading role in providing critical insights, of which society is foremost; JIPOE must analyze societal connections to communities external to the operational field and the impression of society on the total OE. Next socially important element is social structure. Any counterinsurgency operation needs to analyze the social structure or mechanism to help in comprehending how a particular society gets activated and reacts to particular situations. These insights can help in making strides to create HN righteousness, analyze central issues, organize successful information operations (IO), and underscore support of the people to insurgents (US Department of the Navy 174).
In the case of Afghanistan, it is a Muslim country with a distinct set of customs and values. Forces needed to be more involved in their interactions to raise the level of shared understanding. People of Afghanistan have different skill sets, fields of protocol, and behaviors towards female population, etiquettes, sleeping habits, friendly and personal relationships, and level of cleanliness. For the US or any other country to come to the rescue of the ruling government, it is the basic thing to get familiar with the host country’s people, their societal traits, as specified about the people of Afghanistan above, to get their support again insurgency (Headquarters, Department of the Army Ch: 4).
Going ahead with social structures, these are mostly expressed by race and ethnic groups, tribes, institutions and organizations besides other groups and networks. Different racial and ethnic groups have old enmities, creating tension between them. Such rivalries can disrupt the social fabric and become the basis of insurgency or innocent people can become a victim in the hands of insurgents, to be exploited by them. If these groups are identified within and outside the field, including their formal connections and informal links, gaps and cleavages and crosscutting bonds between them, it strengthens the possibility of success in the mission of controlling the insurgency (US Department of the Navy 175).
Racial and ethnic communities of a social structure are mostly the cause of tension and can lead to insurgency or create a debilitating impact on social forces. Tribal communities have different norms that they follow, which becomes the structure of their social order and outlook. In the case of Afghanistan, there are tribal belts. Tribal people are strict followers of their norms and customs. Tribal communities and their relation groups make another tier of identity of the people living there. Loyalty to the clan head is the leading trait of tribal clans, explaining their distinct attitude. The US forces doing counterinsurgency operations may not find a connection with tribesmen’s behavior but there might be other distinct traits (US Department of the Navy 175).
Such flaws as taking bribe might be a common trait of the society in Afghanistan relatively to the US society, which is relatively quite clean on this societal drawback. Not finding other countries respecting the US social standards might look awkward to the US forces involved in counter insurgency but not to the local people and society overall in the host country. Any local government level change of power due to counterinsurgency, resulting in creating pressure to the local administration to perform might be asking for trouble. Their public health system might not work efficiently, as it happens in the US. Any correction measure might offend the local officers or leaders of tribal communities and their families. If self-interest of the local communities seems to be threatened at the hands of forces, they might not react positively although knowing well their position vis-à-vis foreign troops, insurgents, the local goons, the government, and the people. These elements are always on the lookout to approximate their self-interests, dangers, and benefits before committing any favor to the counter insurgency operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army Ch: 4).
Talking of culture aspect in the context of Afghanistan, comments of Lawrence (399) carry weight for acknowledging the role of “tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites and standards” playing critical part. Insight over this human trait felicitates a counterinsurgent to “demonstrate a genuine engagement with the population” and focus on sure shot legitimacy through the “the hearts and minds of the people” (Templar 25); it should be a primary counterinsurgency aim. Assimilating these insights, the counterinsurgents need to function like multidimensional robots, working as “warrior diplomats” (Malvesti 16). They need to behave as if they are equal partners of the people, helping them realising their political goals, aligning them with the government objectives. This strategy can convince social hierarchy of the host country that their interests are also aligned with the interests of counter insurgents. Without developing such understanding with the locals and societies, politically important issues cannot be resolved through counterinsurgency. The reason for this level of expected involvement is that insurgents are also the creation of political, economic and social circumstances of the same land. That’s why the cultural aspect has become a force to reckon with in counterinsurgency actions.
Thus, counterinsurgency efforts should have been focused primarily towards taking and winning the confidence of the affected populations at various levels, including political, social, economic, psychological and local; these are most critical factors. Forces need to exhibit reverence for local people by ensuring their well-being the civilian way, above any other planning of capturing the insurgents. Such an initiative finally looks like an effort “not to win – as if the emotions and aspirations of the local population can be co-opted to the counterinsurgent cause – but to understand and persuade” (Cornish 67). For persuading people in favour of the government, the counterinsurgents need to feel their fears and tensions.
Success of counterinsurgency mission depends on the integration of cultural insights to allow “work by, through, and with indigenous forces and populations” (Lamb & Cinnamond 47). As insurgents in Afghanistan belong to tribal communities, without getting with them locally and culturally involved, a solution to insurgency issues cannot be reached at. Use of cultural insight over Afghan issues has to be at tactical stage for completing counterinsurgency functions, result in taking strategic measures as well to derive a solution that matches the desires of the people.
The most leading behavioural problem among ISAF forces has been their show off of ethnocentrism, which forces one to examining other cultures according to one’s own cultural underpinnings. Without comprehending the political ground realities in Afghanistan where decentralization of political powers between local tribes and central government has a history of being practiced, ISAF tried to enforce their home country practiced central form of political system. Legitimacy of traditional local level civic mechanism was discarded. In a developing country like Afghanistan, unlike the advanced countries of the world, corruption has been rampant, which created many hurdles for the ISAF to hold elections legitimately. As Afghanistan has been primarily a rural country, where a history of “dynastic and religious authority has been unquestioned for over a thousand years” (Kolenda 25). It was a huge mistake on the part of ISAF to create a different political structure in Afghanistan, which did not include the interests of tribal belts of Afghanistan.
The decentralized form of government in Afghanistan had provided enough political rights to local rural tribes; therefore, local stakes had to be catered to by ISAF. As we come to know that a good number of Taliban insurgents were “local allies”, having various grudges of local nature like taking revenge or providing protection to their sect. ISAF ignored these local realities and strived to help in creating a central political mechanism, which was opposed by the Taliban, giving them reason to strengthen their own forces, not assimilating them with the central powers to be (Giustozzi et al. 42).
Culture
We can say that ISAF failed to recognize the cultural identity of the local and tribal people in Afghanistan. Tribal identities were religious in nature, as in the case of Afghan tribes, although in other parts of the world these cultural identities can be national or race-based even, but in Afghanistan tribal and clan connections had personal and historical connotations. When affiliations to various social groups are many, cultural identities are decided by affiliations to these groups. People start prioritizing specific groups over others, which becomes the cause of friction among them, for example, tribal identity may have come in the way of political affiliation (US Department of the Navy 176).
When we talk of cultural values, these are based on beliefs in a particular set of behavior. These values may not be in sync with the wider global and national social system. A conflict between values creates aversion to other people and groups. Perspectives become affected by adopting certain attitudes. It is the procedure a person adopts while taking, digesting, and using that information from the outside environment. Counterinsurgents in Afghanistan failed to provide that legacy to local values and behaviors, the reason of central grievances, peoples’ opinion, and their offering support to the insurgents. Every society has faith on some distinct belief systems. Counterinsurgents should have made attempts to comprehend the Afghani peoples’ belief systems. Rather than assuming things on their own regarding what was right and what was wrong, it was advisable to avoid making such assumptions for a different and traditional society of people such as that of Afghanistan (US Department of the Navy 176).
Each society has its distinct set of cultural forms. These are external expressions of any culture that help them and outsiders even to outline these aspects, which may include dialect, religious ceremonies, signs, and even myths. Knowledge of the cultural forms of the stakeholder people can be the mantra of comprehending the OE in COIN (ibid).
Incidentally, the cultural narrative of the people is the most significant cultural form for counterinsurgents to know. Language helps in communication but it is not just speaking correctly. One needs to understand the social environment, showing respect for people belonging to various social cadres and getting awareness of nonverbal hints. Tribal rituals need to be given not only due respect by counterinsurgents but they need to be understood in the context of their taking place and the meaning attached to them (ibid).
Similarly, local religious or other symbols might be of great value to the people. Counterinsurgents need to show regard for the symbols and know their usage. On the same note, social ceremonies can be important in the religious or state context. These might be some formal presentations, as stipulated in the old traditions or by rule, demanding adherence to showing formal manners. Counterinsurgents should understand the context and meaning of these ceremonies, prevalent in the host country’s society to ensure success to their counterinsurgency mission (ibid).
Another social trait of a society is related to certain myths, which are given sanction and respect. These are old time stories of the past, passing from one generation to the other to state some happening of the past. These create a long-lasting impression in the minds of people for being true phenomena. Counterinsurgents need to understand the resilience of these myths, as they can impact their operations any ways. Another social trait of a society is its narratives that tell the heroic stories of some members of the tribes, happened in the past. These add to the sect or tribe’s worth and character, providing recognition to the entire group. Ideologies get formed from such narratives, as people imbibe those heroic qualities in them (ibid).
Power and Authority
Power in a society can be a coercive force, social strength, economic back up, and in the form of authority. Some power is held formally while some wielding of it can be informal in a social set up. COIN operations should not negate any type of it. Each power group should be identified for gathering relevant information regarding its kind, usage, its acquisition and how to maintain that power (US Department of the Navy 176).
Coercive power is used to pressurize people to gain control over them by insurgents and other non-government groups. Social strength is the result of such social systems where patron-client connection can be seen among people; some influential people offer goods, services, guarantee of safety, or other incentives to their members against the support they need for getting political leverage out of it. Any counterinsurgency operation needs to take note of such socially strong mechanisms when interacting with the people, giving consideration to their focus of impression on such social powers (ibid).
Groups in a society also wield economic power, which can be either through formal means or informal economic means. In Afghanistan, JIPOE should have analyzed these informal economic connections, involved in such activities, as smuggling, black-marketing, bartering etc. During COIN operations, these economic strongholds could have been used to the benefit of government and allied stakeholders to defeat the insurgents. Authority is power that matters when grievances are attended to strengthen the home nation legitimacy, and underscore insurgent activities. When authority is with counterinsurgents, things can better move in their favor and their fight against insurgency (ibid).
Interests
Interests are the stakeholders’ basic incentives that lead to specific behavior that might create problems during COIN operations. These may be related to physical safety, necessary services, economic prosperity, political involvement, and basic grievances. At times, the government does not act to fulfill the interests of social groups and organizations to which people feel attached. Counterinsurgents need to know these interest groups for cutting down support for OE insurgents and building support for the HN government. It is conditional to the success of any joint combat against insurgents that interest of the people look familiar to the counterinsurgent forces (US Department of the Navy 177).
People want to be safe when environment of a country is not peaceful. They want to ensure their and family’s safety, giving it top priority. In the case of host nation forces not capable of providing that security or risk their safety, people prefer to be on the lookout for alternate provisions. If insurgents provide them the surety of security, people accept it, thus, compromising the situation in favor of insurgents. Counterinsurgency operations should ensure the safety of people from risk to their lives. Security to the people can be provided through the prevalent law enforcement system which is judicious and fair in providing safety for all social groups when there is no stable government working to remove the fears of people regarding danger to their lives from warring groups or between insurgents and counterinsurgents (US Department of the Navy 178).
Essential needs of the people of a nation afflicted with internal strife include food, water, attire, home, and health. Fulfilling these essential services of the people can bring stability to the host country’s government, resulting in their active support to the government. Economically prospering societies have no tension of their basic needs, as enough produce is available for rationing and consumption. When society is ruled by authoritarian way, misusing economic resources creates huge income disparity, leading to class differences. People may get aligned with insurgent groups to raise the voice of protest against the ruling class. It can negatively impact the economy and the government. On the contrary, if economic conditions are healthy, society gets inspired from its positive impacts. Another cause of social unrest is not allowing people to get involved in the selection of the government. It happens when their political rights are taken away. JIPOE needed to ensure that all sections of the society were allowed participation; religious and tribal communities were not given partial treatment; Government policies were not adding to the legal and social woes of the people that later on helped insurgents (US Department of the Navy 178).
Grievances of the people are caused when they feel frustrated. This feeling of frustration can be either actual or imagined. These issues create weak spots to the insurgent stories, increasing the possibility of exploitation by the insurgents. If there is no central leadership to lead the people and government has no control, insurgents will take this opportunity to play with the feelings of people. COIN needs to create consensus amongst all stakeholder counterinsurgent parties on people grievances and ameliorating them. These grievances of all sections of the society should be shortlisted and differentiated; what grievances are related to insurgents and what are related to people. An analysis of these grievances needs to be made to know whether these are worth attention, testing them on subjective and objective parameters (US Department of the Navy 178).
The above discussion helps in highlighting the importance of society, critical to ensuring success in the mission of counterinsurgency operations. The example of Afghanistan in the world political history may not be the latest to prove the importance of understanding the local people, their social and cultural traits, role of power and authority and interests of various communities, playing a very critical part in ensuring mission success of COIN operations, but it presents all aspects of society elaborately to help learn the lessons of future COIN operations. Insurgency is a rampant phenomenon, requiring assistance of world powers to run COIN operations. This discussion provides enough detailing of social aspects that can lead the way to success if understood in the right spirit.
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