Introduction
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill started in April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico on the British Petroleum-owned Macondo Prospect. Taking after the blast and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil fix, an ocean depths oil gusher streamed for almost 90 days, polluting the sea water with crude oil and killing off most of the plant and animal life in that ecosystem. Current BP authorities wouldn't remark on the record for this story. Be that as it may, individuals acquainted with within BP's emergency control exertion and outside specialists say at an early stage, BP didn't have an advertising methodology. It neglected to convey the three key messages the general population expected to listen. BP was responsible for the catastrophe, and tried to show that it was profoundly worried about the damage it brought about and had an arrangement to compensate for its carelessness (Freudenberg and Gramling 169).
There's clearly something in this, yet the issue BP has made for itself is that at whatever point things start to look as though they can't in any way, shape or form deteriorate, the organization some way or another figures out how to make them so. Properly or wrongly, the shiftiness over what turned out badly will to the vast majority appear like blame. In the event that officials have lost control of the organization to the White House, they just have themselves to fault. Since the underlying blast on the oil rig in April, BP’s PR department made quite a few stumbles (Benoit 182).
Background:
BP likewise needs to handle that however it may not be so easy, individuals see it that way. The corporate leadership at first said that BP will respect all honest to ‘legitimate claims’ for business compensation from the affected citizens. This was a big gaffe and was immediately seen as an insult since it implied that a lot of ordinary affected people would file false claims to benefit illegally. A correspondent asked what an illegitimate case would resemble. The company representatives replied along the lines of false and illegal cases would be very common in America. The damage done by these initial comments was immeasurable.
Further damage was done by the weak response from the company’s social media team which failed to proactively dispel public doubts about BP’s commitment to environmental sustainability as well as the genuineness of its relief and compensation efforts. If comments and media briefings by top corporate managers did a lot of damage, the work of the PR departments and social media teams failed to undo it and left a lot to be desired. There was no outreach toward the public from platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Freudenberg and Gramling 214).
The Challenge:
Putting your purposeful publicity on Twitter and Facebook doesn't make it any less propagandistic. Be that as it may, it helps an organization react quicker and all the more absolutely to new advancements. At the point when reports turned out that BP was attempting to get anglers to sign waivers holding BP safe from certain cases identified with the cleanup, BP also continued its confused PR strategy on Twitter. They guaranteed the livelihood of the people living in the coastal areas would not be affected, which was not true.
For instance, BP tweeted a hotline for individuals to call in the event that they see oiled natural life. BP isn't the main organization to handle an emergency through new media. The worst crisis was created when its executive chairman Svanberg called the victims affected by the disaster as ‘small people’. This reportedly occurred because Svanberg was not very well-versed in the English language, because his native language was Swedish. This created massive problems for the PR team of British Petroleum as Svanberg was at a loss to explain his gaffe to the media. Most of the American media had already concluded that he had literally meant ‘small people’ when he said that at the news briefing after the meeting with President Obama at the White House. Coming as it did after his meeting with the President, this was seen as doubly backfiring since it implied disrespect or a subtle undermining of Obama’s stand on the issue (Benoit 147).
Svanberg had directly translated what he meant to say from his native Swedish to English and the original meaning had gotten lost in translation. BP did not make much effort in clarifying his comments or trying to issue another comment. In hindsight it seems almost nonsensical that no other PR representative was present at the news briefing that is more adept with words than Svanberg. Allowing just Svanberg to handle most of the media’s questions in the aftermath of the tragedy seems like a very poor choice since he is neither adept at English nor is he trained in communications. Having an authorized PR specialist to conduct the press briefing would have resulted in a far more positive outcome (Guffey and Loewy 94).
Conclusion and Recommendations:
The British Petroleum corporate leadership ought to have been aware of every one of his operations. Amidst the calamity recuperation endeavors not long after his meeting on ABC, another negative feature was distributed. The corporate leadership’s underlying remark ought to have been a solid note of compassion with respect to the requirement for due industriousness in wellbeing. Not only did the initial comments seem out of touch and insensitive, they were perceived as actively distasteful and cemented a very negative public perception of the brand image of British Petroleum (Means 286).
BP's Web website said a lone insignificant number of advisories every day with connections to Twitter and Facebook — a deficient reaction. This has been a war – a war to spare the earth, the employments of families relying upon angling and tourism, and the organization's notoriety. There was no outreach to the local communities in Mississippi and Louisiana on social media nor was there any publicity of the good work done by the company on the ground. Although BP did carry out a lot of ground work in relief, rehabilitation, resettlement and compensation to the victims, it did not publicize these on social media. As a result it failed to wipe out the blot associated with its brand image (White 192).
There was a lot of speculation in the media that B.P. had been let off lightly by the US Government, which only prompted further tough action by the Obama administration against the company. U.S. exempted BP rig from effect study, searches repulsive for BP and a government office. The article showed BP campaigned for an exception with a specific end goal to evade a natural effect examination. The waiver was purportedly elastic stamped by the Minerals Management Service of the Interior Department. The Obama Administration likewise deservedly got feedback for its underlying lukewarm treatment of the mishap.
Best practices to minimize the harm, BP ought to have instantly achieved a number of steps. Issuing consistent, incessant advancement reports, controlling the photos, showing sympathy as a concerned corporate substance contained bona fide individuals constantly attempting to tackle the issues, are some of them. What BP needs to do is establish positive rapport with environmental organizations and pride genuine CSR-oriented support to local communities affected by the disaster. This could include a pledge to stop lobbying for tax benefits and also pay for the future education and well-being of the children and orphans affected by the oil spill disaster.
Works Cited
Benoit, Peter. The BP Oil Spill. Chicago: Scholastic Publishing, 2012. Print.
Freudenberg, William. and Robert. Gramling. Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America. Boston: MIT Press, 2011. Print.
Guffey, M. and D. Loewy. Essentials of Business Communication. Mason: South-Wwestern Cengage Learning, 2015. Print.
Means, T. Business Communication. Mason: South-Western Cengage, 2012. Print.
White, C. Social Media, Crisis Communication, and Emergency Management: Leveraging Web 2.0 Technologies. New York: CRC Press, 2011. Print.
