Introduction
Domestic terrorist acts in the United States have been committed by a combination of native ideological sects, individuals representing what are considered to be extremist ideologies, and internationally-based terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2011 Al-Qaeda sponsored terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was implemented (Furlow, 2005). The primary objective of the Department of Homeland Security can be seen as terrorism prevention. Although prevention of terrorism does not eradicate its ideological causes per se, the act of prevention can aid in the identification and potential eradication of systemic vulnerabilities. Whether stemming from domestic or international sources, terrorist acts committed within the boundaries of the United States share similar, interrelated causes. Those causes include opposing ideologies to U.S. government policies, ideologies that represent racial or ethnic conflicts, a real or perceived inequity of resources (e.g. economic), and an inability to establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships (e.g. trade partnerships) (Furlow, 2005).
Significant acts of terrorism that have occurred on U.S. soil since the mid-1990s include the Oklahoma City bombing, 9/11, and the Boston Marathon bombings. All three incidents were committed by individuals who harbored ideologies that conflict with U.S. government policy, include right wing and Islamic extremism. In addition to conflicting with U.S. government policy, these ideologies are also in direct conflict with the values that the U.S. collectively represents. Furthermore, the individuals who committed these terrorist acts did so in direct response to disagreement with the U.S. government’s superpower status, in particular its economic stronghold. Research collected on the terrorist acts also indicates perceived managerial and systemic failures within various law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI (Hu, Knox, & Kapucu, 2014). While the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies have measures in place that are effective at monitoring suspicious activity, it is debatable as to whether these measures are truly proactive. It would seem that the extremist ideologies themselves are the root cause that stem from actual or perceived resource inequity. Although full eradication of terrorist acts is unlikely (Marvel, 2014), the reduction of extremist ideologies is necessary. The U.S. government can achieve this reduction via education measures and the implementation of policies that promote greater resource equity.
Historical Event Analysis
The Oklahoma City bombing occurred on April 19, 1995 and was motivated by extreme opposition to the U.S. government and its actions against the Branch Davidian complex in Texas (Walker, 2009). Two individuals, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were responsible for using explosives to damage a federal building. The incident resulted in numerous deaths and injuries (Walker, 2009). McVeigh and Nichols chose a target that was representative of the federal government, a choice that was more or less symbolic. Although certainly misplaced, McVeigh’s choice of target was meant to attack the source of what he believed to be his adversary – the U.S. federal government.
The motivation for the Oklahoma City bombing was not necessarily ignited by underlying animosity towards the U.S. government, but by its military action against a religious cult. Although not mentioned in the literature, it is highly likely that McVeigh had an affinity towards the existence of the Branch Davidian sect and its religious ideologies. The Branch Davidian sect was considered to be a cult, consisting of practices and lifestyles outside of the norm. It is probable that McVeigh’s animosity towards the U.S. government and its actions against the Branch Davidians was rooted in what appeared to be hypocrisy. The U.S. Constitution cements freedom, including freedom of speech and religious practice. McVeigh likely held the perspective that by taking military action against the Branch Davidians, the U.S. government was not living up to its own values. In correlation with the idea of the U.S. government failing to live up to its own promise is the likely probability that McVeigh’s own wishes, values and vision for religious freedom and the right to bear arms were in direct conflict with the government’s actions. The Oklahoma City bombing was as much an act of retaliation as it was an attempt to sway the U.S. government towards an implementation of the law that coincided with McVeigh’s interpretation of it.
Following the Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in the most amount of damage and loss of life. Although the 9/11 attacks were not committed by U.S. citizens, the attacks were the largest coordinated set of attacks to date on U.S. soil. Those who were responsible for committing the attacks had infiltrated the U.S. and were living in the country largely undetected. Following the attacks, officials within the George W. Bush administration cited misunderstood foreign policy as one of the causes (Powell, 2004). In other words, the goal of U.S. foreign policy is not to strip other countries of economic resources, cause war-related infrastructure damage, or impose U.S. beliefs, but to promote peace and better the lives of disadvantaged populations (Powell, 2004). Opponents to this view believe that the intrusive manner of U.S. foreign policy is one of the root causes of international terrorism, including acts by international terrorist groups committed on U.S. soil (Nuzzo, 2004).
Similar to the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City bombing, Al-Qaeda members hold extremist beliefs that are in direct opposition to the U.S. government. Islamic extremism is also in direct opposition to the predominate religion in the United States – Christianity. This is not to say that the Islamic religion itself is at odds with Christianity, but rather the extremist interpretation of Islam. It is well-documented that former Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden had declared war on the United States for its military presence in the middle east, support of Israel, and economic sanctions against Islamic countries. Although the 9/11 attacks were not the first act of terrorism against the United States by Al-Qaeda, they attacked symbols of the U.S. government and economic strength. Al-Qaeda attacked and destroyed symbolic representations of ideologies the group vehemently disagreed with. Like the Oklahoma City bombing, that vehement disagreement was further fueled by the (in) actions of the U.S. government against something the group had a personal affiliation with. In addition, the manner in which Al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 attacks was a direct statement regarding the freedom of the American way of life. By exploiting systemic vulnerabilities, the terrorist acts also sought to damage the American notion of freedom.
The Boston Marathon bombings carried out a similar objective. Also committed by individuals associated with Islamic extremism, the bombings targeted an event representing the American way of life. Due to the liberties enjoyed by the American people, open participation in hobbies and events related to those interests are possible. The Boston Marathon bombings sought to disrupt the idea of freedom and perpetuate the idea that Americans are not safe to enjoy freedom. This terrorist act differs somewhat from the other two in that there was not a direct attack on a government building or a building that represented economic strength. Rather it seemed to be an attack on American free will, which perhaps is enjoyed by American citizens due to U.S. government global economic policies and military prowess. In other words, it was an attack against the American ethnocentrism that turns a blind eye to the way in which the country is able to sustain freedom for its citizens – at the expense of other countries and their populations.
Analysis of Deterrents and Antiterrorism Measures
The effectiveness of deterrents and antiterrorism measures became a focus of the U.S. government following the September 11th attacks. The very public focus became centered on not only preventing loss of life, but being able to synthesize and respond to intelligence across multiple law enforcement agencies. An inability to predict a planned terrorist attack and effectively respond to intervene any such attack emerged as a political hot topic, as well as an opportunity for political parties to shape their identity around terrorism prevention (Marvel, 2014).
The formation of a centralized organization – the U.S. Department of Homeland Security – was in direct response to the lack of coordination amongst multiple agencies that many believed was one of the causes of the inability to prevent 9/11 (Marvel, 2014). Homeland Security is an antiterrorism measure in and of itself, as it controls and coordinates the flow of information regarding suspicious activity. In addition, the passage of the Patriot Act legalizes the increased surveillance of activity within the United States, and the sharing of intelligence amongst various agencies (Marvel, 2014). One can point out that these measures alone failed to prevent the Boston Marathon bombings and other smaller-scale terrorist acts, such as the San Bernardino shootings. Yet, large-scale attacks such as 9/11 have not yet occurred.
An argument against the effectiveness of a centralized organization (e.g. Department of Homeland Security) is that its hierarchical, bureaucratic type structure impedes it from being able to respond effectively to ambiguous environments (Marvel, 2014). Organizational behavior theories outside the scope of antiterrorism measures back up the assertion that hierarchical organizations perform well in environments characterized by instability, complexity and unpredictability (Marvel, 2014). In reality, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security appears to be a massive front that simply consolidates the security measures and activities that were already being performed by other agencies prior to the 9/11 attacks. On the surface, there is an advantage to having those measures and activities performed “under one roof” if nothing else for the sense of being able to have access to and compile information more swiftly. Furthermore, a centralized agency can develop and implement responses to events as a unit, rather than having to seek out collaborative partnerships with multiple agencies, all of which may have conflicting policies, procedures, and best practices.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was also formed and implemented in response to 9/11. While the TSA is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the safety of public travel within the U.S., this measure was put into place in response to the means in which 9/11 was accomplished. The TSA and its evolving enhanced security measures for the travelling public may deter potential terrorists from using the same means as the 9/11 hijackers, but this measure overlooks other potential avenues terrorists can take. In fact, the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the TSA, and the Patriot Act are indeed reactive. In other words, these are measures and deterrents based on an attack model that has already happened. These measures and deterrents do not anticipate attack models that may happen outside of the 9/11 blueprint. Arguably, this is one of the reasons why the Boston Marathon bombings were not prevented by the Department of Homeland Security.
Although some may argue that the principles of American freedom open up multiple avenues for terrorists to take advantage of, the reality is that terrorism occurs as the result of conflict between what the U.S. government stands for and other groups that are disadvantaged as a result of U.S. government ideology. The U.S. government spends more on its military than any other Westernized nation (Furlow, 2005). Globalization and the advancement of capitalism throughout the world have also primarily benefited the U.S. from an economic perspective (Furlow, 2005). From an outsider’s perspective, U.S. foreign policy also typically assumes that the economic model of capitalism and U.S. ideology is superior to others (Furlow, 2005). Globalization in effect strips resources from less developed or less prominent countries and transfers those resources into those that hold the power (i.e. “make the rules”). As less developed or prominent countries may not have the resources to form a military, terrorist acts become a means of unconventional warfare (e.g. retaliation).
In order to be effective, an antiterrorism measure or deterrent cannot simply focus on the means by which terrorists commit their acts, but on why. A more effective measure would be to examine U.S. foreign and domestic policies to see where these policies might be overstepping or giving rise to friction with certain groups. Of course, it is impossible to prevent all conflict between the U.S. government and other countries or ideological groups. By the nature of its existence, a government can instill feelings of mistrust and opposition. Still, a more proactive approach would be able to identify those points of opposition and work towards resolving those conflicts before they escalate into acts of violence.
Recommendations
As Timothy McVeigh was motivated to commit the Oklahoma City bombing in response to his disagreement over the U.S. government’s use of military force against private citizens (Furlow, 2005), perhaps the U.S. government needs to analyze its use of power. Terrorist acts are not only acts of unconventional warfare, but political statements (Furlow, 2005). This is not to suggest that the U.S. government should apologize for its superpower status, but to look at its responses to events within the global and domestic spheres. Is it ethical to push the economic model of capitalism and American ideology throughout the globe? Does the U.S. government need to maintain its expansive military footprint and presence in countries that were founded on different ideologies and economic systems? While the U.S. government often does this in the name of promoting peace and stability, prior to the Obama Administration, there was more of a focus on using its military prowess to enforce U.S. ideology. While it does not seem reasonable for the U.S. government (or its citizens) to completely abandon its ideology, it does seem reasonable to question whether that ideology is the only effective one. With power comes responsibility, and there is little doubt that the U.S. government’s foreign policy does at times accomplish objectives for the greater good. Yet, it is well documented that U.S. foreign policy is the primary driver behind anti-American sentiment (Furlow, 2005). It would be much better to identify why and where U.S. foreign policy is giving rise to these sentiments, and look for ways to modify said policy to reduce friction.
Conclusion
Acts of domestic terrorism occur as the result of conflict between what the U.S. government stands for and groups that feel as though they suffer as a direct result. Extremist ideologies form in response to actions and policies the U.S. government takes that perhaps oversteps its boundaries. In other words, those actions and policies are viewed as an abuse of power, and extreme opposition arises as an unconventional means of retaliating against that perceived abuse of power. Unfortunately, the predominate antiterrorism measures and deterrents employed by the United States further build on the notion of centralized power and structure. Although these measures have been effective at preventing terrorist acts committed by the same means as 9/11 or the Oklahoma City bombing, they have failed to prevent future small-scale terrorist attacks that fall outside those means. A more proactive approach that seeks to determine where U.S. government actions are causing friction and rise to extremist ideologies (e.g. education) and the implementation of more collaborative policies that promote greater economic/resource equity is needed.
References
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Hu, Q., Knox, C. C., & Kapucu, N. (2014). What Have We Learned since September 11, 2001?
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Marvel, J. D. (2014). The Boston Marathon Bombings: Who's to Blame and Why It Matters for
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Nuzzo, A. (2004). Reasons for Conflict: Political Implications of a Definition of
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Powell, C. L. (2004). A Strategy of Partnerships. Foreign Affairs, 83(1), 22-34
Walker, J. (2009). The Paranoid Center. Reason, 41(5), 30-38.
