Democracies do not go to War with One Another
The correlation between democracy and war has been a major concern for various political commentators globally. The statement that democratic states rarely go to war is correct and is supported by many scholars. According to Rummel (1999, p. 10), democracy abhors any conceivable form of politically instigated violence. The statement that democratic states do not go to war is, therefore, justified and this behavior can be attributed to the makeup of a normal democratic country. Aspects such as respect for human rights, compliance with the rule of law and the presence of a competitive political setup have arguably contributed to non-violent democratic states (Rummel, 1999, p. 10).
A look at the statistics regarding wars, especially armed conflicts between states offers more support for the position that democracies do not fight. War is sometimes defined as violent confrontations where more than 100 people are killed (Rummel, 1999, p. 10). Using such a definition, 706 countries were involved in a war between 1816 and 1991. None of these engagements saw two democracies fight. Most of the cases saw nondemocracies fighting each other, followed by cases of democracies engaged in warfare with nondemocracies (Rummel, 1999, p. 10).
A point, however, needs to be made that democracies, in some instances go to war. There are a few cases where democratic states have engaged in warfare, once their issues were not resolved. A prime example is the Kargil War of 1999 which was fought between two entirely democratic states; India and Pakistan (Perkins, 2014). Such instances offer insight into the real nature of the concept of “democratic peace”. According to Perkins (2014), some democracies may fight, but a majority of the relationships between democratically elected governments are strong and characterized by peace.
The explanations that most scholars give as reasons for democracies not engaging in armed conflicts arise from the arguments made by Immanuel Kant, in his work, ‘Perpetual Peace’. This piece offers a concrete explanation of how the concept of democratic peace works. According to Kant, constitutional republics are the ingredients of a peaceful world. This Is because the actions of such republics are guided by the wishes of the majority (Cederman, 2001, p. 16). Peace is always the case since a majority of the people despise war. War is only an option once such states need to defend themselves. The argument, therefore, is that democracies, due to their peaceful nature are more constrained regarding engaging in violent military confrontations with their neighbors (Cederman, 2001, p. 16).
The explanations given regarding the fact that democracies do not fight can be viewed from a number of perspectives. First is the approach that suggests that democracies do not engage in war as a result of the norms that govern the country. This approach sees democratic states as embracing a culture of peaceful conflict resolution; within and without the state (Hagre, 2014, p. 162). As pointed out in Kant’s argument, democracies have to respect the views of a majority of the public. The majority expects governments to apply norms that dictate a state to uphold peace and negotiation. When it comes to international relations, the norms used within the states are extended internally (Maoz, 2006, p. 405). To this end, democracies try to come up with compromises during conflict situations. Just like the states reject the complete removal of a political loser internally, democratic countries do not engage in a war where one party is completely crushed.
Another approach in conceptualizing why democracies do not fight touches on the legislation that governs the political class in democratic States. In normal democratic countries, public debates inform the direction which policy and the actions of the leaders take. The implication is that a leader interested in war needs to convince the public that war is necessary. The constraint placed on the leaders by the legislation in democracies, therefore, comes out as a factor that makes democracies not engage in war (Hagre, 2014, p. 162). Given that war is usually costly, many democratic leaders find it difficult to convince the public and the legislature that a state needs military action. The threat of impeachment is also a factor that makes indulgence in war an undesirable option for leaders (Weart, 2000, p. 42). Another explanation for the fact that democracies do not go to war is the ability to show resolve on the side of leaders (Weeks, 2008, p. 40). To this end, democratic states offer a leader the opportunity to prove their ability to reach a solution without incurring significant costs.
A major factor that informs democracies not to enter into violent confrontations is the aspect of mobilization. Leaders who begin to war need to weigh whether they will gain re-election after the war is over. The pressure of reelection, therefore, makes leaders opt against military action (Hagre, 2014, p. 163). Besides, democracies are not particularly attractive targets in war. Leaders in these states are always ready to give anything to win to maintain a good image to the people. The implication is that leaders will less likely engage in wars against other democracies; wars they are unsure of winning.
Another factor that reduces the chances of democracies engaging in war is the issue of joint interests. Most of these states may have conflicts between each other, but the benefits they share may be many in comparison to the costs of war (Hagre, 2014, p. 163). To this end, leaders may choose to emphasize on the joint interests as opposed to violent engagements. In most cases, the states agree to mutual withdrawal in war, which paves the way for benefits on both sides in the conflict.
The study of the correlation between democracies and war indicates that most democracies do not enter into war. An interesting point to note, however, is that democracies do not necessarily cause peace (Dafoe, Oneal, & Russett, 2013, p. 205). The failure to engage in warfare may be as a result of complex dynamics within the democratic setup.
Bibliography
Cederman, L.-E. 2001, "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the democratic peace as a macrohistorical learning process.". American Political Science Review 95.1, pp. 15-32.
Dafoe, A., Oneal, J., & Russett, B. 2013, "The democratic peace: Weighing the evidence and cautious inference." . International Studies Quarterly 57.1, pp. 201-214.
Hagre, H. 2014, "Democracy and armed conflict.". Journal of Peace Research 51.2, pp. 159-172.
Maoz, Z. 2006, Network polarization, network interdependence, and international conflict, 1816–2002. Journal of Peace Research 43.4, pp. 391-411.
Perkins, I. (2014, June 20). Why don’t democracies fight each other? Retrieved May 24, 2016, from washingtonpost.com: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/20/by-ivan-perkins-why-dont-democracies-fight-each-other/
Rummel, R. 1999, "Democracies don’t fight democracies." . Peace Magazine , pp. 10.
Weart, S. R. (2000). Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another. Yale University Press.
Weeks, J. L. 2008, Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. International Organization 62.1, pp. 35-64.
