On the 18th December 1975, Maureen Kelly proceeded to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to challenge the ruling of a nonjury trial regarding her unlawful entry to the Statler Hotel. In the earlier trial, she was convicted of violating D.C Code of 1973 by showing up in the hotel premises after being issued a barring notice. The Court of Appeals later decided that the appellate was guilty of the allegations since the hotel’s management had issued a warning for her arrest (Court Listener, 2016). Nonetheless, one may wonder whether this ruling is justifiable. Precisely, does the hotel management have significant rights to issue a barring license? Additionally, was the argument presented against the appellate enough to justify the second ruling? In the establishment of the validity of this ruling, it is essential to relate this case to others and base the argument on a legal perspective. Overall, I agree with the court’s ruling since Kelly clearly violated the barring notice and she somewhat posed a threat to the premises due to her criminal profile.
Initially, Kelly and her counsel appeared before the court with an acquittal motion from the barring notice issued by the hotel’s management. In the first instance, the court denied this request with a rationale that she posed a threat to the premises due to her criminal record. With reference to the Drew v. the United States case of 1972, the court established that there was a cause for conviction since the appellant, Drew, failed to leave the plaintiff’s restaurant after a lawful request by the one lawfully in charge of the restaurant (Court Listener, 2016). Similarly, Kelly ought to have respected the management’s initiative of not showing up in the hotel after issuance of the notice. In spite of the fact that there exist some differences between these accounts, it is essential to note that in both cases, the appellants go contrary to the requests issued by the people in authority. As such, there is no justification for the appellant’s presence in the Statler Hilton hotel.
Arguably, the hotel management has the authority to determine the people who use their premises. With reference to the Hoppy vs Thompson’s case of 1949, an innkeeper is justified to issue or revoke entry licenses of the visitors. In cases where a visitor calls on an individual with a license for pleasure caused by intercourse, the innkeeper has the right to revoke the guest’s license and to ask the guests to leave (Wasserman, 2004). This case can be undeniably related to the current one. In fact, there is a high similarity index in the outcomes of both events. The chief security officer at Statler Hotel requested Kelly not to show up in the hotel after that encounter and explained that they had made that decision based on her criminal records. As such, regardless of the legal entry posesed by Kelly’s male client’s, it was justifiable to issue a barring notice and to arrest her for the violation of the earlier request for the hotel’s authority has the responsibility to safeguard the welfare of all its clients. Therefore, there is a justification for the prohibition of her conviction upon entry in the hotel.
The ruling would not have been very different if the case was determined in the concurrent society. This is largely accredited to the fact that the current laws respect he management’s authority in the determination of the parties that utilize their property. Precisely, in the Winston vs the D.C Housing Authority (DHCA), the court determined that there was a cause for conviction of the plaintiff, Mr. Winston, for being sited at a housing complex after issuance of a barring notice. In this case, the plaintiff was arrested in two accounts and charged with unlawful entry in spite of the fact that he was a guest to a resident of the complex and a friend to multiple individuals within the complex (The Public Defense Service, 2016). Nonetheless, the government maintains that the party issuing the barring notice has to possess sufficient reasons for restricting entry. The fact that Kelly has a standing criminal record is enough to cause her conviction regardless of legally being a guest. Like Mr. Winston, she ought to be convicted.
Conclusively, the appellant’s grounds for reversal are invalid as they pose an insignificant impact to the final ruling. For instance, claiming that the barring notice was discriminately issued is unjustifiable since she had a standing criminal record. Additionally, the fact that she violated the terms of the barring notice by showing up in the premises after a period makes her guilty of unlawful entry. The situation would have been different if she filed a discrimination complaint prior to visiting the hotel. Moreover, previous court rulings related to this case emphasized the importance of respecting the management’s jurisdiction with regard to issuance of guest licenses and revoking them. Statler hotel had the right to deter Kelly’s presence to their premises on the argument that she posed a significant security threat due to her criminal record. Additionally, her arrest is justifiable even in the modern society as she undermines authority. As a result, I agree with all the rulings issued regarding her trial.
References
Court Listener. (2016). Kelly v. United States, 348 A.2d 884 – CourtListener.com. Court Listener. Retrieved 20 February 2016, from https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2350593/kelly-v-united-states/
The Public Defense Service. (2016). In an unlawful entry case based on the violation of a barring notice, the government has to prove the barring notice is valid. Pdsdc.org. Retrieved 20 February 2016, from http://www.pdsdc.org/professional-resources/criminal-law-blog/criminal-law-post/pds-criminal-law-blog/2015/01/26/in-an-unlawful-entry-case-based-on-the-violation-of-a-barring-notice-the-government-has-to-prove-the-barring-notice-is-valid
Wasserman, R. (2004). Procedural due process. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
