Introduction
In November 1960, the Republicans lost the presidential election, and a Democratic Party candidate John Fitzgerald Kennedy became the president of the United States. A relatively young man (43 years), he represented a new generation of American politicians. Veterans of the war years, a generation embodied by Dwight Eisenhower, were to leave the politics in the US. In the Soviet Union, a “war generation” remained in power until the mid-1980s. In France, Germany, and other countries of the Western Europe the same generation continued to reign.
The Kennedy team was to revise the postulates of the military-political line of the previous administration. However, innovations of John F. Kennedy and the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who was considered one of the most prominent figures of the new administration, were not revolutionary. The democratic administration began to realize the fact that the Republican administration understood but did not want to accept – both the Soviet Union and the United States were vulnerable to nuclear strikes. Americans could not prevent Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike US territory, instead of the enormous military potential of the United States. Therefore, the rivals for the world hegemony had no incentive to risk total war and annihilation with the use of the nuclear arms.
While during the presidency of Eisenhower, the all-or-nothing approach ruled the debate around nuclear policy, Kennedy selected a more flexible position, allowing negotiations with the Soviet Union. Kennedy was advised to act more selectively and use “controlled escalation” instead of Eisenhower’s “unlimited escalation”. The goal of this approach was to manage local conflicts by adjusting the scale and not allowing further escalation, which could lead to a total war. Eisenhower’s philosophy differed cardinally. His “New Look” focused on the use of air and nuclear power. Eisenhower was ready to use nuclear arms even in the response to the Soviet provocation by conventional arms, thus, respond “asymmetrically”. The concerns that proliferation of nuclear weapons caused, led to a moratorium on nuclear testing, which showed that both leaders of superpowers recognized dangers, associated with the use of nuclear arms. However, this agreement was not enforced at that time. According to Craig (1998), Eisenhower’s position was more reasonable, as both parties realized that nuclear war cannot be won, and peace was the only option. On the other hand, Kennedy’s diplomatic approach may have been interpreted as a sign of weakness and to encourage the Soviet Union to more activity on the international arena (as cited in Woods, 2003).
Situation in the world before “flexible response” doctrine
During the Eisenhower’s administration, the United States were engaged in local conflicts at various scales. Sometimes, as in the case of Korea, Americans participated in the wide-scale war, in other cases, for instance, in Guatemala, covert CIA operations were used to overthrow governments that irritated the United States. Eisenhower’s “domino theory” led to inevitable escalation of those local conflicts that were not in the area of American national interests. The mere presence, often imaginable, of the Soviet Union in these peripheral areas, turned them into the concern of American foreign policy. Eisenhower did not want to let the Soviet Union increase its influence in any continent on the Earth. On the other hand, the Soviet leader Khrushchev demonstrated his readiness for negotiations by dropping territorial claims against Turkey and restoring diplomatic relations with Israel and Greece. Besides, Khrushchev recognized West Germany and withdrew the armed forces from Austria. At the same time, while the Soviet Union was drawing back from the center – Europe, it tried to claim itself as a world power, equal to the USA, in the Third World: in Africa, South-Eastern Asia, Latin America. As the USSR interfered in Congo, Laos, or Indonesia, the value of these countries for the national interests of the USA raised and required an imminent response, according to “domino theory”, which claimed the vital importance of every involved domino piece in the rivalry of two superpowers (Cohen, 1993).
Following the victory of Kennedy in the presidential race, Khrushchev attempted to send signals to the newly elected president about his readiness to maintain status quo in Europe and establish rules for peaceful geopolitical competition elsewhere. However, the first face-to-face meeting of two leaders proved to be unproductive, as goodwill and positive intentions of Khrushchev and Kennedy crashed against ideological differences of the two opponents. During his first day as a President, Kennedy faced the legacy of the Eisenhower administration: crises in Congo, Laos, Cuba, - all of them turning to the Soviets; another item on the agenda was a covert operation against Castro, planned by the CIA and to be implemented in the Bay of Pigs by Cuban exiles. This intervention failed, bringing humiliation to the Kennedy’s administration and damaging the reputation of the United States around the world (Cohen, 1993).
The events, preceding the presidency of Kennedy and the crises that took place during his administration, represent one chain of actions and reactions, misunderstanding and misjudgments. Berlin and Cuban missile crises brought confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to a new level. Only one misstep, one link of this chain could have led to the nuclear war and massive destruction. Fortunately, the leaders of both superpowers recognized a perilous proximity of the Third World War and managed to negotiate in the situation of ultimate conflict.
“Flexible Response” Doctrine: advantages, disadvantages, and effects
Flexible response is in the American foreign policy concept during the administration of John F. Kennedy, which refers to a flexible approach of the use of force in a hypothetical conflict with the Soviet Union. This approach was based on the controlled escalation strategy, which allowed conflict management and its retention at the pre-nuclear level (Hastedt, 2004). It is believed that the United States began to act in accordance with the concept of “flexible response” in the spring of 1961.This concept was developed, supplemented and being completed until 1967, when it was officially approved by the other NATO countries.
Kennedy’s doctrine sought to response to two dangers of that epoch. First, he wanted to prevent nuclear war and focused on the selection of response tools from multi-optional repertoire, depending on the international situation. Second, when on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev declared support for “wars of liberation” in the Third World, Kennedy perceived it as a threat to American national interests, which had to be addressed and protected properly. This perception of two dangers led to McNamara’s “flexible response” strategy. These two elements were considered as complementary and, as a whole, were expected to mitigate tension between two superpowers. Both ideas – “respond flexibly” to the threat from the Soviet Union, not succumbing to the tiny “Communist provocations” on the one hand, and to be ready for the first pre-emptive strike if necessary, on the other – existed side by side in the American political guidelines for 1961 and 1962. Kennedy’s advisers assumed that local crises, if left untreated, could have aggravated into global confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is why the USA had to eliminate all the troubles at the local level and meanwhile, keep the dialogue with the USSR going. Therefore, the approach of the Kennedy’s administration presented a mélange of political idealism (attainment of a world order) and hardcore realpolitik (defense of national interests) (Hartley, 1971).
Both approaches were reflected in the actions of the Kennedy administration. First, Kennedy entered in a dialogue with Khrushchev on arms control and resulted in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, prohibiting nuclear tests in three environments: in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. President Kennedy and his administration viewed this treaty, signed in Moscow, not only as an important agreement on curbing the nuclear arms race and cleaning the atmosphere from radioactive fallout, but also as a starting point for further measures in the direction of easing international tension. Only in 1963, President John F. Kennedy came to conclusion that the pre-emptive strike on the Soviet Union was unacceptable, because the USSR’s powerful military potential could not be destroyed with one blow.
Second, in order to demonstrate friendliness of the United States and gain allies in Latin America, where influence of Communist parties grew, Kennedy’s administration worked out new policy, known as “Alliance for Progress”. This policy was officially proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in his speech on March 13, 1961 at the White House in front of the Latin American diplomats and members of Congress. The policy focused on social and economic reforms to defuse tension and growing alienation of Latin America from the United States. As a concrete action program, it was adopted at the special session of the Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Uruguayan city of Punta del Este in August, 1961. In the framework of the program “Alliance for progress”, the United States promised to provide Latin America with about two billion dollars per year during 10 years. Latin American countries also undertook to implement plans of economic and social development, including economic growth of 2.5% per year, democratic reforms, etc. (Paterson, Clifford & Hagan, 2000).
However, the strategy that tried to answer to two threats and integrate them in one doctrine was contradictory in its core. The actions of the States that sought to make the world safer and support change in the developing world were interpreted as a hostile attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the United States. Moreover, Kennedy and his advisors overestimated possibilities of the United States to contain Soviet influence everywhere in the world. Besides, the Kennedy administration seemed unaware of differences between local conflicts, caused by various cultures, local political conditions, economic development. The intervention of the United States in politics of the developing countries did not take into account this diversity(Hartley, 1971).
Harsh anti-communism of the Kennedy’s administration also did not help in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. Generally, Kennedy committed the same mistakes in the foreign affairs, as his predecessors in the office – Truman and Eisenhower. He helped anti-communists to seize the power in the developing countries and establish dictatorships, while combating against social justice movements that were alleged to be supported by Communists (Woods, 2003). Bose argues (1998) that Kennedy’s approach only strengthened Khrushchev’s anxiety and contributed to Cold War tensions (cited in Woods, 2003).
Kennedy’s successor in the office, Lyndon B. Johnson generally followed the doctrine of “flexible response”. He assumed that containment of communism could be achieved by negotiations with the Soviet Union and military preparedness. Besides, he supported the countries of the Third World with economic and military aid, and political advice. Confidence in the power of the USA, resulted from the successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, created an optimistic outlook about future possible conflicts, as it was assumed that if the USSR “blinked” in the eye-to-eye confrontation in the Carribean, what possibly could prevent the United States from establishing the world order? The Vietnam war shuttered this confidence and over-optimistic attitude of “flexible response” policy. As Hartley suggests, “the seeds of its destruction were contained in its own contradictions and, above all, in its failure to stay within the modest bounds of reality” (1971, p. 87).
Relations with Russia
Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists. In 1991, the world witnessed the break-up of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Its political successor, Russian Federation, continues its military expansion, as its leader, President Putin, apparently hopes to return the past glory and influence of the USSR. These hopes and aggressive politics was reflected in the 2008 August war with the Republic of Georgia and consequent recognition of the independence of South Osseti and Abkhazia, regions, which historically were part of Georgia but now are heavily influenced by Russia. Furthermore, in 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninnsula, which was a part of Ukraine, and supports the separatistic movements in other parts of Ukraine: Donetsk and Luganst. Both Georgia and Ukraine repeatedly expressed their will to join the NATO and the European Union. The events that followed these proclamations have clearly demonstrated that Vladimir Putin views these steps as threat from the NATO to the national interests of Russian Federation.
Even though the presidency of Barack H. Obama began with the Russian reset and sought to improve relations between the United States and Russia, this attempt failed, as the events in Ukraine showed Russia’s commitment to pursue its national interests, while ignoring the international law and critique of the West. Recently, Russia’s military intervention in the conflict in Syria demonstrated that Mr. Putin does not care about reactions of the international community to Russia’s activities and will proceed with the policies that satisfy Russia’s interests.
Conclusion
Kennedy’s presidency from the beginning stood under the sign of the new and unusual: the first president born in the twentieth century, he was the youngest elected holder of the highest office in US history and the first Catholic in the White House. His inaugural speech clearly showed Kennedy’s ambitions and his vision for the future of the United States and the world as a whole (John F. Kennedy – Inaugural Address). He strived to build bridges to the developing countries and help their further development; he sketched a “grand design” for Europe and envisioned strong partnership between the USA and united Europe.
In foreign policy, the Kennedy administration choosed the “flexible response” instead of doctrines of rolling back of communism and “massive retaliation” of Eisenhower’s presidency. Calling for strengthening of military blocks and build-up of US military power, using economic aid and ideological penetration in order to contain communism and to fortify US positions and the capitalist system as a whole, Kennedy, at the same time advocated for the search of resolution of international disputes through negotiations and for a more realistic approach to relations with the Soviet Union.
References:
Cohen W.I. (ed.). (1993). The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume IV. America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Hartley, A. (1971). John Kennedy's Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, (4), 77-87. doi:1. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147736 doi:1
Hastedt, G. (2004). Encyclopedia of American foreign policy. New York, NY: Facts On File.
John F. Kennedy – Inaugural Address. Americanrhetoric.com. Retrieved 12 May 2016, from http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm
Paterson, T., Clifford, J., & Hagan, K. (2000). American foreign relations. Boston Mass: Houghton Mifflin.
Woods R.B. (2003). Beyond Vietnam: The Foreign Policies of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. In Schulzinger R.D. (ed.). A companion to American foreign relations. Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
