The American public’s trust of elected officials was at an all-time low after Richard Nixon resigned in August of 1974. The Watergate scandal caused his credibility, the credibility of the office of President and the credibility of the entire government apparatus to take an enormous blow. Before he resigned though, several events had caused the American public’s trust in government officials to waiver. Among the two most harmful were the Vietnam War and the release of the Pentagon Papers. After John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Lyndon Johnson became president. Almost immediately he increased American presence in Vietnam and by 1964 the United States had begun bombing North Vietnam. This is the beginning of the “credibility gap.” The credibility gap refers to the disconnect between what government officials claimed was happening in Vietnam and the actual events going on in the conflict. The credibility gap first surfaced during the Johnson administration when, despite his assurances that America was making progress in the fight for South Vietnam’s independence, no actual progress was seen by the American public and an increasing number of soldiers were dying. The credibility gap continued through the Nixon administration’s handling of the Vietnam War.
In 1965, President Johnson addressed the nation to attempt to explain why exactly the United States was involved in a conflict in Vietnam. In his speech, he cited reasons like preventing the spread of Communism and maintaining American power. He describes the United States as reluctant but resolute and asserts that America must act as “the guardians at the gate.” His speech was an emotional appeal to a nation who had no idea what was happening in Vietnam nor what its government’s policy was towards the Asian country.
During the Nixon Administration, a man named Daniel Ellsberg released classified documents that were published in the New York Times. These documents detailed the policies of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations handling of Vietnam and how the official policies differed drastically from the information the American public was receiving. These papers are known as the Pentagon Papers and they explain how the credibility gap was not just perception but that in actuality, the information that the government was giving the American public was drastically different than the actual events happening in Vietnam.
One example of the credibility gap is the Johnson administration’s characterization of the escalation of the war. In his speech, Johnson portrays North Vietnam and China as the instigators and aggressors. He stated that the conflict is “guided by North Viet-Nam and it is spurred by Communist China” and claims “we did not chose to be the guardians at the gate.” These two statements indicate that America was an unwilling participant in the conflict. However this differs from the Pentagon Paper’s explanation of a long history of intervention in Vietnamese affairs. The Pentagon Papers detail more than 25 years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam including an extensive review of the coup d’état staged by South Vietnamese generals over Ngo Dinh Diem is October of 1963 which the Kennedy administration knew about and the American Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, implicitly sanctioned.
Another discrepancy arises in Johnson’s confidence that American support could help the South Vietnamese government. Johnson stated, “most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.” The implication here is that while these governments cannot fight Communism alone, with the help of the United States, they can. However, the Pentagon Papers detail a meeting from September of 1964 in which Johnson asks his advisors, “Can we really help strengthen the GVN (South Vietnamese Government)?” Less than a year had passed between when Johnson asked this question and when he gave his speech to the public. Nothing substantial happened to assure him that America’s efforts in Vietnam would strengthen the South Vietnamese government. This example of public statements that did not match private discussions perfectly demonstrates the credibility gap.
Perhaps what Johnson does not say in his speech is just as telling as what he does say. He speaks of “solemn pledges” and firm American commitment to South Vietnam but never discusses any actual events. This flowery language is a patriotic appeal to the American public to support the war and perfectly illustrates the Johnson administration’s policies of secrecy and deception when it came to events in Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers lament the fact that, after some suspicious events in the Gulf of Tonkin that “remain puzzling,” Congress “almost unanimously” agreed to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which effectively gave the president the power to wage war without actually declaring war. The Resolution, passed with very little public debate and therefore not really considered by the American public, is an example of gap between government action and public knowledge of government action. The result of this divide, the credibility gap, has had lasting repercussions for the integrity of the American government, both at home and abroad.
Works Cited
“Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN July-October 1964.” Pentagon Papers. National Archives. http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/. Accessed October 17, 2014.
Johnson, Lyndon B. “388-The President’s New Conference.” July 28, 1965.
