Introduction
The situation related to Russia and Ukraine is constantly evolving, and in order to understand the current circumstances, it is essential to go back to the roots for a better understanding. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine began when the Ukrainian administration decided not to sign the European Union in 2013, which was a political and trade agreement that would bind Ukraine to European values and principles. The crises moved on very fast, leading to demonstrations and regime change. Ukraine has always had a history of political and cultural divide. The East always cooperated more toward Russia while the West was always leaning more toward Europe ( McLaughlin). Nineteenth-century historians often shape the Russian understanding, and many Ukrainians experienced the rule of Russia. It is difficult for Russians to separate their history from Ukraine’s and recognize the equality of the Ukrainian culture alongside their own. There is a whole array of attitudes among Ukrainians. Crimea population is teeming with Ukrainians, and Russians all living together and it is uncertain as to where the situation will head towards next. Ukraine has been reassured by the world leaders for its security and sovereignty.
When one looks at the history education in Russia and Ukraine, it is seen that Ukraine portrays Russia as an old enemy while Russia seems to condemn the nationalism. Russia believes in dominating over its younger brother – Ukraine. Ever since the independence of Russia and Ukraine, the relation between the two have become even more complex. During the past years, how the two have been portrayed and represented in media and news, has become another kind of a battlefield between the two countries. Russia has often bene portrayed as an aggressor. Although historic textbooks do not lead to conflict directly (Korostelina 129-37), they can lead to a nation to perceive itself as a forceful and powerful nation and portray others as treacherous or a tolerant neighbor or as a victim. The tensions have bene brewing up between the two countries for many years now.
Vital Interests of Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine’s borders have been well in place for many years now, only with the exception of Crimea that was transferred to Ukraine in 1954. In addition, the Ukrainian leadership has repeatedly proven that it will. The Ukrainian leadership has shown it will not tolerate any threats to its territorial integrity, particularly with the case of Crimea. The major part of Ukraine’s armed forces have been inherited as a part of the former Soviet tier that was based in Western Ukraine in the former Carpathian military district. However, these troops have not been relocated throughout Ukraine, except the Border Troops and National Spring (Kuzio). A large number of Ukrainian security forces remain under Kiev’s control. Nuclear bases are placed in Western-Central Ukraine and thus remain under Kiev’s control. Moreover, Ukrainian leaders have already warned that any loss of Ukrainian territory would lead to its announcing itself a nuclear state. What would arise as a new threat would be the cruise missiles and strategic bombers that are situated in Priluki and Uzin. Moscow and Kiev have often accused each other of violating the ceasefire.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich was anxious about loss of exports resulting due to Russian sanctions and the unbearable stress it would place on the Ukrainian economy. Another alternative was to join Russia-led Customs Union that would lead to a great reduction in natural gas prices and lower pressure on the near-bankrupt Ukrainian economy. There were agreements signed, but these did not initiate Ukraine into the Customs Union but did buyback $15 billion Ukrainian debt.
Russia can easily influence arrangements to put pressure on Ukraine in other areas, including Association Agreement with the EU or the sale of strategic companies. Ukraine has lowered its gas imports well over the last three years. Russia is likely to require something out of Ukraine in exchange for lower gas prices. It has been widely discussed to restart work on a Russian–Ukrainian grouping to manage Ukraine’s gas transit system. But this is seen as a means of Russia controlling Ukraine’s gas pipeline system (Balmaceda61-7). It is unlikely that the December 2013 agreements will remain active for long. Only lower gas prices could put a stop to the numerous energy diversification initiatives, and the price rise has already pushed Ukrainian industries to look for saving technologies.
Ukraine received loans from China and Russia to make up for the suspension of the IMF loan (Woehrel 179). In 2010, its foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita was less than half of that in Russia. Ukrainian leaders did promise closer ties with Russia in exchange for Russian energy at lower prices, but are not willing to implement agreements that would make serious compromises with Ukraine‘s sovereignty. The foreign policy under President Yanukovych seems to tilt toward Russia and to work towards improving ties with Russia. So far, Russia has not been successful with Ukraine in relation to its ambitious demands for economic and military integration.
Russia Relations with China
Against the backdrop of the mounting tension between Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s relations with China have been moving ahead on a fast track, especially in the realms of economics and strategic coordination. After 20 years of hard negotiation, there has been a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal between the two nations. Beyond this, Beijing and Moscow have played an important role in creating the BRICS development bank worth $50 billion and a $100 billion reserve fund. There have been eager signs from Russia to get closer relations with China and the two also seem to side-step the Ukraine issue. However, both sides knew that Ukraine factor was very much there in the background (Yu131). Russian Foreign Ministry describes relations with China as the best and that the two sides are now ready to expand ties in numerous spheres. The Ukraine crisis seemed to present Russia with a strong incentive to cooperate on the pricing gap that had stopped the deal from getting closed earlier. However, both sides deny if the “Ukraine factor” had anything to do with the agreement.
The complex relation and issues of energy
Ukraine and Russia share the closest, yet most complicated, relationship. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, about 17% Ukraine‘s population is made of Ethnic Russians and they remain concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country, thus forming the majority in the Crimea. The most severe crunches in Russian-Ukrainian relations have been over energy and Ukraine is heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supplies. However, the pressure has been lowered by the fact that main oil and natural gas pipelines from Russia to Central and Western Europe go through its territory. Although Russia has tried to take control of Ukraine‘s natural gas pipelines and storage facilities, but has not been successful so far (Woehrel). It continues to pressure Ukraine to yield to its demands and make further concessions if Ukraine wants further gas price cuts. Russian banks offer loans to Ukraine in order to pay for energy and gas. Ukraine has reduced Ukraine has sharply reduced Russia and is looking for alternative sources of supply of energy,
Return of Geo-politics
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders have never been able to come to terms of not being a super power anymore. The country has a weaker influence in world affairs, and its voice in foreign policies is not counted upon as much. For a couple of decades now, Russia’s weakens has prevented Moscow from gaining a prominent position with the Western policy makers. The political and economic recovery as well as its nature and goals are extremely important for the country that was once a superpower. It wants to change the post-Cold war security order that it feels was imposed on during the time when it was politically weak. The real driving force behind the Russian policy towards the western perimeters of the post-Soviet space is Ukraine. Ukraine is an entirely different matter and with the shift of strategic balance in Europe, Russia hopes to create a Slavic union composed of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Larrabee 33). Russia can automatically reestablish its supremacy by becoming a powerful imperial state by controlling the productive agricultural bases of Ukraine and the access to Black sea.
Reference
Balmaceda, Margarita M. "Will Cheap Russian Gas Save Ukraine?" Problems of Post- Communism 61.2 (2014): 61-7. Print.
Korostelina, Karina. "War of Textbooks: History Education in Russia and Ukraine." Communist and Post-Communist Studies43.2 (2010): 129-37. Print.Kuzio, Taras. "Ukraine and Russia’s Vital Interests." School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Print.
Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics." Journal of International Affairs 63.2 (2010): 33. Print.
McLaughlin, Lauren. "The Conflict in Ukraine: A Historical Perspective." Summer.harvard.edu. Harvard Summer School, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. <http://www.summer.harvard.edu/blog-news- events/conflict-ukraine-historical-perspective>.Steven Woehrel. "Ukraine: Current Issues and u.s. Policy."Current Politics and Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe 28.2 (2013): 179. Print.Yu Bin. "China-Russia Relations: Navigating through the Ukraine Storm." Comparative Connections 16.2 (2014): 131. Print.
