In 1994, Rwanda, a country in central Africa, exploded into civil war. However, the fighting in Rwanda would not be limited solely to fighting between two civil military forces; instead, the country exploded into a full-scale genocide seemingly overnight. Although the events of the Rwandan genocide lasted only a few months, the participants were committing genocide at a rate faster than the rate of genocide during the Holocaust (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). Over the course of these few months, Rwanda went from a relatively stable country to one that was experiencing significant political turmoil. The events of the Rwandan civil war and the Rwandan genocide are still felt in central Africa today. In addition, the impacts of these events can be seen in international policy today; many of the problems that global powers experienced trying to fight the magnitude of the Rwandan genocide remain issues that are significant to this day.
The purpose of this discussion is to establish an overview of events that led to the Rwandan genocide, followed by an explanation of the human rights violations that occurred during this conflict. In addition, international sanctions and punishments against participating individuals will be discussed. Finally, the research will discuss the reaction of international powers to these events, and will determine what steps were appropriate—if any—and which should have been taken, given the ideal hindsight provided by history. The Rwandan genocide is often lost in the horrors of history because of the many conflicts occurring in Africa and the Middle East, but it is a conflict that should be considered in more depth, as it marks many of the failures of the international system.
The Hutu and the Tutsi have long been at odds with each other, but the modern-day disputes have their history in the post-colonial state of Rwanda which was formed after independence from France (Melvern, 2006; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008). The Hutu have long been the majority in Rwanda, but it was not until the late 1950s when the two groups were recognized officially as separate races in Rwanda (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008). When the Rwandan Civil War broke out in the 1980s between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu majority under the leadership of President Habyarimana, the Tutsi-led RPF was mostly defeated and were forced to take shelter in the northern part of the country (Melvern, 2006; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008; Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015).
One of the products of the war was the rise of the Hutu Power movement, which was an extremist group that disliked the President’s policies as well as Tutsi existence in Rwanda (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). In 1993, the Hutu Power movement began organizing hit lists of important individuals that needed to be removed from power for Hutu success and survival; one of these individuals was the President (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). Although General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, the United Nations’ armed forces in Rwanda, sent a fax to the United Nations on January 11, 1994 warning of potential genocide, the UN did nothing to stop the events (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. The following day, the genocide in Rwanda began in earnest (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015).
The Tutsi members of society were targeted during the genocide. Hutu Power carried out the assassination of all moderate leadership in the country, and then armed the Hutu people—even the average citizen—with blunt objects, knives, and machetes, and encouraged them to commit genocide against their Tutsi friends and neighbors (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). The United Nations, despite having an armed presence in Rwanda, could do nothing to stem the killing. Gourevitch and Stewart (2015) and others note that the rate of killing was five times the rate that occurred during the Nazi genocide during the Holocaust (Akresh & De Walque, 2008; Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). The killing only ended when the RPF began to re-form and take over the northern parts of Rwanda. However, Prunier (2008) notes that in reality, the genocide slowed to a halt because it was so successful: that is, nearly every Tutsi was slaughtered during this short time between April 7, 1994 and mid-July, 1994.
Death was not the only method used to cause harm during the genocide. Rape was a toll that was used all too frequently against women and girls during the genocide, and the high rates of HIV that exist in Rwanda today are largely a part of this terrible history of rape as war crime (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Prunier, 2008). Indeed, much of the propaganda that was used against the Tutsis at this time painted Tutsi women as seductive and dangerous; to the perpetrators of the genocide, Tutsi women presented a particular threat to the success of the program to eliminate the Tutsis as a people (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Melvern, 2006; Akresh & De Walque, 2008).
The French, despite having a vested interest in the outcome of the nation, protected many members of the government during the early days of the genocide. The French tried to create a safe zone for refugees, but many analysts suggest that their actions were too little too late in the course of the genocide (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Melvern, 2006; Akresh & De Walque, 2008). No real international sactions were ever implemented against Rwanda, and the international community never stepped in to stop the human rights violations occurring on Rwandan soil (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Melvern, 2006; Akresh & De Walque, 2008). Rape—mass rape, in the context of war particularly-- and genocide are the two primary methods of terror and human rights abuses that the Hutus used to terrorize the Tutsis.
The international community did not react badly to the events of the Rwandan genocide. In fact, the problem is that the international community failed to properly react at all. The French interceded on behalf of expatriates and powerful people in government, but the French did not step in to halt the genocide. Neither did UNAMIR step in, despite having active troops available in the region that were able to secure potential targets of the genocide (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Melvern, 2006; Akresh & De Walque, 2008). The
The lack of response from the international community did not end with the end of the genocide. Although the UN stepped in and helped slightly with the refugee crisis, the crisis still spilled into the surrounding countries, and the dispute in the Congo quickly became more pronounced as a result. Although the new Rwandan government began the process of trails for those who participated in the genocide, there is still serious distrust in the population today (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Melvern, 2006; Akresh & De Walque, 2008). Initially, the goals of the special Rwandan court set up to deal with genocide include identifying the truth associated with the genocide, providing speedy trials for those affected, contributing to an atmosphere of reconciliation, and demonstrating the capacity of Rwanda to solve problems independently (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015; Melvern, 2006; Akresh & De Walque, 2008). However, the court was closed in 2012 after controversial decisions, and the United Nations formed the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Gourevitch & Stewart, 2015). The trial has been moderately successful, convicting 29 individuals, but no large-scale international intervention has ever occurred on behalf of Rwandan victims of genocide.
The Rwandan genocide was a terrible series of events, to be certain, but it should also be noted that many mistakes were made on a domestic and international level that led to the magnitude of the genocide growing so exponentially. Although the Rwandan civil war set the groundwork for the genocide, this is one of the key events in recent history that really demonstrated the impotence of the international system insofar as intervention in sovereign affairs is concerned (Akresh & De Walque, 2008). Although a near-perfect set of sociocultural, political, racial, and economic differences set the background for the genocide, the events that occurred during this time underscored the reality that any number of nations could potentially experience genocide in the right circumstances (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008).
Political, racial, social, and economic differences led to much of the tension in Rwanda, but propaganda really had the effect of pushing the population into genocidal behavior (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008). The role of leadership in incurring fury in the general population cannot be overstated: the Hutu majority government is widely considered responsible for distributing propaganda promoting Tutsi genocide, and this propaganda worked incredibly quickly (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008). It was only a day after the Hutu President Habyarimana was killed in the airplane crash that the genocide began. In short, propaganda served a very significant role in developing the correct atmosphere for ethnic cleansing (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Prunier, 2008).
References
Akresh, R., & De Walque, D. (2008). Armed conflict and schooling: Evidence from the 1994 Rwandan genocide. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Vol.
Gourevitch, P., & Stewart, R. (2015). We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families (Vol. 24). Pan Macmillan.
Melvern, L. (2006). Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide. Verso.
Prunier, G. (2008). Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe. Oxford University Press.
Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014). Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4), 1947-1994.
