Good Example Of Military Victory Essay

Military Victory. Tet Offensive.
Tet offensive that took place in February of 1968 was a turning point of the Vietnam War. American leading political and military figures of the time expressed different assessments of the consequences of the Tet offensive, but they all agreed that it had dramatically changed the course of the war in Vietnam. Prior to the February 1968 attacks, the general consensus was that of an imminent American victory. General public was led to believe that the American forces and the South Vietnamese forces are superior to the Communist enemy. After the offensive, the attitude has changed towards the inevitability of the peace negotiations. General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the telegram to General Westmoreland (dated March 8, 1968), referrers to the Tet offensive as “a great shock to the American public”. He admits that the offensive has put an end to the “euphoria” that preceded the attack.
The shift in the American public opinion is a convincing evidence of the change caused by the Tet offensive. The percentage of those, who believed that United States government had made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam had been going up steadily since August of 1965, but in February of 1968 it has jumped 5 percent in the course of shortest month of the year. When the initial shock subsided, the public opinion has gained back 1 percent in April of 1968. However, even this slight reversal is a vivid indication of how unexpected and shocking the February attack was. In November of 1967 more than 50 percent of Americans believed that the US and its allies were making progress in Vietnam. In late February of 1968 the number have diminished to 32 percent. Looking at these public opinion polls, it is evident, that the Tet offensive had a dramatic effect on the attitude of common Americans towards the war in Vietnam.
The American military leaders of the time were not as pessimistic as the general public even after the Tet offensive. However, the events of February 1968 had a cooling effect on them too. General Westmoreland assessment of the situation in Vietnam in November of 1967 was very optimistic. He believed that “the Communist enemy” was experiencing manpower problems and that US forces were “grinding the enemy down”. General Westmoreland, the commander of American armed forces in Vietnam saw some improvement in the South Vietnamese armed forces and deemed it possible to start shifting some additional responsibilities to them. Overall, the General saw “some light at the end of the tunnel”.
In February of 1968 General Westmoreland was far less optimistic. He believed that the Tet offensive was just a prelude to a “major” offensive operation. Gone was his believe that the enemy was unable to launch a major attack. At that time the General evaluated Communists capabilities much higher. In his February 12 assessment of the situation General Westmoreland pointed to the enemy’s change of strategy from “protracted war” with limited objectives and fought with “limited resources” to “all out” approach. General believed that the enemy was aiming at a quick decisive victory during the election year in the United States. At the same time, General Westmoreland saw the situation as the one of “heightened risk”, but with a “great opportunity”. His optimism was based on the belief that the enemy would not be able to sustain the level of losses inflicted on him at the heightened level of fighting. In order to exploit such opportunity he was asking for more troops.
General Westmoreland’s view on the situation in Vietnam after the Tet offensive has raised mixed opinion among the senior foreign policy advisers to the President, known as “the Wise men”. The President referred to Westmoreland’s February 12 analysis and earlier assessments as written by two different persons. Other “Wise men” also noticed a sense of urgency in General’s February 12 telegram.
The Tet offensive and later Communist forces attacks showed that Westmoreland was too optimistic in both his enemy assessment and his allies’ analysis. South Vietnamese ability to assume more responsibilities was greatly overestimated. February 12 presidential meeting notes indicate, that South Vietnamese, rather than stepping up to the challenge, have requested “more American troops”.
The “Wise men” all agreed that more troops would be necessary. It is clear from the notes of the February 12 meeting that the real capabilities of the North Vietnamese are not known. General Taylor openly indicated that there was a possibility of another major Communist offensive starting on the same day. At the same time, it was implied at the meeting that the Americans could not rely on South Vietnamese forces. Their fighting ability was also uncertain. Even though it was not clearly articulated at the meeting, the possibility of a military victory in the war in Vietnam after the Tet offensive was diminishing in the opinion of the top American political figures.
Various American sources give a similar analysis of the goals that the Northern Vietnamese forces pursued launching the Tet offensive. The Communist forces clearly understood that they were not getting anywhere with the type of warfare that was conducted prior to 1968. They also clearly understood that they didn’t have enough strength to achieve a military victory by defeating the American troops in Vietnam. But they correctly assumed, that if they show enough military strength and inflict enough losses to raise the public outcry, they will win a major political and psychological victory. Gaining political and psychological advantage might turn the tide of the war. They needed such victory to enter the possible peace negotiations as an equal strength side, not as a receiving side. January 31, 1968 intelligence report supports this assessment, saying that the offensive intended to show that “the Communists are still powerful and capable of waging war.” The same intelligence report undermined General Westmoreland’s opinion that the Tet offensive was a “go for broke” effort. The reports pointed out to the “improved fire-power, flexibility of tactics, and a considerable degree of resiliency”.
Ambassador Bunker in his February 4, 1968 telegram admitted that despite what he called “a military defeat” for VC, the enemy achieved at least a partial psychological victory by shaking the Vietnamese confidence in “the invincibility of the allied forces.” This analysis of the situation after the Tet offensive was shared by Special Assistant Lansdale. He indicated in his February 27, 1968 memo that “too many Vietnamese civilians and soldiers have a sinking feeling in their guts”.
Both diplomats claimed that one of the objectives of the Northern Vietnamese forces was to start an uprising in the parts of the country controlled by the South. Even though that goal was not achieved, the Communists have gained a political and psychological victory by shaking popular confidence in South Vietnamese government and raising contempt and distrust in American forces.
General Wheeler’s March 8, 1968 telegram is a good summary of the consequences of the Tet offensive. Even though Wheeler described the opinion of the new Secretary of Defense Clifford’s, he admitted later in the telegram that he had shared the Secretary’s point of view. Main point of this shared opinion was that the Tet offensive laid a tremendous blow to the American public’s confidence in the Vietnam war effort. It was a stark contrast to earlier optimistic assessments. Further major attacks were possible and the enemy had the capabilities to maintain such attacks. General Wheeler, for the first time used the expression “a war that cannot be won”. Even though he was citing somebody else’s thought, it seems like the same notion was not altogether foreign to General Wheeler himself. The instruction Wheeler gave to Westmoreland “to be conservative in in assessments of the situation and enemy capabilities” is worlds apart from November 1967 Westmoreland’s opinion. General Wheeler also admitted that request for additional forces would be “hard, if not impossible to sell.”
February 1968 Tet offensive has been a turning point in the Vietnam war in many respects. The attack was planned by the Communists to achieve military, political and psychological objectives. Even though it may be argued that the military goals were not achieved, the Communists clearly won the other two. They have managed to shake the public confidence in both United States and Vietnam. They have showed the capability to maintain a scaled-up war effort. The timing of the attack was not a coincidence as well. Facing presidential elections, American political leaders were reluctant to show support to an unpopular increased war effort.
American military leaders played to the hands of the Communists with their over-optimistic assessments of the situation in Vietnam prior to February 1968. General Westmoreland did not have a clear picture of the real strength of the enemy and he greatly overestimated the South Vietnamese capabilities. His excessive optimism expressed in 1967 made it impossible to gain political and popular support to the dramatic increase in American military presence in Vietnam when it became apparent that the enemy was much more capable and getting better in all respects. General’s lack of understanding of the gravity of the situation is apparent in his reactions to the Tet offensive. He initially saw the attack as a military opportunity to strike a decisive military victory with only 25 thousand troop reinforcements. Just two weeks late the General came back with a request for 205 thousand additional men without any mentioning of a complete military success. Overall, Tet offensive can be viewed as a victory of the Communists.