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The main lesson of the last five decades is that the process and reconciliation in Europe based on the European security system. If it were not for NATO, France could not have a sufficient sense of their own safety to settle their differences with Germany. If there wasn’t NATO then France, and the UK more actively opposed to German reunification. Suffice it to recall the desperate attempts Thatcher and Mitterrand tighten (and thus even prevent) the reunification of Germany, to evaluate the role of NATO in the eradication of the European fear of eternal power and possible domination of Germany, which persists despite its postwar successes in building a democratic state and the establishment of good neighborly relations with other European states.
In addition, if there were no NATO, it would hardly be possible (for the same reasons) the creation of the European Community, now the European Union. Going at the moment the process of reconciliation between Germany and Poland would not have been possible without the American presence in Germany and the associated sense of security, which is created for Poles prospects of joining NATO. The same applies to relations between the Czech Republic and Germany, Hungary and Romania, Romania and Ukraine. Similarly, the desire to become a NATO member influences the attitude of Slovenia to Italy and Lithuania to Poland.
Reconciliation process unfolding between Poland and Russia, also promises to be more active in the foreseeable future. By becoming members of NATO, the Poles, in all probability, be less fearful that fraternal embrace their more powerful neighbor could suddenly turn the iron grip. On the other hand, when the Russian realize that Central Europe is no longer a geopolitical vacuum, this will cause them to moderate appetites when defining its sphere of influence. Given the fact that all of Russia 's western neighbors - rightly or wrongly - with apprehension relate to its possible intentions and strengthening regional security should benefit the whole of Europe, including Russia.
Creation and expansion of both the European Union and NATO clearly represents a long historical process, which is still far from complete. Even if at this stage, perhaps too early to draw conclusions - and perhaps them and can never be completely done, once and for all, given the role of chance in the historical process - it is obvious that neither the EU nor NATO cannot be regarded as completed, finally established structures. Both institutions openly declare their intentions for further expansion. Just look at the map to understand why their current framework cannot be considered final.
In addition, the enlargement of the European Union and NATO - are mutually reinforcing processes. Each contributes to the other. In the area of overlap between these two processes created the field of enhanced political interdependence, which leads to stronger sense of common security and promote further convergence of Europe and America. On the other hand, these processes are developed unevenly periodically advancing each other. For example, Poland will join NATO before enter the European Union. Estonia, apparently, before its accession to the European Union than in NATO. However, most of the coincidence of the European Union and NATO gives a sense of common geopolitical space that creates a collective confidence to all the member countries of these two structures.
The enlargement process must be built at a pace that, on the one hand, not to weaken the cohesion of the alliance and not undermine its capabilities, and on the other - not to delay unduly the liberation of Russia from its imperial nostalgia. Hence the conclusion that Russia cannot be excluded from the process of European enlargement under the wing of the Alliance. However, Russia should not be a veto on the free choice of one or another European country, or worse, in this case to refer to the fact that some of these states were formerly part of the Soviet Union. With regard to the Baltic States, the fact that Russia continues to officially say that in the fortieth year they voluntarily joined the Soviet Union, is also an insult.
Works Cited
Johanna Granville,"The Many Paradoxes of NATO Enlargement" Current History (April 1999), vol. 98, no. 627, pp. 165–170.
Johanna Granville, "After Kosovo: The Impact of NATO Enlargement on Russian Political Parties," Demokratizatsiya vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 24–45.
