Introduction
The main legal issue raised in the present scenario is whether Andrea was suffering from mental insanity when she committed the aforementioned crimes and therefore whether she can successfully rely on the defense of insanity, say, on appeal. Further, this problem raises the issue of if Andrea’s ex-husband, Rusty, bears any criminal responsibility in the crime. As a general defense to criminal liability for all offenses, the defense of insanity allows the jury to return a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. Under this defense, the accused person may claim that at the time they committed the alleged offense, they were suffering from a mental insanity that affected their mental faculties so as not to appreciate the illegality of what they were doing at the material time due to mental illness (Grachek, 2006, p. 1480). However, this defense can also be relied upon by an accused before trial or during trial to claim that they are unfit to plead to the charges levelled against them by the prosecution.
Legal Principles
The legal rules and principles for determining whether or not a defendant was suffering from insanity or was insane at the time of the commission of the crime were laid down in the celebrated UK case of R v. M’Naghten (1843). Here, the House of Lords came up with what has now become the M’Naghten rules used to determine insanity. In this case, the defendant, Daniel M’Naghten, had formed an intention to attempt to kill Sir Robert Peel, the then British Prime Minister. However, instead, he mistakenly murdered Edward Drummond, Peel’s assistant, by shooting him. At his trial for the murder, he claimed that he was insane and psychotic at the material time; that he suffered from insane delusions. He claimed that he had beliefs that he was being persecuted.
Based on these rules, for a defendant to succeed with the defense of insanity, they must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that at the time they committed the offense, they were suffering a defect of reason. This has been affirmed in R V Clark (1972) in which it was emphasized that absentmindedness or forgetfulness does not constitute a defect of reason. Further, it has to be demonstrated by evidence that the cause of the defect of reason was a disease of the mind, and not a medical one. A physical disease that impairs the mental functioning of the human brain, such as arteriosclerosis (R v Kemp [1957]), sleepwalking (R v Burgess [1991]) or epilepsy (Bratty v A-G for NI [1963]) would qualify as a disease of the mind. Lastly, this defect must have been such that it made the accused not to know or comprehend what they were doing or that what they did was wrong or unlawful as was affirmed in R v Johnson (2007).
However, as was held in R v Quick (1973), the defense of insanity will not succeed if it is an outside condition or source that has led to the defect of reason, such as the failure to take one’s medication if they are suffering from, say, diabetes
In the US, as held in Durham v. United States (1954), a mental defect or disease that causes a defendant to do an unlawful act would constitute insanity. However, after the jury’s verdict of guilty but mentally ill in US v. John Hinckley (1982), the grounds for insanity as a defense have been narrowed by US courts and under the Insanity Defense Act 1984 (Resnick, 2007, p.155). According Resnick (2007), the new American law now requires the defense, and not the prosecution, to present clear and convincing evidence to prove insanity.
Application of the Law to the Facts
Applying the legal principles applied by the court in M’Naghten and Yate’s cases, it can be argued that Andrea Yates was not insane. Firstly, most of the action of hers that led to her crime were self-induced and somehow premeditated. For instance, she went against her doctor’s advice not to have any more babies and also failed to take her prescribed Haldol medication. Based on the rule in R v Quick, she cannot be qualified as having been insane.
Moreover, the courts have held in M’Naghten and Hinckley cases that for the defense to succeed, the defect of reason must have been caused by a mental condition or disease. This was not the case for Andrea Yates since Dr. Mohammed Saeed declared her not psychotic and hence hers were merely indoctrinated religious dogma and beliefs that she would be punished or go to hell if she did not kill her children. Further, as shown in the recent trial of David Tarloff for the murder of Kathryn Faughey under the delusion that his action was sanctioned by God, mental illness does not automatically guarantee the successful plea of insanity defense (Buettner, 2013). The fact that she turned herself in after the murders also points to the fact that she knew that what she had done was legally wrong hence a claim of insanity cannot hold.
Her husband does not bear any responsibility for the crime. This is because he lacks neither the requisite mens rea nor actus reus that are necessary for proving a crime. Even morally, Rusty would or Andrea’s husband would not be responsible since he did all he can to help Andrea out of her condition.
References
July E. Grachek, The insanity defense in the twenty-first century: How recent United States Supreme Court case law can improve the system, 81 (4) IND. L.J. 1480 (2006).
Phillip J. Resnick, The Andrea Yates case: Insanity on trial, 55 (2) CLEV. ST. L.R. 155 (2007).
Russ Buettner, Mentally ill, but insanity plea is long shot, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Apr.3. 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/nyregion/mental-illness-is-no- guarantee-insanity-defense-will-work-for-tarloff.html
