Introduction
Political contests should be peaceful processes which do not divide people along ethnic lines or worse still- cause violence. In parts of Africa this is not always the case. Rampant populism in Africa in political competition has led leaders to mobilize across ethnicities (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 494) even leading to post-election violence in countries like Kenya. There is a deeper perception of other factors surrounding ethnicity as a cause of violence such as historical economic injustices, faulty electoral system, voter numbers and political influence as well as political disagreements (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 495). This makes political victory to have political and socio-economic implications. The Kenyan general Elections in 2007 ended up in one of the most violent post-election periods in the country’s history. This is mainly attributed to political alignment along tribal lines. The two major parties, PNU and ODM were headed by Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga respectively, who come from the two most dominant tribes in the country (Kikuyu and Luo) (Klopp 181). However, ethnicity on its own does not always lead to political violence. In contrast to Kenya, Zambia practices political power-sharing (tribal balancing), which was initiated by Kenneth Kaunda (Lindemann 1850). This has been an attempt to blur ethnic alignment in political contest and is based on political, economic and military power-sharing. In addition, elitist strategies have led to peaceful political transitions despite differences in ethnicity and economic capacities across the country. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the 2007 Kenyan elections and the 2006 and 2011 elections in Zambia with a view to examining the contexts in which ethnic-based political violence emerges in Africa.
Must ethnic diversity lead to post-election violence?
Before examining ethnicity and how it affected the 2007 political contest in Kenya, it is important to understand the context of these occurrences. Kenya is a highly divided country in terms of ethnicities. There are 42 ethnic groups but the dominant ones are Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Kamba and Meru. The citizens are highly loyal to their individual ethnic groups and this is seen clearly in voting, elite strategies and in a socioeconomics of the country. Since the advent of multi-party politics in 1991 post-election peace is not always guaranteed. Similarly, it is not always true that tribal groupings must lead to election-violence. Whether tribal post election violence happens or not is highly hinged on the type of elite strategies for power-sharing that are formed between major ethnic groups. This is evidenced by the fact that when the Kikuyu community formed pre-election coalitions with either the Luo or the Kalenjin community (such as in 2002), political transition was smooth and peaceful. On the other hand, when this did not happen (such as in 2007), post election violence arose. This implies that in Kenya, ethnic diversity is so pronounced that absence of post-election violence cannot be overruled.
The presence of ethnic diversity does not always have to lead to post-election violence. In Zambia, for example, there are 72 ethnic groups. According to Lindemann (1850), the largest ones are Bemba (North), Chewa and Ngoni (East), Tonga (South) and Lozi (West). Despite the many ethnic groups and allegiances by citizens of Zambia to their ethnic groups, the country has been very peaceful in terms of political transitions and power-sharing. This may be attributed to efforts meant to distribute political, economic and military power equitably among the existing ethnic groups. President Kaunda initiated “tribal balancing” to reduce tribal tensions in electoral processes and in distribution of power. This strategy involves political, economic and military power-sharing. Zambia is one of the best examples in Africa that underlines that multiple ethnicities do not have to result to election violence.
In Kenya, power sharing takes a different format. It is not expressly planned but results as a political strategy rather than a strategy meant for peace. An example of pre-election strategies that have led to peaceful post-election periods is when Daniel arap Moi (from the Kalenjin community), the second president of the country, appointed a successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu tribesman) to run as the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki, however, won the elections with a landslide victory. According to Klopp (181), this is another example of ethnic-based elite strategies for power sharing. The NARC coalition comprised of Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu/ Central), Raila Odinga from the Nyanza province and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) from the Eastern province. This shows the multi-ethnic coalition in Kenya as being a political strategy to win the elections.
Factors that contribute to ethnic-based violence in Kenya and how Zambia avoids them.
- Economic inequality
Post election violence also happens with influence and interaction with other factors besides ethnic diversity. In Kenya, the most prevalent of these factors is economic inequality as a result of historical injustices. In 2008 and late 2007, many people from the Kikuyu community were driven out of their homes in the Rift Valley by the Kalenjins who are the majority in that area. Some were killed, while their homes and property were burnt. This hatred was driven by the fact that many Kalenjins believed that the Kikuyu people living in Eldoret, Molo and other parts of the Rift Valley had been illegally given Kalenjin land during the regime of the first president, Jomo Kennyatta (a Kikuyu). The Rift Valley is known for its agricultural productivity and economic benefits accruing from agricultural practice. The violence by the Kalenjins was a way of reclaiming their land and one may argue that it had an economic element as a motivator. In Zambia, the situation of ethnic tensions as a result of differences in economic power has been averted for an extended period of time. For example, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government implemented economic reforms (Mulungushi reforms), which saw the 51% takeover of foreign commercial and industrial corporations (Lindemann 1852). The government then equitably distributed shareholding and appointments to the different ethnic groups. While this was a way to ensure that all ethnic groups in the country had a degree of equality, it was not good for the economy of the country.
- Political disagreements and unequal political influence
Another factor related to post-election violence in Kenya is political disagreements and political strength/ influence. In 2005, for example, president Kibaki changed the constitutional draft to avoid the diminishing of presidential powers. This, coupled with his intent to run for a second term, thereby violating the NARC coalition’s 2002 pre-election Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) led to major disagreements with Raila Odinga. In 2007, the elections were held. By this time, the disagreements between Kibaki (from the Kikuyu tribe) and Raila (from the Luo tribe) factions over the constitution had driven a big rift between them. In Kenya, some ethnic groups have a higher population of voters than others. This means that those communities with the largest voter bloc command a greater pull on smaller groups to form parties or coalitions. This can be overbearing on other smaller communities as a result of being looked down upon in decision-making (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 495). The Kikuyu community and its allies (Meru and Embu) command a voter bloc only rivaled in numbers by that of the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley region. This has been evident in election results of 2002, 2007 and 2013. The Kikuyu community has ruled for three consecutive presidential terms and dominates in key government and corporation appointments to date. This is often a cause for clamor smaller ethnic groups and a motivator for balancing through violence. In Zambia, political power-sharing overcomes the problem of overbearing ethnic numbers. Although the Bemba enjoy wider influence due to numbers, there have been strategic efforts to reduce political influence based on ethnic groupings. This is evidenced by the nationalization of the ruling party, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). Proportionate distribution of appointments in government ministries has been made ensuring that there is reduction of the dominance of ethnic groups in politics and decision-making.
- Flawed electoral and transition systems.
The electoral system and transition planning mechanisms also plays a part in post-election violence (Hoffman, Barak and Long 129). In Kenya, opinion polls in 2007 had predicted the ODM party as eventual winners in many instances, creating worrying political tension in the country. When the results were announced, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner having amid claims of gross electoral malpractices and rigging such as double tallying and voter bribery. There were constituencies where the number of votes counted exceeded the number of registered voters. These irregularities led members of the opposition to believe that the outcome would have been different if the elections had been free and fair. In unclear circumstances, Kibaki was quickly sworn in at night for a second term as president of Kenya. Election violence broke out the next day with brutal killings happening in different parts of the country. Many have attributed the violence to the perception that the elections were rigged based on the hasty swearing in and voting irregularities. In Zambia, the claims of electoral malpractices are almost unheard of. This makes for a smooth transition of power.
Conclusion
Ethnic diversity does not have to lead to post-election violence. However, the most ethnically diverse nations are most prone to ethnic alignments which may lead to violence. Ethnic diversity on its own does not contribute to post-election violence. There are a myriad of other issues which coupled with ethnic differences become magnified to an extent that they motivate people from different ethnic backgrounds to rise against each other in the political context. This can be seen clearly by examining the cases of Kenya and Zambia. Kenya and Zambia are two African countries with a rich diversity of ethnic groups. Kenya has 42 while Zambia has 72. In both countries, there are handfuls of ethnic groups which dominate in the economic, political and socioeconomic landscapes. Zambia has managed to maintain peace for extended periods while Kenya struggles with her diversity. The issues surrounding post election violence in Kenya include faulty electoral system and transition planning mechanisms, historical economic injustices, political influence from voter numbers and political disagreements. In contrast, Zambia practices economic, political and military power-sharing, which has overcome the threat of ethnic diversity as a source of ethnic post-election violence.
Work Cited
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Hoffman, Barak D, and Long D James. "Parties, Ethnicity, and Voting in African Elections." Comparative Politics 45.2 (2013): 127-146. Print.
Klopp, Jacqueline M. “Kenya Struggles to Fix Itself.” Current History 111. 745 (2012): 181-186.
Lindemann, Stefan. “Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma of Unproductive Peace: A Zambian Case Study.” Third World Quarterly 32.10 (2011): 1843–1869.
