Overview
The paper will present a case study of the terrorist attack on the United States – US on 9th September 2001. The terrorist attack will be analyzed in the area of upcoming events, actual attacks and its consequences. The primary perpetrators of the attack were members of the terrorist group al-Qaida. The goals of 19 affiliated men from different countries were attacks on the American symbols. The targets chosen include the capitol White House, World Trade Center and Pentagon. A tactic used was plane hijacking and the larger issues at stake went beyond the domestic politics into the international politics, global security and changed threat perception.
Pre-Event/Event Actions
The degree of surprise achieved was not due to the sole terrorist attack, but the number of deaths, which was at around 3.000, which was unprecedented for a single act of terror. Based on the 9/11 Commission Report number of deaths recorded at the World Trade center was at 2.600, 125 deaths in the Pentagon and 256 deaths on the four planes. The tactic used to inflict the casualties was other factor of surprise. The terrorist attack was not anticipated and the levels of perceived terrorist threat prior the attack were low. The attack was an attack on liberal, open and democratic values and similar terrorist attacks in a recent past were seen in other continents and countries and not on the US grounds. Based on the 9/11 Commission Report the attack came as a shock not as a surprise. The Islamist extremist have given numerous warnings of intention of attacking American soil. Further on, there were numerous terrorist attacks committed by the Islamist prior the year 2001 in different foreign countries where American embassies, buildings, officials and tourist were targeted. There were publicly known threats by the Osama bin Land, but the attention was focused overseas. The degree of surprise was also achieved because the Bush administration believed that the al Qaeda threat would be eliminated within three to five years. On the day of the attack 19 hijackers managed to come over the airport security checks and taken four different flights. Due to the failures of policy, capabilities, management and imagination the shutdown of hijack planes American 11 which hit the World Trade Center, United 175 which hit the South tower of the World Trade Center, American 77, which hit Pentagon, were unsuccessful. The tactic used by the perpetrators resolved in the attacked carried out due to the various failures, where some of the perpetrators were spotted but no relevant action was seen by agencies based on the gathered information. However, from the improvised actions by major actors and organizations the attack can be regarded as a surprise since none of them had any contingency plans leading to and during the terrorist attack.
Further on, the attack caused massive destruction and negatively impacted the economy. On the other hand, the psychological impacts in the United States were seen in the widespread posttraumatic stress disorder – PTSD, and symptoms among the people who were not directly exposed to the attack. The scale, surprise of the attack, novelty of threat on such a scale on national ground, and implications for the future safety with the live reporting, government warning of possible future attacks have increased the terrorist threat perception. The graphical presentation via television created subjective response of fear, horror and helplessness. The people were worried about their personal wellbeing and the perception of the terrorist threat has increased.
The airplane hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon left numerous different consequences on social and political sphere in the United States and abroad. Lost lives and destroyed property are one of the most visible consequences. To continue, the political consequences of the attack resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and allies, which impacted the economic and political situation also in foreign countries. The terrorist attack led to the public support due to the increased fear of future terrorist attack of national security policy and the erosion of civil liberties under the USA PATRIOT Act. What is more, based on the Frazier et al. study, terrorist attack resulted in the increased violence against the Middle Easterners in the US. A significant increase in hate crimes was seen in 10 days following the terrorist attack. Based on the FBI in the aftermath of the attack the increase by more than 1600% was seen. There can be national as well as local political impacts seen. The international and national consequences in waging new wars and emerging of the politics of “war on terror” which have brought numerous consequences. On the local level elections were postponed and in the light of the event the different candidates won the elections and came into power. On the state level the intelligence community had been reformed.
Missed Indicators
Cognitive biases can be seen in the area of judging another person of being a friend or a foe. In this case the intelligence and hence CIA was aware of inflow of some of the perpetrators of the terrorism attack, but have failed to report the information to the FBI. On the other hand, the FBI knew about the terrorist cell activity in which some of the perpetrators were part of, but have regarded them as harmless. The cognitive biases as well as organizational barriers have influenced decision of not sharing information. Organizational barriers are one of the biggest issues, which disabled the direct communications and response between different domestic agencies, organizations and actors. Non-cooperation and lack of sharing of information between the intelligence and national security organizations was seen because of the bureaucratic cultures and inadaptability to new threats. The organizational barriers were evident in the year 2000 when the CIA had the information of Khalid al Mihdar, one of the suspected al-Qaeda member’s possession of US visa. The information on the second hijacker Nwaf al Hazmi visa possession and his flight to Los Angeles was also gathered by the CIA year prior the attack. The agency did not recognize the value and importance of this information.
The national defense actions in the time of the terrorist attack indicate failures of cooperation on all levels. There were civilian private and state sector’s challenges seen. On the state level, there was no unified command, communication and coordination between agencies, which resulted in non-sharing of real time critical information. The Congress did not adjust to the rise of transnational terrorism. What is more, terrorism was prior the year 2001 seldom perceived as an important threat. Politics in the US in the year 2001 focused on different foreign issues, such as Haiti, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Russia, Somalia, Kosovo, NATO enlargement and Middle East peace process among others. Fragmentation can be seen since only in the White House the terrorism had been under the jurisdiction of 14 different committees with none existent integrated approach. The government and agencies failed to connect the dots and let the individuals with a known terrorist past into the country. The inaction of organs despite having relevant information has resulted in the surprise attack. The federal government, state and local authorities’ inadequate protected the World Trade Center, without counter surveillance, security patrols, restrictions of physical access, structural changes and improvements, which could have been introduced with attacks around the world on important buildings and landmarks. There were leadership failures seen and the threat environment which impacted the security perception. From this the cultural biases can be seen and misunderstanding of the roots of terrorism, which diminished the importance of anti-western sentiments. It must be noted that even if the resources and threat perception would be different there is no guarantee that the attack could be prevented. The weakness of lack of imagination, focus on tactical intelligence and organizational and bureaucratic limitations were exploited. Political concerns were not focused on the domestic terrorism, but rather on foreign terrorist actions and terrorist prevention. Based on the political focus they have not properly assessed the situation prior to the attack since the chances of such an event were not anticipated.
Lessons Learned
The first lesson learned is that the structural changes and cooperation between the domestic agencies must improve with the sharing of information and increased communication. Some organizational obstacles have been improved, but much still needs to be done. The actions to prevent such an attempt must be based on the cooperation on national and international level. The second important lesson is that policies accepted at the time of great national security threat can be exploited to reach narrow goals and to use the situation to gain support for restrictive policies. The security is a broad term and it cannot be achieved on the expense of decreasing human rights. More oversight and analysis on the restrictive policies and possibility of violation of human rights and their implementation is needed.
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