Arunabha Banerjee
Senior Associate, Corporate & Compliance Solutions, Thomson Reuters
Abstract
This article proposes to compare the reigns of Chief Justice Earl Warren and William Rehnquist, two stalwarts of the Federal Supreme Court, in influencing civil rights protection jurisprudence in the history of American Constitutional law. After individually addressing key aspects of their respective tenures, the article delves into a comparative analysis and examines recent trends in protection of civil liberties in light of past developments and future prospects.
Keywords: Supreme Court, Warren, Rehnquist, Civil Rights, Civil Liberties, Constitution, National Security
Introduction
The Federal Supreme Court in the United States of America offers no shortage of drama when we observe the trends and patterns in pronouncing verdicts in relation to protection of civil rights. As we turn the pages of history, Chief Justices Earl Warren and William Rehnquist stand out as key influences in determining the course of civil rights protection in numerous landmark rulings. It will therefore be appropriate to undertake a comparative analysis of the tenures of these two Supreme Court superstars to arrive at an informed understanding of the nuances of protection of civil liberties in the procedure of constitutional law.
Earl Warren
The law underwent enormous changes during the tenure of Judge Earl Warren in the 1950's and 1960's. The Warren Court took up the mantle of a dynamic force to mould the legislations in accordance with the changing needs of society. In Brown v. Board of Education, Warren posed the question regarding racial inferiority. He stated that segregation could be explained only by believing that blacks were inferior, basing his opinion on Plessy v. Ferguson. Warren did not agree with the notion of judicial restraint because he felt that it adversely affected the court as a constitutional protector of individual rights. In Warren's opinion, such restraint amounted to abdication of the role of an enforcer of constitutional rights. To him, the Court operated to guarantee fairness coupled with equity, especially in cases where the government did not succeed in achieving the desired outcome. In arriving at a fair conclusion, Warren was not bogged down by the authority of stare decisis. To him, the underlying principle was more persuasive than a previously decided case.
The Warren Court's upheaval had two major aims, which were integral to the belief of its supporters. The first aim was regular supervision of interaction between the police and civilians. The next concern was racial discrimination. The Judges felt that constitutional criminal procedure was pivotal in respecting the civil rights of the colored segments of the population.
Warren gave elementary, but highly effective, verdicts that centered around core moral values in question. In Miranda v. Arizona, Warren's judgment summarized the foundation principles and requirements that later significantly influences the assent of the companion justices. In Loving v. Virginia, he held that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to eliminate discrimination based on race, but the miscegenation enactments ensured the supremacy of fairer skin.
William Rehnquist
The first phase, from 1986 to 1992, under William Rehnquist in the Federal Supreme Court was marked by immense deference towards the ruling power. The term of October 1988 was marked by numerous rulings which impacted major issues like abortion rights, affirmative action, habeas corpus etc.
At the outset, it appeared that the Rehnquist Court stood against discrimination based on race and origin. In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that a desegregation order should end when it is obeyed, even if other such orders are in force. The Court followed an identical logic in Missouri v. Jenkins. The Rehnquist Court has also restricted available remedies for discrimination in cases of affirmative action.
A very narrow interpretation was conferred upon civil rights statutes. The enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1991 is largely a product of such a pedantic approach.
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court put the onus on plaintiff to prove a racially disparate effect for recovering damages pursuant to alleged racial discrimination in employment. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court held that the prohibition of racial discrimination in contracting is applicable only at the stage of formation.
It would be interesting to note Earl Warren's philosophy on the constitutional criminal law procedure in this regard. This vision primarily rests on two principles - firstly, that rules of constitution should apply to all steps of enforcement, and, secondly, the courts should be the primordial custodian of constitutional rights. The Rehnquist Court, however, buried this under underlying notion in Teague v. Lane by holding that habeas corpus should be used only to prevent misconduct by state courts, thereby, significantly limiting the writ's ambit. The Warren Court had viewed the Apex Court as an expositor as well as enforcer of rights.
Comparative analysis - two sides of the same coin?
However, contrary to popular notion, the Rehnquist Court never indulged in blatant overruling of past precedents. A careful analysis would reveal that most of its rulings aimed to create distinctions and carve out's to the existing position of law to create its own jurisprudence. Davis v. United States is a classic instance of the Rehnquist Court's approach. Here, the Court had to decide how must police interrogators respond to statements that bring into play the rights of the accused under the "Miranda" ruling. The investigators responded to the statement of the accused by asking for termination of interrogation. The Court concluded that the action was conformed to the "Miranda" ruling.
A similar theme can be observed in Roe v. Wade, where the Rehnquist Court lessened the safeguard for abortion rights by substituting "strict scrutiny" with the “undue burden” criterion.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court ruled that it was a gross miscarriage of justice to inflict death penalty on juveniles. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court overruled the precedent by restricting the scope of hearsay testimony. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down the death sentence provision for the mentally challenged.
Concluding Thoughts - Recent trends
In recent times, notwithstanding the rich history of civil rights protection, the courts, including the Supreme Court has validated government actions citing reasons of national security, offering limiting the scope of civil liberties with the passing of every day. Critiques have often questioned the court's inability to perform the delicate balancing act between civil rights and security of the nation. Staunch civil right activists have advocated greater judicial activism in the mould of Earl Warren when the judiciary intelligently probed into government actions to expand the boundaries of civil liberties. Recently, the Supreme Court apparently agreed, at least in principle. There have been a few encouraging signs as evidenced in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where the Court held that the Constitution contemplates a role for judges when civil liberties are under threat from a legislative enactment or executive action and rejected the premise that the President enjoys absolute authority to impinge upon individual rights during times of war and crisis.
In spite of the promise, the idea of having a comprehensive civil rights protection regime with the Apex Court as the custodian, appears unrealistic, given the constant concerns regarding security that govern our current existence. A subtle balance in favor of constitutional rights by carefully accommodating the dangers of national security crisis, can prove to be the correct solution, if the judiciary remains adequately conscious in its decision making.
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