Abstract
Shortly after WW2, Japan became a place where the Allies put on trial Japanese military criminals of different standing. Overall, the process looked methodical and well-though-out, with an ad hoc classification developed for determining the guilt of offenders. The post-war years witnessed the execution of generals and the punishment of soldiers following their brutal orders. However, several years later, a complex of factors like the deliberate destruction of evidence or the enormous number of cases halted the prosecution process expediting its termination. As unethical and immoral as it was, the USA had its reasons not to prosecute some of top Japanese officials, including Emperor Hirohito. Such opportunistic treatment of criminals led to the formation of threatening attitudes in the Japanese society exonerating itself from blame along with the return of the offenders to the society and the occupation of importance positions by them.
Keywords: WW2, Japan, Hirohito, offender, trial, attitude, the USA
The WW2 left great desolation in its wake. One of its principal participants, Japan was in want of restoring when the country was finally done resisting and fighting since parts of the country lay ruined. What it needed desperately was to bring those who turned Japan into a pariah state to justice, which were wartime offenders operating on different levels. Indeed, instead of getting around to rebuilding the country following the draining military conflict, the country got punishing its top political and military offenders, and so did the Allies, as befits victors. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal along with smaller courts in Japan and beyond the country came putting officials of different standing on trials for their wartime actions. A, B, and C were categories placed in descending order by crime gravity.
However, a mixture of reasons like poor cooperation of law enforcers and the deficit of investigators led the Allies to end trials earlier than planned. As appears from uncovered evidence, the USA intentionally allowed Emperor Hirohito along some other war criminals with the aim of setting itself prepared in the face of the oncoming Cold War in many ways, which led to ghastly criminals reintegrating into the society in spheres like science, politics, and business and Japanese developing the dangerous misperception of their impunity. Thus, the post-WW2 Japan hosted a wide range of trials for war criminals who had committed blood-creeping atrocities; however, legitimate factors, such as poor cooperation and scanty resources, coupled with clandestine US and USSR rationales resulted in selective justice that left plenty of top-level offenders unpunished letting them occupy high position in social hierarchy in later years.
Japan that Had Much to Answer for
Finn (187) states that Japan waged germ warfare in Manchuria. An official from Japan admitted in 1982 that the country in question used over 3.000 allied POWs in medical and biological experiments. Drea (15) confirms Japanese involvement the medical experiment. Gorman (n.pag.) reports about Japanese use of water boarding, which was water torture revolving around drowning an individual subjected to the procedure. Secret police known as Kenpeitai would use this torture technique against detainees at Fort Santiago. Yang (31) notes that, during the Bataan Death March, Japanese maltreated 70.000 Filipino and American prisoners of war making them march for days without supplies or food, which left 5.000 Filipinos and 750 Americans dead due to diseases, starvation, and occasional executions. Drea (15) also notes that Japanese were responsible for civilian internment camps, the Rape of Nanking, and comfort women. The imperial army had what was field brothel system in China and other locations. Recorded were the cases of forced prostitution involving Caucasian women and the rape of Filipina women (Drea 15). There being much to be held accountable for, Japanese awaited trial, which ensued following their surrender, yet the comprehensiveness and impartiality of criminal justice remains to be researched.
Punishment for Wartime Offenders, Their Gradation, the Scope and Comprehensiveness of Justice
Horwitz (542) notes that the victors got the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal working in May 1946. It came to be known also as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The number of Class A defendants from among the top officials of Japanese descent like admirals, generals, bureaucrats, and career diplomats stood at 28 individuals. Of these, the key figures were Koki Hirota, the former prime minister and the acting foreign minister at the time of surrender, Shigenori Togo and Mamoru Shigemitsu also acting as foreign ministers during the war, and Hideki Tojo to have served as the prime minister of the country all through the better part of the conflict (qtd. in Interagency Working Group 7). General Tojo was a militarist hardliner promoting the aggressive vector of Japanese development (Pacific War Historical Society n.pag.). Horwitz (542) stated that these defendants were liable for three types of crimes, such as traditional war crimes, aggression, and conspiracy to commit aggression. The prosecution yielded upwards of 800 witness affidavits, 400 witnesses, and 4.000 other documents (qtd. in Interagency Working Group 7). A total of 7 A-Class war criminals was sentenced and put to death at Sugamo prison on 23 December 1948. A remaining 18 A Class offenders obtained different prison terms (Pacific War Historical Society n.pag.).
Gorman (n.pag.) suggests that an estimated six generals had capital punishment applied to them for the waterboarding application along with more general offense categories, such as aggression, conspiracy, and crimes against peace (Gorman n.pag.). In all probability, the generals accused of torture fell under the category of A-class offenders, as Japanese soldiers must have applied torture when under their ferule. According to Horwitz (542), additional were Class B and C war offenders indicted on the commission of atrocities in the course of occupations, battles or against war prisoners. Extra tribunals assembled outside the capital in cities like Yokohama to try these criminals put in excess of 5.500 Japanese on trial, with 2.200 hearings held (qtd. in Interagency Working Group 7). Gorman (n.pag.) suggests that the USA prosecuted Japanese soldiers for the use of water torture. Drea (7) claims that 5.379 Japanese alongside 148 Koreans and 173 Taiwanese were indicted on different counts, such as the breach of the laws of war, traditional crimes, POW mistreatment, murder, and rape as class B and C offenders. In round figures, 4.300 received sentences, 1.000 individuals obtained capital punishment while hundreds did life imprisonment. Pacific War Historical Society (n.pag.) places the number of the convicted at 5.472 defendants out of 300.000 Japanese.
However, this is not to suggest that Japanese offenders stood convicted of what they did in no country other than Japan or that Americans were the only judges doing the sentencing. Nor should one think all criminals received what they deserved. Interagency Working Group (7) described General MacArthur as having staged trials in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, in haste. These were the first war crime trials in the Far East. The court wasted no time in proving Japanese generals Masaharu Homma and Tomoyuki Yamashita guilty, whereupon the Americans were quick to execute them. Chinese city Shanghai also saw US tribunals arranged for Japanese soldiers involved in the trial and execution of American pilots, which they had done under the Enemy Airmen’s Act. The American Navy conducted trials for wartime offenses Japanese perpetrated in the Pacific, and the Dutch, Australian, and British authorities participated actively in such. Triggs (123) notes that Australia took part in the trials of Japanese war offenders in the Pacific and put 1.000 criminals on trial by itself in Papua New Guinea and other locations using the War Crimes Act of 1945. Finn (186) suggests that trials over a number of Japanese involved in bacteriological weapon development took place in the Soviet Union in 1949.
The Pacific War Historical Society (n.pag.) notes that, in 1948, the USA decided to bring war offense prosecutions to their premature end after 25 A-Class offenders being sentenced to imprisonment or death over the 2-year period although the number of such criminals run up to a few hundred individuals. Seven A-Class offenders punished capitally in December 1948, MacArthur ordered plenty of other suspects of the same caliber released from detention at the Sugamo Prison. At this, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers fell to winding down Class C and B trials. The USA cooperated with Australia poorly, which led to Australia-initiated prosecution being impeded. Scarce time and resources, the enormous number of offense to investigate, the intentional destruction of compromising records, the insufficient number of prosecutors and investigators, and the forced reliance of those investigating the crimes on hostile Japanese government officials and police for the identification of witnesses and suspects’ whereabouts made it impossible for the Allies to punish more Japanese offenders. However, there may be other reasons the post-WW2 trials came to their abrupt end.
The Other Side of the Justice Process in Post-War Japan, Implications, and Consequences
That the West took to punishing the war criminals did not mean that the justice process and the selection of criminals would be unbiased. It could not be since the party involved in the justice process was the country that sustained human and material losses in the conflict, which might suggest at the time that the USA would be punishing Japanese right and left. However, it did not happen that way. Professor Herbert Bix (327) agrees with lingering suspicions that the Japanese emperor had participated in the routine management of the military aggression of his country in the years between 1937 and 1945 being the commander-in-chief. His having performed this central function became obvious upon the retrieval of evidence that the imperial palace accommodated the Imperial General Headquarters allowing the leader to plan military aggression and guide the progress thereof (qtd. in the Pacific War Historical Society n.pag.).
The war over, the government of Australia desired the emperor prosecuted; however, MacArthur did not agree to this happening. The administration of Harry Truman was of the belief that the administration of the vanquished country would be easier to implement if the emperor cooperated with the occupying regime. Letting the emperor be indicted on war crimes would have made such scenario impossible. Thus allowed political expediency the major military criminal to emerge scot-free from the bloodbath he committed, and element like humanity, morality, and legality were absent from the decision. Later, President Truman came to an understanding that Japan is worth reshaping into a US ally for it to serve as a citadel against the proliferation of Communism (The Pacific War Historical Society n.pag.).
Plenty of high-ranking military officials found themselves indicted and sentenced to death. No matter how senior, these officials probably could not so much as stir a finger in terms of serious matters, without the head of state telling them to given the political model of Japan led by the emperor, which means that his was the decision-making capacity while the officials did no more than submit to Hirohito’s will. Far from being punished, Emperor Hirohito retained his august position until dying over four decades after. To make mater worse, as argued by the Pacific War Historical Society (n.pag.), the USA let plenty of high-profile A-class offender leave the walls of detention facilities unpunished only for them to move smoothly into national bureaucracy, politics, and big business. Plenty of scientists-turned-war-criminals from the Unit 731 proved able to gain positions in prestigious national universities and research institutions (the Pacific War Historical Society n.pag.). If that is the way it was, the former criminals and their progeny may constitute the current Japanese elite on these levels.
For all its unethicality, the vision of the American president was logical, and there was no room for ethical categories on the threshold of the Cold War that requires the means of deterrence like all manner of the weapons of mass destruction. Finn (188) notes that the US media censured their country for the protection of General Ishii and the connivance of the biological warfare. A book saw print in the UK in 1989 that pressed charges for a protracted conspiracy by different countries with the intention of keeping specific war offenses hidden. As follows from the book, General MacArthur himself secretly promised to leave unpunished all the Japanese involved in biological warfare. According to Finn (187), the International Prosecution Section and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers MacArthur wanted to assist the Japanese with war offense charges avoidance in exchange for useful information on bacteriological warfare. Pacific War Historical Society (n.pag.) agrees that Japanese who had carried out gruesome biological experiments on live captives at Unit 731 avoided criminal prosecution since the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers wanted their advanced research in chemical and biological warfare, on which the USA managed to lay hands. The Soviet Union too penalized only some Japanese letting ringleaders stay unpunished. Finn (186) states that it took the Soviets four years to punish Japanese war prisoners found responsible for the production and employment of bacteriological weapons. The USSR and the USA both thought of Cold War politics as more relevant than they did of unbiased justice (Finn 187). Indeed, it was probably after the Soviets had elicited all bacteriological secrets from the prisoners draining them dry in terms of utility that they brought them to justice.
The Formation of Dangerous Attitudes Following the Trial Period
Plenty of Japanese were united in the belief that the Tokyo trial was unjust. Civilians were made to answer for offenses perpetrated by military leaders. Worse, the tribunal rulings limited the defense. The attitude was also such that the people of Japan considered the Tribunal President Webb biased against indictees (Finn 188). More to the issue of Japanese attitudes, the Pacific War Historical Society (n.pag.) opines that the actions of the USA vis-à-vis Japan facilitated the development of an attitude by some Japanese who refused to admit the war guilt of their country along with offenses. The political theory of Imperial Japan referred to as kokutai turned the divine emperor into the symbol of the Japanese spirit and the central point of the life of the entire nation. The decision to allow Hirohito go unprosecuted had massive attitudinal implications and consequences. A great number of Japanese concluded that their leader was innocent of the crimes if no charges were pressed. Since the country was centered on the emperor, it seemed innocent too. It was like Japanese to shift the blame on the shoulder of the imperial army believed to have betrayed the emperor and the nation. All the US accusation of the Japanese Imperial Army and wartime Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo did was only reinforce this attitude (Pacific War Historical Society n.pag.).
The situation is unique in many ways. What happened is like having Germans worshipping Hitler left alive and in power. Thus, for the USA to have left Hirohito ruling is a highly unethical decision at the minimum. It set a dangerous precedent; however, for some reason, there was no recurrence of the paranoid conquest sentiments, even less their materialization. However, the USA was being pragmatic having a bigger picture at the time when the Cold War was looming large. It needed people with different expertise, and Japanese had much to offer, as Nazi did. Thus, it is unsurprising why those who escaped justice were aplenty. Had the geopolitical conjuncture been different at that point, Hirohito would have mounted the scaffold sometime after surrender. What in unclear though is why American did not approach Hirohito on surrender terms guaranteeing immunity before bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki out of existence. Maybe, the USA wanted to test its new lethal weapons, and there was no better way to do so than release the bombs in midair while on the territory of a hostile country.
Concluding Remarks
Thus, the post-WW2 Japan did become one of epicenters of war criminals’ prosecution. As much as it did, relatively few ended up in prison cells or in the dock. A variety of factors like the insufficient number of prosecutors and the unwillingness of Japanese police to cooperate contributed greatly to the premature termination of the justice process. The interest of the USA to keep the chief criminal Emperor Hirohito to curb communism spread and enter into possession of biological warfare knowledge on the eve of the Cold War seem to have outweighed moral and ethical considerations. The worst part of the prosecution failure was that its brief duration enabled criminals to take over important positions within Japan while ordinary people developed a harmful perception of their innocence regardless of appalling offenses committed during the war.
Works Cited
Drea, Edward. “Introduction.” Researching Japanese War Crimes. Researching Japanese War Crimes. Washington DC: the National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006. Web. 28 April 2016.
Finn, Richard B. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. University of California Press, 1992. Web. 28 April 2016.
Gorman, Sean. “Bobby Scott: After WWII U.S. Executed Japanese for War Crimes Including Waterboarding.” PolitiFact. 12 January 2015. Web. 28 April 2016.
Interagency Working Group. Nazi War Crimes & Japanese Imperial Government Records. 2007. 1-156. Web. 27 April 2016.
The Pacific War Historical Society. “How the United States Protected Japanese War Criminals and Facilitated Japan’s Denial of War Guilt and War Crimes.” n.d. Web. 28 April 2016.
Triggs, Gillian. “Australia’s War Crimes Trials: All Pity Choked.” The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches. Eds. Timothy L.H. MacCormack and Gerry J. Simpson. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997. Web. 28 April 2016.
Yang, Daqing. “Documentary Evidence and the Studies of Japanese War Crimes: An Interim Assessment.” Researching Japanese War Crimes. Washington DC: the National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006. Web. 28 April 2016.
