There is increasing, and well-founded, concerns that the threats of possible terror attacks no longer require physical contact to execute because societies in the twenty-first century have become entirely reliant on computer systems and information technology. Subsequently, as the global environment continues to grow and root itself in the lives of people from the personal to national levels, there is the possibility of the same technological advances being the next weapon that terrorists will use against their targets. Now, the utilization of computer networks has proven particularly advantageous by turning the world into a global village and aiding its economy and for that reason alone, the mentioned threats remain unknown. Still, the use of the virtual environment as a threshold through which terrorists can launch attacks remains possible and that is a problem because people fail to recognize small-scale terror attacks and in some cases mistake other forms of violence as terrorism. This paper asserts that since terror attacks and terrorists cannot change in nature, it is safe to argue that the methods of conventional terrorism are applicable in the virtual environment. To that end, computer networks and information technology pose a threat as weapons of destruction.
Foremost, terrorism is an action and to that extent, the definition of the term encompasses multiple elements that conform to the idea of a person or a group of people executing a series of actions while seeking to cause terror. Therefore, when the definition of terrorism does not involve actions garnered towards creating terror and not just harm, confusion emerges as people and nations may confuse other forms of violence with terrorism. Accordingly, a report published by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1999 defines terrorism as the use of “force and violence” against people and properties as a means to “intimidate or coerce” governments, populations, or groups (i). With that in mind, terrorism does not end with brutality but instead, extends to cover the results of violent actions against a target. Apparently, while the target goes down, the people who witness the destruction that terrorists cause also matter because they form the group that would exhibit terror. In his text, dubbed Demystifying Terrorism, Michael Stohl explains the given claim by writing that for an action to fit under the heading of terrorism, it must be “intended to influence a wider audience” and send a message of fear (3). Hence, just as the portrayal of violence is essential for terrorists, the reaction of the audience is vital to the success of a terror attack. Thus, the presence of the element of fear in the victims and audiences of attack make terrorism different from other acts of violence.
Meanwhile, cyber terrorism as a term depicts a tactic that terrorists use to reach their target and because it is a method, the use of information technology in terrorist assaults does not qualify as a new form of terrorism. In other words, the principles mentioned above, in the definition of terrorism, also govern the nature of cyber terrorism. Therefore, cyber terrorism merely entails an act of terrorism that utilizes the virtual environment to execute its plans. In concurrence, Gus Martin defines the implementation of cyber terrorism as “the use of technology by terrorists to disrupt information systems” and in turn, launch an attack or interfere with plans set by either a government or its civilians (5). Consequently, as the authors of Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism observe, cyber terrorism is comparable to “cyber wars” that refer to “information-oriented” attacks against an enemy (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, 81). Nonetheless, cyber terrorism is an action that either turns computer networks into instruments through which terrorists can launch an attack or makes the existing technology the target of the same.
With the given facts in mind, it is important to expound on the note that terrorism targets an initial group, which suffers the blunt force of the attack, but a larger audience has to deal with the aftermath. Evidently, while the attacked units of people and property face possible death and destruction respectively, a more diverse and larger group forms the mentioned audience and completes the plans of a terror assault. A perfect illustration is evident in a report gathered by a panel of people that created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States and released The 9/11 Commission Report. According to the collected details, on September 11, 2001, a terror group launched an attack on American soil and by the end of the assault, the Al-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden claimed responsibility for the same (National Commission, 51). Now, before the attack in the United States, a series of bombings targeted American embassies in other countries and allies to the government were potential targets in the terrorists’ plans. For example, on August 7, 1998, the group bombed the American embassies in “Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania” and when asked about it Bin Laden confirmed that the attacks sought to capture the attention of the United States from the personal to national levels (National Commission, 115). Thus, a few Americans and many Kenyans and Tanzanians formed the immediate casualties, yet the actual target was the government of the United States. Such is the nature of terrorism and no matter the methods used; the results are the same as they only serve to spread terror.
Now that the goals of terrorism are clear, the grounds on which terrorists can launch a cyber attack are not only easier to understand but also possible to compare to the conventional methods of terrorism. As noted before, cyber terrorism merges the traditional forms of terror attacks with the virtual environment to produce tools and targets that terrorists use to achieve their goals. Extensively, in the publication of Cyber‐terrorism in 1997, Andrew Rathmell wrote that cyber attacks are possible via three main methods that successfully allow the use of both new and old techniques to meet the terrorism criteria. Apparently, whether it is a new/new or new/old combination, the effects of cyber terrorism remain consistent as it harms some people to gain the attention of larger groups, sometimes at the global capacity.
First, in a new/old model, terrorists can use computer networks to carry out terrorist procedures that would have otherwise taken longer to finish. For example, as Rathmell observes, terrorists require information about a potential subject in planned attacks and at the same time, the group needs to protect itself from detection by authorities (43). Ordinarily, it would take time and multiple risks to achieve both goals, as it is physically impossible to gain access to buildings without detection unless a person is stealth enough. However, with computer technology, such actions are possible if not easier to complete simply because of the fast communications and anonymity that machines can provide to whoever seeks the same. In fact, in The 9/11 Commission Report, the National Commission gathered intelligence that suggests the Al-Qaeda group was already on the move by 1993. In the document, investigators report that Osama Bin Laden had “computer specialists” who were responsible for “surveillance” and their use of computer networks provided Bin Laden with the necessary information about his intended victims before the bombings of 1998 (National Commission, 68). Therefore, the persons who were unfortunate enough to be at the American embassy building in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, were already victims since the year 1993.
Secondly, there is the old/new formation that permits terrorists to use the conventional methods of violence, such as physical harm, to disrupt new forms of security that happen to include the use of technology. For illustration purposes, one can consider a scenario in which some vandals gain access into and destroying a company’s security system by smashing the machines with baseball bats. Albeit not an act of terrorism, the same methods can apply to a terror attack and would be particularly efficient because, in a world that is fast becoming reliant on computer networks, such plans can be damaging for the target. In Rathmell’s words, the old/new strategy in cyber terrorism encompasses the utilization of physical violence against the “information activities of target [entities]” (43-44). Expectedly, if done correctly and on a large-scale, such terror attacks will be damaging because information is vital for the cohesion of different bodies that include the army and the government. Again on the Al-Qaeda, suicide bombing was a favorite method the terrorists utilized in spreading their influence and in August 1996, Bin Laden voiced his pleasure over the suicide bombing of “American military facilities” (National Commission, 48). At the time, the United States Army faction had access to advanced technology and part of the destroyed facilities included the same.
Finally, yet importantly, Rathmell suggests the possibility of a new/new model in which terrorists create computer attack procedures that they can use to destroy the information activities of those they consider enemies. The idea of modern day information technology as a weapon waged on the battlefield of digital warfare leaves every individual who uses any technology in a vulnerable position. Accordingly, Rathmell recognizes the third formation as the worst form of attack terrorist can launch and for that reason, the author suggests that the new/new model ought to cause the most concern for governments and civilians (44). In what is evidently an echo of Rathmell’s assertions, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini point out that terrorists could use information technologies for both “offensive and defensive purposes” and still manage to support their "organizational structures" with the same (77). Therefore, the use of emerging technologies by terrorists to attack the computer networks of their foes is the strongest and worst form of cyber terrorism, especially when undetected.
In summary, computer technology can assume two roles in cyber terrorism: that of a facilitator and as a component of a weapon or a target. About facilitating terrorism, information technology in the hands of terrorists is perfect for exploitation simply because it is a modern invention and is widely used by most populations. In that sense, terrorists can use the virtual environment to meet the goals that closely resemble those set before the introduction of computers. The only difference would be unlike the traditional methods, new tactics that incorporate computers simplify operations, allow one to be anonymous when he or she desires the same, and cannot backfire because the world cannot stop using technology. Correspondingly, the assimilation of computers as part of the weapons that terrorists use in the fight against an opposing power or as the actual target at which they are aiming shows the role of technology in cyber terrorism. Through computers, terrorists can issue threats against national security and place nations in panic mode. From threatening and attacking a single victim’s technological resources to bringing down infrastructures that rely on computer networks, cyber terrorism can take the form of a weapon.
Conclusively, cyber terrorism proves that terrorism is evolving, and terror organizations are at the center of the changes as they gradually increase the degree at which they capitalize on computer technology in their plans. The given examples based on the Al-Qaeda group that Osama Bin Laden governed provide sufficient evidence to the claims of technology playing a crucial role in the operations of terrorists. The process of planning attacks no longer requires physical contact and a single person can launch a terror attack as long as he or she has the necessary equipment to cause fear in the larger audience. In other words, extensive resources, a large workforce, and management within the terrorists’ ranks are no longer a necessity because computer networks are cost effective, can execute multiple tasks with one operator, and can monitor all members. Hence, cyber terrorism is fast gaining momentum, and new tactics are necessary to increase cybersecurity and combat the rising threats.
Works Cited
Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division. Terrorism in the United States. Government Report. Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999. Web. <https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terror_98.pdf>.
Arquilla John, Ronfeldt David, and Zanini Michele. "Networks, Netwar and Information-Age Terrorism." Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Ed. Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White. California: RAND Corporation, 1999. 75-111. Print.
Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues. 4th. Carlifornia: SAGE Publications, 2012. Print.
Rathmell, Andrew. "Cyber‐terrorism: The shape of future conflict?" The RUSI Journal 142.5 (1997): 40-45. Web.
Stohl, Michael. "Demystifying Terrorism: The Myths and Realities of Contemporary." The Politics of Terrorism. Ed. Michael Stohl. New York: Marcel Decker, Inc., 1988. 1-28. Print.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Complete 9/11 Commission Report. Government Report. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004. Web. <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>.
