The Berlin Conference, or the West African Conference, took place between November 15, 1884, and February 26, 1885, and sought to settle skirmishes that erupted among the European nations that desired territories in Africa. Central to the calls for the Conference was Otto Bismarck of Germany and the French government. By 1884, three European powers boasted of control over a portion of the Africa Continent: the British, French, and the Portuguese. However, with the Conference and the ensuing endorsement of the “General Act,” tides changed as the colonization of Africa gained momentum (Craven, 2015, p.38). Before the Berlin Conference, the acquisition of territories revolved around three factors: conquest, occupancy or settlement, and cession with the last form paving the way for the second. At the same time, any symbolic occupation of a land was enough to warrant a nation’s claim over the same. For instance, if the Portuguese were to raise a flag in a particular territory, it was sufficient to dissuade the British from trespassing on the same. By that logic, claims over Africa were flimsy and too broad without any form of organization for the interested parties. After the Conference, for a recognized right of occupation, physical possession became a necessity. In other words, the European powers had to establish control and ensure the maintenance of law and order in the African colonies. To that end, the Berlin Conference begot the General Act, which contained “four Declarations and two Acts of Navigation” (Craven, 2015, p.38). As part of the mentioned resolutions, the Conference called on the powers “to watch over the preservation of the native tribes and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being” (Craven, 2015, p.39). Naturally, as the document called for the occupation of the African lands by interested European nations, imperial competition only intensified as general annexations became impossible. After all, vast territories required more settlers from the mother country and that alone meant there was a territory for each of the interested nations. Africa was up for grabs.
Now, before the Berlin Conference, partition was mostly a matter of documents as opposed to physical domination. Subsequently, treaty rights, which were subject to the ill-informed consent of native chiefs and other leaders of the African communities, defined most of the territory acquisitions. Apparently, “[African] rulers hoped to obtain, and sometimes actually [received]” political benefits from the invading Europeans and for that reason alone, the treaties appeared to benefit both sides (Touval, 1996, p.205). The problem was, as long as the chiefs and elders expected a favor in return for a task performed for the colonizers, it was impossible to achieve maximum control over the colonies. In other words, the local powers had more authority than the outsiders did and the Europeans were keen to change the situation. Apparently, where the Europeans did not get what they desired it was common to have them employ “coercive measures [that] may have been the explicit threat of superior force” (Touval, 1996, p.283). By that logic, the interests the Europeans had in Africa, the more desperate they became to ensure the complete occupation of the lands. Hence, whereas they employ diplomatic tactics before, the methods evolved and became forceful to protect the interests of the mother countries. Notably, the invaders had better weapons than the native tribes the partitioning was only inevitable.
References
Craven, M. (2015). Between Law And History: The Berlin Conference Of 1884-1885 And The Logic Of Free Trade. London Review of International Law, 3(1), 31–59. doi:10.1093/lril/lrv002
Touval, S. (1966). Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa. The Journal of African History,, 7(2), 279-293.
