The commons problem
The tragedy of the commons is the destruction of the environment that occurs when many people use a limited resource in common (Ostrom, 2015). According to Garret Hardin (1968), the population usually grows exponentially, but the world available to the human population is finite. Therefore, for the finite world to support the human population, the population growth rate should be zero. However, this is not the case hence it is impossible to maximise the good to more than one person or group of persons at the same time. Hardin (1968) disagrees with Bentham’s goal which is to achieve the greatest good for the maximum possible number of people. He argues that from a mathematical point of view, it is impossible to increase the values of two variables at the same time. The tragedy of the commons arises when people use a resource in commons thus an individual’s decision to maximise his benefit has a greater positive impact than negative impact on the individual. Another example is a factory releasing untreated wastes to the environment. Without regulation, the factory will not treat wastes since the cost of treating wastes is higher than the factory’s share of the social cost of pollution resulting from such wastes.
Hardin used an example of a pasture that is open to all in the community. Each herdsman would make a decision to maximise his profit by increasing his herd. The proceeds from the sale of the additional animal go to the individual herdsman. However, there is the negative effect of overgrazing which is shared by all herdsmen (Hardin, 1968). Therefore, each herdsman is motivated to add animals, and the overall impact will be a degradation of the environment. The problem of commons is, therefore, a serious economic problem in societies. If not addressed, natural resources may be depleted leaving less or nothing to sustain the future generations.
Use of common property to address the commons problems
According to Wade (1987), common property or common pool resources are those whose rights to use are jointly held by people. Unlike other public goods, the use of the common property is usually subtractive. This implies that if an individual overexploits, then the rest is left with less to exploit. Several means can be adopted in the use of common resources to reduce the commons problem thus protecting resources and ensuring a sustainable use of resources. These measures are discussed below.
Collective action
Collective action refers to an action taken by two or more persons aimed at achieving a common goal which cannot be achieved by an individual alone. Collective action can address the commons problem when members of a group set and observe rules that restrict them from accessing the common property. In this case, limits can be set beyond which no individual can exploit the common property. Restrained access rules, of adhered to, can lead the sustainable use of the common property thus eliminating the problem of the tragedy of the commons. However, Mancur Olson questioned the viability of voluntary collective in resolving the commons problem. He argues that individuals are unlikely to abandon their self-interests and act in the common interest with coercion or external legislation (Olson, 2009). He proposes that there should be selective punishments and rewards in common interest groups (Olson, 2009).
Common interest groups can use collective action to produce public goods and services through local arrangements without necessarily being coerced by external bodies and state regulations. Robert studied the application of collective action in forty-one villages in India. He found out that villages that had public realm had four institutions, namely; the village council, the village standing fund, village guards and the common irrigators. The village council is responsible for organizing and providing public goods and services while the common irrigators have the responsibility of distributing water to rice fields. Village guards protect crops from thieves and livestock. Such activities are funded by the village standing fund which raises money in several ways including contributions from farmers and sale of council-sanctioned franchises.
The corporate villages have instituted regulations to enhance the protection of crops from livestock. There are specific rules for both crop farmers and the herders. Failure to adhere to the rules attracts fines. Besides, enforcement of these rules is enhanced through the village-appointed guards. The introduction of fines addresses the limitation of collective that individual members cannot sacrifice self-interests for common interests unless there is selective punishment or reward (Olson, 2009). Therefore, to reduce the resolve the commons problem, individuals using common property can have local arrangements and establish institutions and rules governing the use of the property.
Regulations
Local and state authorities can also set rules that govern the exploitation of common property. The rules should be aimed at restricting access to common-pool resources to ensure the long-term sustainability of such resources. This can be done through issuing licenses upon meeting certain requirements. For instance, a state can reduce the commons problems in fisheries can help reduce the commons problem by issuing fishing licenses to fishermen. This implies that access to the fishery will be limited to only the licensed fishermen. Acheson (1975) cites that the state of Maine enacted a few regulations to conserve lobsters. This includes protection of female lobsters irrespective of their sizes. The license of a fisherman who violates this law can be withdrawn. Hardin (1968) argues that it may be difficult to enforce legislation on common property usage since it is possible to include all conditions. He recommends the use of administrative law to enhance the legislation of temperance.
Informal norms of territoriality
In some cases, government and state regulations do not limit access to a common property. Informal norms of territoriality can be used to limit access to the common property as well as the quantity of the resource an individual can access. These norms are common for fishermen and hunters. After using part of the common property for some time, a group or an individual acquires informal property rights over the portion of the property. The individual restricts access by other individuals to the area thereby guarding it against overexploitation. Similarly, an individual should not exploit the common property beyond his informal territory. This creates a form of privatisation of the informal territory. The individual or group sees the territory as his hence overexploitation in the territory affects only individuals within the territory.
According to Acheson (1975), informal property rights exist in the Maine Lobster industry. There is a delineation of boundaries on the shore and any fisherman that violates the informal property rights face threats of violence among other sanctions. They have both nucleated, and perimeter defended fishing areas. A fisherman must join the respective harbour gang to get permission to fish in a given territorial boundary.
Bibliography
Acheson, J. (1975). The lobster fiefs: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in the maine lobster industry. Hum Ecol, 3(3), pp.183-207.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 1(162), pp.1243-1248.
Olson, M. (2009). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2015). Governing the commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wade, R. (1987). THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: Finding a Cooperative Solution. World Bank Res Obs, 2(2), pp.219-234.
