Theaetetus is a middle-period dialogue by Plato (Smith 53). Plato is determined to be precise but there some ambiguities and difficulties in his terminology. Therefore, Theaetetus fails to provide a fulfilling account of knowledge even though knowledge plays an integral role in Plato’s philosophy. I disagree with the claim that “knowledge is nothing other than perception”. Plato’s general point in Theaetetus is that perception in not tantamount to knowledge (Smith 69).
Section 1
Claim: “Knowledge is nothing other than perception”.
In Theaetetus, Plato opposes the notion that “knowledge is perception”. He handles the definition of knowledge ambiguously in the text. In some sections, Theaetetus asserts that knowledge is the infallible and reality is one of the issues (Smith 62). The theory that knowledge is perception bases on the notion that sensation can realize or yield infallible things. However, something that results from sensation may not be real because real things are unchanging and fixed. The mind plays a crucial role in knowledge because it helps in the interpretation of senses (Smith 62). In most instances, the interpretation of the sense’s raw data precedes the achievement of knowledge.
2 Disambiguations
The first disambiguation is that “knowledge is justified true belief” while the second one is that “knowledge is perception”. Perception is not equal to knowledge because perception is concerned with appearance. Appearances always vary from one subject to the other. If perception were knowledge, then, all people would be equally wise because each individual would believe that their sense of perception is the best. Perception is fallible, and that disqualifies it from being knowledge. Perceptions are often in a flux state, and they evolve perpetually; therefore, they cannot constitute knowledge (Smith 69).
Plato is more likely to accept the claim that “knowledge is justified true belief.” Objects of knowledge should be abiding, fixed, stable, and capable of being construed in clear definitions that can be embraced universally. The claim matches people’s intuition that is it is impossible to know that which is false. A person may think that they know something only for them to realize that they do not. That is not knowledge, and the person was just wrong in thinking that they were knowledgeable about something (Smith 70).
Section 2
Claim: Objection to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief:
A belief may be justified and true, but that does not make it knowledge (Smith 70). The notion that one must believe something from them to know it is objectionable because knowledge and belief are from different mental states. Either a person knows something or believes it. However, believing something does not qualify it to become knowledge. It is possible for a person to think that they know something, only to establish that it is wrong, despite having believed it (Smith 74). Furthermore, an individual can mistakenly think that belief is knowledge. It is also possible for a person to have a “justified true belief”, which is not knowledge. The connection between a belief being true and reasons for having the belief may just be accidental. One of the main distinctions between belief and knowledge is that people are capable of believing diverse propositions, some of which are not true (Smith 74). On the other hand, one can have true beliefs without any justification or evidence to support such beliefs. A person can also hold a belief that is true even though the evidence suggests that the belief is false. The strength of justification is also a controversial issue in the relationship between true belief and knowledge (Smith 74).
Work Cited
Smith, Nicholas. Knowledge (Polity Key Concepts in Philosophy). New York: Prentice Hall, 2013. Print.
