The common resources are natural and cultural resources, and they include air, water, ocean and habitable earth. These common resources are accessible to all society members. The resources are not privately owned but instead are held in common. Due to a tragedy of commons, individual users of the shared resources act independently as directed by their self-interest and deplete the resources by behaving contrary to the shared resources. For instance, oceans as common resources are usually subjected to overexploitation and abuse since it is not private property. Since the competition of fisheries is high, the fishing firms demonstrate predatory behavior by their unwillingness and inability to conserve the sources of marine which they depend on but only focus on overcapitalization. Since oceans are common property and everyone may exploit them, nobody takes the interest of conserving them (Acheson 205). The fishers only try to catch a large number of fish to maximize on their capital equipment. This paper focuses on exploring various ways on how commons can be used to minimize the problems associated with common resources. There are different ways in which the ocean can be used to minimize overexploitation of marine environment.
The user of common resources can voluntarily restrain the resource use to avoid overexploitation. By using collective action, the observing rules can be developed to control the access of common-pool resources that will result in sustainable exploitation. Similarly, mutual coercion is necessary to prevent the tragedy of commons by managing the resources. People usually act in a rational self-interest hence conscience should not be relied on as a mean of policing commons. Thus, the ocean should be utilized in a manner that will address the common problem.
Taking the case of the Maine lobster industry, boundaries are used in the territories to restrict the group of fishers. The territories are guided by practical political groupings that support the enactment of local measures of conservation and restrict entry into the area. Hence, men fishing out of one harbor have to allow one to enter into the territory. Interlopers are usually restricted from entering into the area where the lobstering gear is destructed in most cases. However, the perimeter defended territory is severely controlled and limited as compared to the nucleated territory (Acheson 187). Maintaining strict boundaries reduces the number of people fishing is a given area. The fishing territory can, therefore, maintain the limits of their territory to minimize the number of fishers in a place to avoid overexploitation of the resource.
Also, fewer boats per an area can be used to minimize overexploitation of the ocean. This implies that every fisher will have less capital equipment and will use less fishing effort. Hence, the lobster in those areas will be in a higher proportion and will attain the minimum legal size. Eventually, the lobster will grow to large sizes because they remain uncaught for an extended period. Similarly, the fishermen can agree voluntarily to restrict the number of traps they use in fishing. Limiting the traps can increase the profit of fishers by reducing the production cost, including fuel and bait cost. Also, restricted traps minimize the Mortality of lobster, since lobster that would have occupied the avoided trap get incarcerated permanently. The traps also mold the lobster by pulling them frequently. Thus, the two approach measures will allow a significant number of female lobsters to service until breeding stage. A large number of females will lay many eggs resulting in biomass conservation (Acheson 197). Trap limit can also make the fishermen dispense with minimal traps as well can maximize the yield of the trap. Although trap limit takes a longer time to catch the lobster, the same catch is attained at the end of the annual cycle.
The state can also impose closed season as a way of using the ocean resource sustainably. The law can be passed to limit fishing at a given period of the year. For instance, Monhegan men only fish during midwinter when there are several economical options and lobster price are very high. During summer, the fishermen engage in alternative employment, but ensure that their territory is well guided by the state fish warden (Acheson 197). Thus, the closed season approach can ensure that no traps have been set during the critical months to avoid very high mortality since during this critical season the lobsters are melting. Trap limit and closed season occur effectively where there is mutual coercion among the members. Every member should agree to such measures to defend their area.
The subgroup of the fishery can also be given the power to develop local rules governing their groups. For instance, the groups should pass local rules that limit the number of traps and boats and agrees to such terms. This will result in the success of collective action and will ensure that the number of lobsters caught are many and large. It will eventually become an economic measure as the lobster will be sold at a good price because of a large proportion of lobster. The state can also establish as small fishing area and few fishers to avoid exploitation. The fishermen should be equipped with the necessary knowledge on the practical means that can be utilized to minimize resources and maximize the output.
As a matter of the collective action, voluntariness has to be considered as an issue of the constitution. The constitution gives the people a right to agree to set of rules of financial contribution or restricted access because of net collective benefit. Hence the fishery rules should be voluntary, but a system of punishment should back them to assist each follow the rules. For instance, the requirement that one should have a license to access the fishery territory can limit some members from participating.
Managing the territory of fishing thus, ensure that there are fewer fishermen per given area due to high restriction. Local closed season measure and trap limit in this management, minimize fishing effort that in turn will reduce mortality of the lobster and increase the size of the lobster being caught. The reduced effort of fishing can also halt the overexploitation process (Acheson 204). Hence the whole management can result in the highest number of lobster per trap, high prices of the robust and higher income from the fishery. Nevertheless, the measures can sometimes limit the effectiveness of fishing.
Therefore, collective action can be used to avoid the problem of common resources. Since individuals act in a rational self-interest, conscience should not be relied on as a mean of policing Commons, but instead, mutual coercion is necessary to prevent the tragedy of commons by managing the resources. However, the government can provide technical assistance and legal framework to support the local systems.
Work cited
James, Acheson. The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and Ecological of Territory in Maine Lobster industry. New York: Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1974.
