ABSTRACT
The Hamas in a terrorist organization that has a long and diverse history. In this paper, I will examine this body and break down its organizational structure. Other sectors of key interest will be its ideologies, military involvement, and past atrocities. This will facilitate an in-depth understanding of the Hamas, its vindication as a terrorist organization and the role it plays in the Middle East.
INTRODUCTION
While all these definitions appear concise at face value, countries worldwide are confronted by a serious challenge of picking a comprehensive definition. With the State Department of the United States' definition, for example, sub-political and terrorist cells are termed as the cause, and this is short sighted as it fails to include governments as possible terrorism agents. Another challenge in these definitions is terming terror as an act committed against civilians. This brings a problem when acts of terror are targeted at military targets (Jordan, 2011). The United Nations General Assembly met and tried to find a more encompassing definition which defines terrorism as any act intended to cause injury, bodily harm or death, persons not actively participating in hostilities during armed conflict, when the aim of the act by nature or context is meant to intimidate a government or civil body and pressure them to carry out or abstain from and an action.
Organization and history of the Hamas
The Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, also known as the Hamas is a Palestinian fundamentalist group formed under extremist Islam principles. It was established in 1987 during the first Palestine uprising as a splinter group out of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and is widely active in the West Bank and the Gaza strips. Its mission is setting up of a Muslim Palestine state in place of Israel and opposes all deals made between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel (Jamal, 2005). In 2006, Hamas secured a legitimate landslide victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. While its opponents see its cause as a legitimate one, because of their continued acts of violence and their stand for the destruction of Israel, Hamas has been named as a terrorist organization (Higgins, 2009).
Once the primary intifada (rebellion) broke out, Hamas as an associate of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that in its geographic region branch had been non-confrontational towards Israel, evaded resistance and was hostile to the political movement. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin declared and was later affirmed in the Hamas charter that the organization’s goal was to liberate Palestine, together with contemporary Israel, from Israeli occupation and to ascertain a Muslim state within the space that's currently the Gaza Strip, Israel, and the West Bank. The cluster has declared that it should settle for a 10-year peace if Israel reverts to the borders that existed in 1969 and allowed Palestine refugees exiled as well as their descendants, to return to what's currently Israel, though instructive that this doesn't mean recognition of Israel or the top of the conflict. Hamas' military wing, however, has continuously objected to the peace provision. Analysts have voiced that it appears clear that Hamas is aware of that a lot of its conditions for the peace might never be met (Fletcher, 2014).
Hamas acquired from its ancestor a three-tier system tasked with providing social services, military operations and religious indoctrination under a council known as the Shura. Customarily it had 4 distinct capacities: a military division (al-Mujahideen al Filastinun) that was tasked with acquiring weapons and carrying out military campaigns and attacks, an altruistic social services and welfare department (dawah), a security administration arm (Jehaz Aman) as well as a media branch (A'alam) that aims to spread propaganda and call out for new recruits. Authority in the Hamas is comprised of internal leadership based in West Bank and the Gaza strip, and external leadership split between a Gaza branch and a Kuwaiti gathering according to Levitt (2006, p.11-12). The Kuwaiti section of Palestinian rebels is the more influential and wealthy after it started getting massive funding from the Gulf States, due to opposition of Palestinian Liberation Movement leader Yasser Arafat's decision to stand by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the Invasion of Kuwait, and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Roy, 2013).
The intricate nature of the organization’s working is indistinct, mystery being kept up inspired by a paranoid fear of assassinations by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence organization and to maintain the covert nature of its operational exercises. According to information put out by the faction, its wings keep autonomous operations (Chosak & Sawyer, 2005). Experts, however, are highly sceptical such as Matthew Levitt (2006) who argues that this is merely a façade and a publicity show. Davis (p.60) contends that they are both semi-autonomous and operate in unity for both internal and external purposes. The meticulousness of Mossad’s gathering of intelligence and a broad base of sources makes correspondences between the administrative and military wings troublesome. However, following the death of one of their commanders Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, the infrequent political activities of the activist wing lessened to a bare minimum, with field administrators given the power to make their decision in regards to operations without oversight.
The representing body is the Majlis al-Shura Council, which based on the Qur'anic idea of counsel and prevalent consultation, which Hamas pioneers contend accommodates majority rule government inside an Islamic framework (Mandaville,2014). As the association developed and became more complex and with increased confrontations with Israel, there was a need to restructure the council. The Majlis al-Shura was changed to the General Consultative Council and comprised of individuals elected from adjacent local governing bodies and they, in turn, chose 15 men to form a Bureau (Al-Maktab al-Siyasi) , the highest decision-making body in the Hamas. This body is rich and diverse with leaders being in exile, former inmates in Israeli prisons, as well as leaders from factions within Gaza and the West Bank. The headquarters were in Damascus but had to move due to insurgency when Hamas joined the rebels in the Syrian civil war who sought to ouster, Bashar al-Assad.
The Social Services Wing
Just like its administrative council, the Hamas adapted its welfare system from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. In Quranic convention dawah obliges believers to connect with others by both converting them to Islam and by beneficent works. Charity is the most prevalent means of outreach; spearheaded by mosques which utilize both waqf (assets ) and altruistic gifts (zakat) to finance social needs and amenities like halfway houses, nurseries, schools, women's initiatives, food programs, libraries and notwithstanding sporting activities. These efforts were aimed at advancing the purpose of teaching Islam and public discourse on political issues. According to data collected in the late 1990's, about 85% of its budget went to providing for social amenities which makes the organization probably the largest social administration in Palestine. It is estimated that by 2000 Hamas and its subsidiary foundations were responsible for running almost half of the social agencies in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Hamas and other Islamic charities provided monthly stipends and income to 120,000 people in Gaza. These groups aim to fill the vacuum left by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had neglected to take into account the social needs of the people and was plagued by corruption. As late as 2005, the monetary allowance of Hamas, majorly sourced from worldwide philanthropic donations drawing on, was, for the most part, tied up in operational expenses for its social projects. They ranged from the supply of lodging, nourishment and water for the destitute to other broad capacities like education, medicinal facilities, instructive and religious direction. There was a budgetary adaptability which permitted these assets to cover both social causes and military operations, allowing exchange from one to the next (Davis, 2016).
In the Palestine context, dawah was understood to the means which will enable the rebellion to prosper and therefore contrasts from the opponent Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which does not have any social welfare arrangement and depends on acts of terror and threats alone to earn recruits and respect. Through $60 million in funding received from Iran for example, Hamas gave monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 labourers, and an equal amount to fishermen in the Gaza Strip who were affected by Israel's embargo on fishing as well as providing $45 million in grants to prisoners and their families.
The scheme is contended that Hamas awards to individuals are a brilliant well thought recruitment strategy, with this being done for the long-term benefit of persuading people to join the organization. Those connected to terrorist exercises receive more amounts than families who are victims of Israeli attacks. Hamas targets whose homes have been wrecked by Israeli shelling as they are desperate and vulnerable. While these generous contributions stretched all over the West Bank, a PLO crackdown and the Egyptian revolution which ousted the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas found itself with limited resources. It has tried to delegate the responsibility of providing social amenities to Palestinian National Authority, however without achievement.
The military wing
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the Hamas’ military faction was founded between 1991 and 1992 of Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas, field commander. It was based on an umbrella group that brought together fighters from various Islamic cells that were fighting Israel. During its early days, weapons were in limited supply, and the insurgents obtained ammunition by ambushing Israeli soldiers. This approach was justified when Israeli agents dispersing a protest near a mosque killed several protesters, and therefore the Hamas declared war on all soldiers. The exact number of these militants is not known, but it is believed that there a few hundred core members who receive military training abroad and are backed by about 15000 other fighters.
The wing, which also called itself ‘Students of Ayyash’ benefited from his expertise as he had an electrical engineering degree. He taught them to make improvised explosives and initiated suicide bombings (Mukhimer, 2012). The militants took advantage of children and women as suicide bombers due to their advantage in concealing explosives and the ability to approach targets with lesser scrutiny. This method, however, was ineffective, and the militants devised rudimentary rocketry and in 2000 launched a rocket that had a 4-kilometre range and carried 500-gram warhead that could hit targets 4 kilometres away. The explosives were made from fertilisers. Within five years the rocket was improved and could carry a 3-kilogram warhead for a 6-kilometre range. Rocket attacks increased from four in 2001, 155 in 2003 and by 2005 had reached 179. By 2005, the rockets had a fifteen-kilogram warhead, and the range doubled warhead. By 2015, the rocket heads could hit Tel Aviv, and Hamas favoured rocket attacks to suicide bombings (Sabry, 2015).
Funding sources of the Hamas
As of 2011, Hamas had a budget of 70 million dollars, with 85% of this being from foreign sources. Most of the funds originate from donor organizations in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Britain, Germany, the United States, Qatar and France for what Hamas claims to be charitable work for Palestinians. Investments made from its ideologies also account for a substantial part, with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia being the biggest contributors. Hamas also profits from both legitimate and criminal organizations as well as financial networks that support terrorism. It also is involved with financial fraud, drug smuggling and piracy (Vittori, 2011). Another primary source of funding is religious groups. Unlike other terrorist organizations, however, it must maintain a balance between funds for social causes and its militant activities as numerous organizations channelling money to them have had their assets frozen by The United States, Israel, and the European Union.
The Hamas Charter and impact of Hamas in the Middle East
The Hamas Charter decreed in 1988 set out the aims of the organization and its doctrine. It enshrined the spirit of the resistance with the primary goal being setting up of a Muslim Palestine territory and obliteration of Israel. Article 11 of the charter stated that the land of Palestine is a holy possession to all Muslims, and it is their duty to protect it for all generations. The letter was littered with anti-Semitic rhetoric and a call for Jihad for Muslims to kill all Jews.
Furthermore, the charter rejected all peace settlements terming them as folly by Zionists to appoint infidels to rule the land. It stipulated that there would be no other solution to the conflict apart from Jihad. They also condemned the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty and claimed that it was a means to lure Arabic countries from their cause.
With time, however, it appears that Hamas has changed their stand and gradually taken up the two-state solution where Palestine will secede and coexist with Israel, and their leader publicly acknowledging this as a solution. The charter, however, has remained unchanged as altering it would indicate them softening their stance and would threaten the unity of the movement.
For most of its existence, Hamas has operated within the territorial boundaries of Israel and is seldom involved in external wars. Internally, its main rivals are the Fatah, who also oppose the Palestinian Authority but do not agree with Hamas' methodology (Phillips, 2011). Things were further escalated by the 2006 election, especially when the Fatah stopped Hamas' attempted assassination of President Mahmoud Abbas and got their head appointed as Minister of Security. This conflict heated up and escalated into the Gaza War, which ended with the formation of a union government. Internationally, Hamas came into the spotlight during the Syrian Civil war as it provided fighters and support to rebels fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
CONCLUSION
As I conclude, there is a sharp divide globally on how countries treat the Hamas. While most prominent powers have classified it as a terrorist organization, some have opted to sit on the fence while others support it. Israel, The United States and the European were the earliest countries to classify it as a terrorist organization followed by Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Japan and Saudi Arabia (Department of Defence, 2005). Turkey, China, and Russia, on the other hand, recognize Hamas as a legitimately elected government and even met with their leaders, however, they continue to pressure Hamas to drop their violent ways.
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