Kuwait, as a nation, has faced a number of successive revolutions, all led by the country’s youth. Despite its immense oil wealth, as the third greatest producing member of OPEC, Kuwait is small country. It has a total population of just 1.2 million people, and as a result is often overlooked on the diplomatic level. Moreover, it has a fragmented and complex political structure that can be challenging for outsiders to understand. So, Kuwait stayed largely out of the media, and international affairs, since it was released from Iraqi occupation in 1991, by Western armed forces. At that time, the Western military commitment was justified by the need to defend democracy against the Baathist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Previously, Kuwait had established its independence, in 1961, according to a constitution, which was very advanced compared to the political frameworks used by its Middle Eastern neighbors. Recently, however, The Emir has wanted to give greater prominence to the nation, as it relates to global politics and trade. All of this political upheaval has led to the rebellion of the youth, who are seeking change.
Regression threat
It is important to understand the current political situation in Kuwait. Today, Kuwait seems to have regressed, in terms of its political development, and international significance. This has occurred because the current political leader, and successor to the former Democratic Emir, who was very effective in his position, has been actively working to weaken the impact of reforms which are desired by the citizens of Kuwait, and which would move the country into greater prominence. However, the public is responding to this regression with surprising dynamics. Some have insinuated that the current rebellion , known as the Arab Spring, actually began years ago, ramping up so gradually that no one really realized that a revolution was occuring. In 2006, there was a youth movement, known as the "orange" Ukrainian revolution. Then, in 2008, the movement openly opposed the Prime Minister. Formally, however, on December 8, 2010, nine days before the immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia triggered the Arab Spring. On this day, a law professor Obaid Al-Wasmi, stood publically against the emir’s right to ban public gatherings, and stated that based on his actions, the emir deserved to be beaten by the riot police, rather then being triumphantly elected in the next election. This led to large street protests, which forced the emir to accept the resignation of his prime minister in fall 2011, even though he had sworn he would support the prime minister, and keep him seated at power despite the resistance (Zaccara, p. 80-101). It then followed, that in October of 2015, the candidate of the opposition, Al-Barrak Moussallam, delivered a resounding speech, in which he stated: "I quite entitled to speak directly to the Emir, and also to criticize his mistakes". His speech was significant, in that it denounced the attempts of the ruling family to circumvent the constitution, either openly (it had suspended it twice in the course of history) or by circumvention, (the emir dissolved parliament four times during the seven years of his reign). He even described the regime as "brutal", a term that was previously reserved for the evocation of the Iraqi occupation in 1990, concluding by saying "we will not let you do," which has since =become the slogan of the demonstrations held by the Arab Spring (Dupont and Passy, p. 447-451).
Youth rebels
This trend has accelerated since the early elections on 1 December 2012. The elections were boycotted by the opposition in protest against the new electoral system imposed by the emir. The day after the elections, the challenge shifted from addressing institutional bodies to rallying in the streets.
Rapidly, increasingly young protesters adopted rebellious attitudes inspired by Che Guevara and Anonymous, the online hack group. As a result, they have been attacked with tear gas, stoned and attacked by Special Forces. Further, attempts at repression increased, resulting in dozens of arrests, as protesters were put to trial, with more than 500 facing various charges in 2016 alone. Those leagally charged have included former members of Arab Spring, bloggers, and intellectuals. Additionally, television stations, or chains, that oppose the government of power have been taken off the air. This lead to increasingly rapid tension which have increased the tension between the two opposing parties. The contrast between the urban bourgeoisie and tribal peoples has also been exacerbated by arsonists programs a private satellite channel who used to treat tribal "cockroaches" - which, according to the opposition, was supported covertly by the Emir himself.
Alliance with the Shiites
The emir desired a change of alliance. While his predecessor had relied on, first, tribal, and later largely apolitical alliances, to counter Shiite and urban elites. In contrast, the current emir created alliances among Shiites, and affluent townspeople, in order to counter the newly politically empowered tribes.. The Shiite minority also participated in the elections in extremely large numbers, allowing them to be strongly represented in the new parliament which was elected. As a result, Shiites make up 17 of the 50 House memberes. These members of the house include Dishti Abdelhamid, who stood out by organizing rallies supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad.
For their part, members of the Sunni tribe have accused the regime of intentionally delivering the country to Iranian influence. Although there may be an element of exaggeration, reports consistently demonstrate that the Kalashnikovs have increased activity in the black market as a result of the tension involved in the crisis. In some Sunni tribal circles, concern has also been expressed, specifically that "the Shiites will be as ruthless as the Alawites in Syria." However, from the Shiite perspective, many have a similar fear of a "wave of intolerant Sunni tribal."In short, an insidious climate of fear and mistrust has become prominent on all sides. The staggering oil wealth has enabled the emir to calm the political scene for a few months in early 2011 by distributing 1,000 dinars (about 2,500 euros) to each citizen, including newborns. Officially, it was to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of the Iraqi occupation, but it also effectively slowed the power, or influence, of the Arab Spring.
Thirst for new ideas
Yet for a large section of the young population, especially the tribal youth becoming involved in the political sphere, it is not about asking for more money (they live very well, even for the less well off). It is related to the development of "Karama" (dignity). They desire to be seen, and valued as adult citizens, no longer subject to the whims, or demands, of others who have been granted more political respect. The emergence of a new political elite occurs as the result of elections, even if they do not go as expected. This sometimes includes unexpected Islamist elements coming to power, as occurred during the elections that occurred in February 2012. But when they occur rapidly, or in multiple successive elections, it demonstrates that voters have a thirst for new ideas and that they are demanding evolution in the political sphere. They read, discuss, reflect, and learn to Attempts to stifle these developments have so far always the opposite effect to that desired, and have allowed the opposition to take greater control. For the first time, in December, a few crying "the people want the fall of the tyrant" marred more productive demonstrations. As such, the country has now a window of opportunity to redefine a political pact, which could create a consensus between young rising elites and large sections of the old urban liberal elites, who are also increasingly anxious about the changes in the regime. In the absence of such a political horizon, on the other hand, part of the population may fall into radicalization and exacerbation of isolationism in the tribes.
Model for Saudi Arabia and others?
The importance of the events goes far beyond its borders. It could indeed have a considerable influence on its Saudi neighbor, and therefore the entire region. For Saudi Arabia risk medium-term experience a political crisis of considerable magnitude (aging ruling family, the presence of increasing mass of unemployed graduates, corruption increasingly blatant and less and less accepted, etc.) The tribes that form the backbone of the Kuwaiti opposition maintain close links with their counterparts across the border. If Kuwait will be used to acclimate a true constitutional monarchy in the Gulf, then this country will largely fall short of the word "democracy" who had presided over his release (McCaffrey, p. 99).
The revolution in Tunisia and the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resemble political upheaval observed in the past, except on one point: the key role played by social networks. Facebook, in particular, once considered a high-tech hobby for idle teenagers, now appears as a political tool of the first order. Why have social networks been so helpful to Tunisian and Egyptian protesters? How these tools were in the case of protests in Kuwait?
In the most developed countries in technology, politicians have already taken over internet tools with great profit - the best-known example is the lifting of Obama funds for the presidential campaign of 2008, which reached nearly $ 750 million, many collected online - but the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, the protests that led to the fall of President Hosni Mubarak show that social networks are, politically, much more powerful that we previously imagined (Yanai, p.112). Revolutions were born with the means at hand, and according to specialists from North Africa, for Tunisians and Egyptians, a number of special circumstances have social networks, particularly Facebook. The Kuwaiti government was closely monitoring the use of the Internet and tried to restrict access to many sites, but many people came to work around these restrictions through tricks to hide their identity to government employees says Nejib Ayachi, president of the Center on the Maghreb, a think tank focused on North Africa in Washington. People relied on the internet to have access to uncensored views. Although the country has a lot of television stations and independent newspapers, there were still "red lines that you cannot cross. But in the Internet there was no red line. Everyone was free to say what he wanted. Unsurprisingly, the news about local events and comments on blogs proliferated, numbering 40,000 according to estimates. In Kuwait, the Internet reaches a wide audience. Finally, social networks allow a clear view of the composition of the public (Herrera and Mayo, p. 71-78). Many of the most frequent users are young, and like other young people everywhere, they have entered fully into the dynamics of social networks. About 58 % of young people are on Facebook - by a factor of nearly five in two years - and 58% of them under 25, according to the public relations agency Spot On, based in Dubai. Not only do these networks have utility in terms of information, says Nejib Ayachi, but they also raised among these people a sense of collective belonging. Mobile telecommunications networks have also helped people to communicate. Nejib Ayachi recalls that in Kuwait, almost everyone has a mobile. With the massive audience assembled by political blogs and Facebook pages, the protests have become easy to organize. One incident - the self-immolation of a fruit and vegetable seller driven to despair in Tunisia, and the example of the Tunisian revolt triumphant for Egyptians - and an almost instantaneous reaction has started. In Kuwait, some bloggers and leaders of the movement on Facebook began by calling for a march on 25 January - events which are then transformed into a national revolt. "Facebook has played a critical role," says Dalia Wahba.
The other kind of the revolution
Could social networks play the same role subversive in other poor countries where the authoritarian rule is in place? The same ingredients - many people connected and reachable on their mobile when they are not - are certainly present in many countries. Jared Cohen, a former expert on social networks with the US State Department and now head of Google Ideas, the new entity not described Google's leaders as a "place of reflection and action," recently noted that today's 5 billion people are equipped with a laptop and 2 billion use the internet. In many developing countries, people share the enthusiasm of the Arabs for Facebook (Mikaberidze, p. 78). The adoption rate of social networks is extremely high. Unlike other radical changes experienced by telecommunications in the past, and which tended to occur first in rich countries then spread to poor countries, social networks seem to spread quickly everywhere - and perhaps even faster in developing countries. At 10, December 2010, the second largest market for Facebook after the US was Indonesia with 32 million users, followed by the UK. Turkey, the Philippines, Mexico, and India also figured in the top ten. The official interest in user activity is also not of the privilege of undemocratic governments ("More Than ‘Arab Spring’: The Arab Future", p. 167-174). In the US, the Obama administration seeks to arrogate the right to appeal from a company data on the activity of an individual on the internet without a court order, if federal investigators think to find a useful item for a terrorism case. But to some extent, the concept of social networks seems to be so well established that Internet access could no longer be necessary. For example, after the government cut the Internet in Egypt, some users have switched to the system to use Twitter through voice recognition, set up by Google. On the other hand, concerns of users could limit the impact of the most important social networks. The will of dissidents to remain anonymous (that Facebook currently does not allow) could limit their value as a tool of mass mobilization (Herd, p. 103-120).
Social networks could also be faced with complex problems concerning freedom of speech, making them inhospitable for users whose opinions are not popular. Faced with requests to do so, Facebook has had such a hard time deciding how far he had to go to the censorship of pages created by denialist groups. When Facebook becomes a publicly traded company, such pressure will only increase. As summed up by the slogan of the movie "The Social Network", "You cannot get 500 million friends without making a few enemies." Some, especially Malcolm Gladwell, The New Yorker, also claim that the woven superficial links through social networks are less for social activism that powerful links forged between committed activists willing to die for their cause. "Social networks are effective at increasing participation - by decreasing the level of motivation to participate," he wrote. But the site AlterNet, Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith claim that Gladwell does not understand the true nature of social networks. As for the criticism relating to the alleged superficiality links, they write, the comparison with the online dating sites would be more appropriate, in the sense that social networks can help activists with similar views to get in touch. In itself, they only bring together potential partners "but in fact they have linked many people who are then the couple and married." While governments, users, and investors have a negative impact on the political potential of social networks, they seem at least highly likely to trigger other types of revolutions, scientific and technical, which could be disruptive elements while as fundamental in the long term.
Works cited
Dupont, Cédric and Florence Passy. "The Arab Spring Or How To Explain Those Revolutionary Episodes?". Swiss Political Science Review 17.4 (2011): 447-451. Web.
Herd, Graeme P. "The Arab Spring: Challenges, Obstacles And Dilemmas". Connections: The Quarterly Journal 10.4 (2011): 103-120. Web.
Herrera, Linda and Peter Mayo. "The Arab Spring, Digital Youth And The Challenges Of Education And Work". Holy Land Studies 11.1 (2012): 71-78. Web.
McCaffrey, Paul. The Arab Spring. Ipswich, Mass.: H.W. Wilson, 2012. Print.
Mikaberidze, Alexander. Conflict And Conquest In The Islamic World. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Print.
"More Than ‘Arab Spring’: The Arab Future". Contemporary Arab Affairs 7.2 (2014): 167-174. Web.
Yanai, Shaul. The Political Transformation Of Gulf Tribal States. Print.
Zaccara, Luciano. "Comparing Elections In Gulf Cooperation Council Countries After The Arab Spring: The United Arab Emirates, Oman, And Kuwait". Journal of Arabian Studies 3.1 (2013): 80-101. Web.
