Introduction
Safety programs in aviation are structured in relation to the reactive analysis and investigations that have been conducted by the industry with respect to the events and mishaps that the industry experiences. These programs are aimed at reducing the number of accidents and improving efficiency in the aviation industry. While human factors that lead to errors and finally accidents in this industry cannot be fully eradicated since “to err is human”, certain measures can be put in place in order to reduce the possibility of these errors. Thus the safety approaches in this industry involve a comprehensive process used to address the safety risks. This process factors in the operations of the management, human resource availability, financial implications and the technical systems. These safety programs are also known as safety management systems (SMS) and govern the system errors within the aviation industry. All member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are required to come with safety programs within their states in order to achieve safety levels that are acceptable within the civil aviation.
SMS Risk management programs
In the process of risk management, the first step involves to analyze the system. This process involves the identification of the hazards in the new equipment that are acquired or when the procedures of operation are developed. This process ensures that all the information that regards the functioning of the system and its purpose and its operational environment are subjected to analysis in order to identify the hazards that may possibly come with it. Other system factors that require analysis are the facilities that it will operate with, the personnel to carry out the operation and the equipment itself (VINNEM 662-670).
Secondly, SMS undertakes the identification of the risk hazard in relation to the system requirements in step one. This involves determining the possibility of the system integration in the system equipment, personnel, facilities, procedures, training, supervision and the environment of operation. The process also determines the probability of these system components to compromise the safety and be classified as hazardous.
Thirdly, SMS has to do risk analysis in order to determine the degree of the hazards in the second step above. In this case, the member state of ICAO is required to develop an operational matrix that would outline the outcome projected from the hazard analysis. These risk matrices consider the following levels: Catastrophic; which means their level of the hazards involves multiple fatalities and complete destruction of the equipment. Hazardous; meaning the damage level would end in serious injury. Major; meaning the incident is serious. Minor; meaning the hazard would result in minor incident and emergency procedures can be invoked. Negligible, meaning the consequence of the hazard is less and poses not much danger.
The fourth step is to assess the risk. This involves determining the acceptability of the safety risk. In this case, the regulatory requirements, the performance and the technical standards are considered. Finally is the implementation of the risk control methods (VINNEM 662-670). These depend on the assessments in step four and include: adding or changing the operational procedures, introduction of new control methods for supervision, adding more software and hardware for the organization, changing the training systems, changing the arrangements of the staffing hierarchy, among others. The above changes are then subjected to testing in order to determine if they would help in achieving the desired goals for the risk management (Maslow 370-396).
Boeing’s MEDA
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) is a tool developed by Boeing Aviation industry in 1992 for manning the safety of its personnel. It has been accepted almost in the whole world as a standard by other airlines. MEDA is organized in a way to examine the reasons for errors that the maintenance technicians and inspectors make (Rankin et al. 263).
Its aim is to help an organization to learn from its past mistakes and find ways of overcoming the errors. MEDA addresses the following issues:
The result that come by reducing the errors in maintenance
Importance of investigating the event rather than the error
Initiators of errors and violations that finally produced undesired outcomes
The importance of addressing the factors that contribute to the low-level events in order to prevent serious ones.
Human factors on maintenance tasks
Maintenance tasks focus on the following four factors:
Physical factors:
These are external factors and represent the sizes, the spaces and the distance available in order for the technicians to finish the task. If any of these factors are missing, the condition of working for the maintainers will be poor and thus the technician may compromise the quality of his/her work. In order to overcome this, the company can consider redesigning the equipment under maintenance, rather than restoring the original functional properties of the machine. This is because the latter is time consuming, and in the process of the technician competing to meet the stipulated maintenance time, the possibility of an error occurring is very high.
Physiological factors
These are the factors that relate to the normal working conditions of the human body during flight. These factors include the pressure, altitude, acceleration, temperature and changes in the human perceptions. Other internal factors in the person under flight that come to play under physiological factors to be considered include the circulation and respiratory systems, that is, the stability of one’s circulation of the blood in the arteries and veins and the ease with which one is able to breathe in a continuously changing environment like that in the atmosphere. In addition, these factors include human thinking impacts that results into stress and the changes in the behavior patterns resulting from either social levels, the organizational levels or work levels. For instance, the pressures resulting from the family matters, tensions with the workmates and mental tiredness as a result of the monotony of the work are among the possible contributing factors (John, David & Daniel 122).
Other factors under this category affect the ability of the technicians to access the required information and perceptions that the job requires. For instance, factors such as the visibility, noise levels in the background, placards, indicators, signs, human-machine interface and the gauges all influence the sensory abilities of the technicians. Taking the case of noise level for instance, when the background noise level in the aircraft is high, the level of concentration of the technician will reduce and he will be easily worn out, thus resulting into possible errors during maintenance.
Psychological factors
These are the characteristics of the pilots and other crew personnel that relate to the safety in the aviation industry and their results to the behaviour of the passengers. These factors originate from within an individual and must be subjected to though control for there to be safety in aviation.
Psychosocial factors.
These factors include strict requirements that the industry prescribe to its workers. This normally alters the technician’s ability to explore the existing knowledge in his field of work, since such requirements come with a predetermined order of doing things and is not easy to alter even an inch. If the technicians would be allowed to use their own judgment depending on the situation, some of these errors can be averted. These are related to job frustrations, family issues, lack of promotions, failure to work as a team among the crew members, among others (Maslow 370-396)..
In addition, the deterioration of psychosocial factors in the industry can lead to lack of safety assurance. This can result in a fatal outcome, simply due to lack of the safety assurance that the operator dearly requires in order to boost his/her confidence in the duty and to enhance his/her concentration. In order to succeed in this area, the tool that is used for safety, performance and monitoring must be set in place and be proven effective. Such tools and sources for safety assurance include Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Systems (CASS), which functions to monitor the inspection and maintenance programs (VINNEM 662-670).
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM)
The crew management personnel undertake thorough training in order to avoid any misperceptions and misunderstandings that would result in their line of duty. This empowers the personnel to add to the objectives of the aviation industry, that is, the proficient and safe go of the general population and their merchandise (John, David & Daniel 216). The training deals with the following factors of the personnel: equipping them with leadership skills, managing the individual attitudes of the personnel, stress management strategies, error chain and the decision making process. From this, CRM expects to improve on the crew performance with an aim of averting accidents (Campbell & Bagshaw 20). In order to effectively train their crew personnel, CRM must take note of the following threats and errors and devise ways of managing them:
Intentional noncompliance: these are intentional deviations from the laid down procedures and regulations by the crew personnel.
Procedural errors: in this case, crew personnel have good intentions, but the procedure of executing it is flawed. Also included in this are the errors in which the crew forgot to do an intended duty, rightly termed as the slips and lapses.
Communication error: These include misinterpretations, missing or a failure to communicate vital information. This can take place between the members of the crew themselves or between the crew and other external agencies such as the maintenance personnel.
Error from operational decision: These errors results from poor decision making in the regions with no standardized regulations or procedures of operations. In the end, the safety of the passengers on board is compromised. In order to be categorized as an operational error, the CRM must weigh the error against the following paradigms: first is if there must have been other conservative options that the crew failed to take. Secondly is if there is likelihood that the decision taken was not subjected to group discussion among the crew members. Finally is whether the crew had enough time available, but failed to use it in evaluating the decision.
Works cited
Campbell & Bagshaw, Margarete. Human Perfomance and limitations in aviation.
London, England.: BSP Proffesional books, 1991.Print
John, Wise, A., David, Hopkin, V. & Daniel, Garland. A Handbook of Aviation Human factors.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, 2010. Print
Maslow Abraham. " A Theory of human motivation." Psychological review, 50 .1943.: 370-396.
Vinnem J. Erick. "risk analysis and risk acceptance criteria in the planning processes of the
harzardous facilities." reliability engineering and system safety, 95. (2010): 662-670.
William, Rankin; Rebecca, Hibit; Jerry, Allen & Robert Sargent. Development and evaluation of
the Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) process. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 26, 2000, 261-276. Print
