Abstract
Hurricane Katrina touched ground in Louisiana in August 2005. The resulting lack of coordination in a catastrophe of this size by federal agencies led to large numbers of evaluations, reports, and recommendations for improvement. Particularly under fire was the FEMA organization tasked with management of the disaster operations. The inability to coordinate local, state, and federal resources lead to billions of dollars in waste and additional loss of life secondary to lack of food, water, and shelter. Government policies and restrictions in addition to complicated definitions of responsibility delayed relief for the stricken areas by as much as a month. The lessons learned from the debacle that was the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts have lead to changes in leadership, policies, and the emergency preparedness activities on every level.
In the afternoon in August 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana and Mississippi with high winds, torrential downpours, and tidal waves that eventually became the most expensive disaster in American history (Townsend, 2006). An estimated 1836 people died with property damage in Louisiana alone estimated at over $100 billion; in addition, expenditures by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of $43 billion contributed to the cost (Guilford, 2010). The state lost 25 percent of its economy and 400,000 residents did not return to New Orleans after evacuation while as long as five years after the event, thousands remained living in shelters. An evaluation of the rescue and recovery operations of the catastrophe quickly revealed that lack of communication between officials in federal, state, and local agencies compounded by delays from the dictation of policies and the lack of definitive direction resulted in further loss of life and relief.
The amount of manpower mobilized for rescue, relief, and recovery efforts was impressive. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) deployed the largest number of state resources for Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent Hurricane Rita on record; while an anticipated disaster warranted 50 EMAC missions, over 1007 were used for the aftermath of the two hurricanes (Guilford, 2010). At the touchdown point of Waveland, approximately 95 percent of the buildings and homes were destroyed and the emergency vehicles positioned 10 miles from the town were also completely wiped out (Wombwell, 2009). The power infrastructure for the region was devastated, leaving around 2.5 million people with outages in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Bays and rivers as far inland as 12 miles surged with water that destroyed many towns and left downtown Gulfport coping with standing water as high as 10 feet.
Condition of Emergency Preparedness
There is no doubt that the citizens, business, and emergency agencies were unprepared for the impact of Hurricane Katrina. Of particular interest in the area were the large companies that influenced the cities after the weather had passed. The oil refinery in particular spilled almost as much oil into the Gulf of Mexico as the Exxon oil spill in Alaska in 1989; over 8 million gallons of oil spilled onto the ground and into the waterways.
Preparedness of response teams.
As it became apparent that massive hurricane was headed for the southern coast of the country, there was not only inadequate management in place for recovery, but even fewer individuals skilled in disaster coordination. A disaster of any magnitude required preparedness plans in place that have been resourced and practiced. FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) in response to the inadequacies experienced during the Katrina destruction. Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, thousands of people have been trained in the intricacies of disaster recovery management with experts organizing plans for major cities from coast to coast.
Preparedness of large companies.
Two major companies came into important consideration as Katrina ran its course: Mainthia Technologies and Chevron Oil. As previously mentioned, 8 million gallons of oil spilled as the refinery was struck by the hurricane. However, there was little thought given to the possible safety of the employees as the industrial sites attempted to address the damage (Torres, 2007). Although New Orleans is the location of previous hurricanes, there were not adequate plans in place for the possibility of a natural disaster of this magnitude. Today, the United Steelworkers Union teaches courses on disaster preparedness and recovery so employees understand their role in a future event. Written plans, training, and coordination with other resources in the area provide control in a time when panic and disorganization surface.
Mainthia Technologies is a contractor that supports relief and recovery operations. It was discovered that the industrial hygienists from two facilities had been evacuated or were not able to come to work. Mainthia has one industrial hygienist that attempted to manage all safety operations including conducting triage for health issues such as intrusion of mold, release of asbestos, and flooding damage. Due to the lack of local support, it became apparent one of the most important components of a relief and recovery plan involved bringing in outside resources to assist in civilian and business rescue.
Participation by the National Guard
There has been criticism of the late deployment of the military into the disaster sites, but personnel were preparing for arrival prior to Katrina’s landfall (Buddelmeyer, 2007). The United States Northern Command began arrangements days before the event took place. It is generally understood that the military is not sent into a state until the governor of that state requests assistance. The governor of Louisiana at the time of the hurricane’s devastation, Kathleen Blanco, came under heavy attack for not immediately sending the state’s National Guard division into New Orleans immediately and placing them under the control of the federal agencies for guidance, but a large number had been deployed to the war in Iraq. She was required to ask for members from neighboring states.
In all, approximately 22,000 active duty National Guard personnel carried out assistance in Louisiana and Mississippi. Another 50,000 National Guard members came from every state, three territories, and the District of Columbia, many using their own resources and experience to take the initiative in rescue operations. The day of the hurricane strike, there were 5982 National Guard members in Louisiana and 3838 in Mississippi on active duty (Wombwell, 2009). In the next few days, National Guard members rose to 72,000. Their aide was invaluable at a time when conventional military troops were still waiting for deployment.
Issues with Communication
Local emergency services were interrupted when Katrina knocked out 38 call centers for 911 and telephone service was interrupted for over 3 million people in the states hardest hit (Townsend, 2006). In addition, half of the radio stations and 44 percent of the television stations lost power. Victims could not call for help and responders had no idea where to start with rescue operations. As a result, the National Response Plan was crippled by lack of the ability to communicate (Wombwell, 2009). A satellite telephone was used in the first report of the New Orleans levees collapsing, but confirmation was not possible due to only one satellite radio remaining intact and by the time confirmation was obtained, large sections of the city were flooded. To compensate in Mississippi, 4500 AM/FM radios were distributed to citizens and 120 soldiers used loudspeakers to canvass the areas.
Emergency disaster aid required a real-time communication system that is shared by all the agencies involved. A lesson learned was to create hard lines of communication with lines and antennas protected from weather and water and with separate electrical power that is reliable.
Lack of Government Presence
Without adequate communication or the ability to assess damage, government officials could not dispatch assistance or prioritize needs. Federal help was late in arriving due to lack of planning (Morris, 2008). Evacuation left New Orleans devoid of political officials and the severity of the damage was overwhelming to the lower level government staff remaining. Calls requesting helps were nonspecific included, “Send everything!” In the meantime, dispute between the White House and Governor Blanco over the federalization of the National Guard delayed her request for active military troops.
Transportation Complications
Debris and damage to roadways completely cut off some areas and many other were impassable and open only to emergency crews (Moynihan, 2009). Barriers with communication further hindered transportation efforts as officials were not sure which roads were able to be used. Distribution sites were inaccessible for resources because survivors could not get to the centers as trees, telephone lines, electrical lines and other debris were as high as three stores and four blocks wide in some places. Chemical spills and gas leaks contributed to the danger in addition to agitated animals such as alligators. Eventually, it was determined the only way to reach many survivors was by helicopter for airlifting evacuees or dropping supplies.
Failures in Law Enforcement
With personal issues and dangerous situation, about 25 percent of the police in New Orleans did not report for work (Wombwell, 2009). The city became overrun with looters and other criminal activity. The dead were lying in the street and the Superdome and Convention Center, which sheltered thousands not able to evacuate, was the scene of acts of murder and rape. Security became a major issue, but the National Guard supplied trucks, other transportation, 68 fixed-wing aircraft, and 346 helicopters. It took over a week for military police to set up checkpoints and provide a presence to assist the police in restoring order.
Mortuary Support
One of the most upsetting consequences of inadequate planning after the impact of Katrina was gathering and disposing of human remains. Hundreds of corpses littered the streets, lurked in the rubble, and occupied homes (Wombwell, 2009). As it became increasingly apparent that FEMA was not able to effectively manage rescue operations, the Department of Defense dispatched nine mortuary teams to locate the deceased on September 13, which was 19 days after the hurricane struck. Soldiers were not allowed to touch the body until contractors prepared it for relocation. Every mortuary team from the military was also accompanied by a member of the clergy for support of the soldiers and civilians as the heat contributed to the trauma of death by decomposing the remains.
Coordination of Relief Teams
There were three major commands for operations by the government in place following Hurricane Katrina (Moynihan, 2009). The intricate definitions of responsibilities overlapped each other and a chain of communications fell apart and the three commands did not coordinate with each other. As a result, many resources were sent to the same area multiple times while other areas received none. The Coast Guard, without adequate instructions, took the initiative to conduct effective search-and-rescue operations, but did not effectively document who or where they were left and many were without food, water, or shelter. Confusion about new government policies hampered operations on a large scale.
Volunteers
Inexperience people swarmed into the area offering assistance in any form. The Red Cross worked closed with FEMA operations, but communication breakdown lead to long delays in dispensing resources (Moynihan, 2009). For instance, 300,000 meals were requested six days after landfall, but arrived a month later. Shelters were requested, cancelled, reordered, and finally delivered without information about the locations. The lesson learned from working with volunteer organizations in a crisis requires coordination with responders both in and out of the government agencies.
Comparison of Relief Efforts in Louisiana with Mississippi
In many way, Mississippi received more damage than Louisiana from the hurricane. It suffered the same communication shutdowns, destruction and debris dangers, and transportation barriers (Wombwell, 2009). However, Mississippi recovered faster because it did not suffer from the flooding resulting from the failure of the levees. With the assistance of the National Guard and FEMA, the roads were cleared and utilities restored in a relative short period of time. Also, there were fewer people living in Mississippi than in New Orleans, creating a lower need for search-and-rescue efforts. The primary reason for Mississippi’s quick recovery was the planning in place by the Mississippi National Guard that was set into place within hours of the passage of the hurricane. The state leaders did not even request military support, bypassing much of the confusion that arose in Louisiana.
Lessons Learned by Federal Contractors
Conclusion
The lessons learned from the catastrophe called Hurricane Katrina are similar to those experienced following the bombing on September 11, 2001. Both events were unexpected and inconceivable until they actually occurred: high-jacked airplanes crashing into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon and a natural disaster reaching destructive proportions never previously seen in the United States. The delayed responses, crossed communications, ineffective chain of command, and other inefficiencies in the preplanning, execution, and recovery from the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe revealed problems that resulted in additional loss of life and property in addition to the initial damage inflicted by the weather. The lessons learned from the reports, evaluations, and analyses concerning all areas of the operations have contributed to modifications and restructuring of emergency response organizations. The responsibilities lay not only with the government, but with state, local, community, and even individuals involved. Businesses, social networks, political agencies, social systems, and health facilities unite in times of horrific impact by external forces. Recovery takes place in every arena from public services to economics. While government assistance provides the means to rebuild damaged infrastructures and provide temporary leadership, the ultimate recovery of a city or town relies on its residents privately, publically, individually, and collectively. The terrible consequences of the poor planning, chaotic rescue operations, and inefficient recovery processes of Hurricane Katrina give testimony to the need for organizations and government agencies to stand ready at a moment’s notice.
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