Akpabio, E., and Akpan, N., 2010. Governance and oil politics in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The question of distributive equity. Journal of Human Ecology, 30(2), pp.111-121.
Frynas, J., 2000. Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and litigation between oil companies and village communities. Germany: Lit Verlag Munster.
Omeje, K., 2005. Oil conflict in Nigeria: Contending issues and perspectives of the local Niger Delta people. New Political Economy, 10(3), pp.321-334.
The Nigerian political economy is seriously damaged by the rift between international oil companies with large-scale operations in the Niger Delta and the residents living within it. Nigeria relies so much on the oil exports manufactured by international oil companies that those account for as much as 98% of annual Nigerian export earnings. On the other hand, residents of the Niger Delta have since endured years of oppression, displacement and environmental hazards arising from the operations of international oil companies in their area. Employing both a sociological and legal approach, Oil in Nigeria takes on the research conducted by Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231), which includes 68 cases filed before Nigerian courts of law that feature the bitter battle between international oil companies and Niger Delta residents. Without appearing to make a bold assertion due to the strength of the evidence presented, Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231) concluded that international oil companies are much more favored by Nigerian land and environmental laws, system of law enforcement and judiciary. Yet, such findings did not discount the apparent shift of direction in litigation towards the 1990s, where Niger Delta residents have started to gain more ground in final decisions of cases. According to Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231), the emerging trend provides that judges and lawyers have increasingly become more concerned towards protecting the welfare of the Niger Delta residents. Lawyers, in particular, have significantly improved in their legal skills in defending Niger Delta residents against the undeniably abusive actions of international oil companies. Judges, for their part, started to employ a more liberalized approach to reviewing citizen suits filed by Niger Delta residents. Overall, Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231) has presented an enriching account of how local politics and legal issues, international companies and human and environmental rights activism intertwine to produce significant reforms.
Generating more than 80% of the national revenues of Nigeria and more than 90% of its annual export earnings, the Niger Delta is home to the vast oil resources of the nation, according to Akpabio and Akpan (2010, pp. 111-121). However, the Niger Delta remains severely underdeveloped, with its poor ecology and subpar infrastructures having been the venue of seemingly perennial fighting between its residents and the international oil companies that run their establishments there. Consistent with the findings of Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231), the Niger Delta is a highly politicized area where self-interests of political actors prevail, mostly in the form of violent conflicts that include kidnappings and murders (Akpabio & Akpan, 2010, pp. 111-121). As a result, the supposed benefits of the oil resources of Nigeria do not even trickle down to its citizens, particularly to residents in the Niger Delta. Maladies in resource distribution, primarily characterized by corrupt and violent practices of political actors, stem from the severe lack of measures that ensure the prevalence of transparency and accountability. The underdeveloped Niger Delta, as explained, is a consequence of poor governance on the part of the Nigerian government, both in terms of its structures and practices. Akpabio and Akpan (2010, pp. 111-121), to that account, emphasizes that Nigeria is getting less from the enormous potential oil resources in the Niger Delta could bring to its growth and development, simply because its government is not practicing proper governance that would regulate itself and international oil companies against abuses and protect the citizens living within the area.
The foregoing findings, considered as among the most thorough reviews of the semi-perennial conflict between international oil companies and Niger Delta residents in Nigeria, has found substantial support from the existing literature, as Jensen and Wantchekon (2004, pp. 816-841) found in their empirical study on determining political regimes based on the following factors: income inequality, economic development and poverty. Africa, as found by Jenson and Wantchekon (2004, pp. 816-841), is notorious for its severely poor quality of democracy, despite the fact that it is among the most resource-rich areas in the world. The abundance of resources, Jenson and Wantchekon (2004, pp. 816-841), determines both the struggles of Africa in democratic transition and consolidation. Empirical evidence, in fact, provides that African nations that have relatively fewer resources – Benin, Mali and Madagascar, have found it easier to go through the processes of democratic transition consolidation. Nigeria, in particular, is lagging in terms of its progress in undergoing democratic transition and consolidation because its possession of vast oil resources have not been coupled with what Jenson and Wantchekon (2004, pp. 816-841) termed as “vertical and horizontal accountability.” Such is consistent with the findings of Frynas that the laws, law enforcement and judiciary in Nigeria are severely lacking in supporting its status as an oil-rich nation, hence exposing it to multiple accounts of abuse by international oil companies. Ite (2004, pp. 1-11) explored the role of government failure in disabling a nation to sustain the gains contributed by international companies through their corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.
The basic notion of Ite (2004, pp. 1-11) in considering the case of Nigeria is that it lacks concrete measures for macroeconomic planning and management and responsible resource allocation at the national level. At the same time, Ite (2004, pp. 1-11) recognized that Nigeria does not impose its environment to be enabling of feasible practices for economic stability, based on the aforementioned measures. With that, Ite (2004, pp. 1-11) noted that it would be wasteful for Nigeria to take for granted the huge potential of Shell to spearhead economic growth and development in the nation if it does not provide for favorable governance practices that would provide harmony in the political, economic and social spheres. Additionally, Amaeshi et al. (2006, pp. 83-99) emphasized that CSR is primarily a localized construct focused primarily on indigenous firms. Taking into consideration the CSR efforts of international oil companies, it is important for local firms to collaborate with them in order to provide CSR initiatives empowered by oil resources that are truly effective. It is possible that part of the problem of international oil companies in Nigeria in imposing the full potential of their CSR initiatives is their failure to take into account the indigenous context of CSR therein. Yet, with the lack of an enabling environment, the foregoing may prove to be difficult to fulfill, as international oil companies might find the pursuance of such efforts as an added risk on their part due to the anomalous nature of the regulatory framework of the Nigerian government. Again, the findings of Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231) is of significant relevance here, given that international oil companies have been allowed to thrive abusively mainly because Nigerian policy structures that directly affect them do not promote the vision of Jenson and Wantchekon (2004, pp. 816-841) on vertical and horizontal accountability. Taking everything into perspective, it is therefore improper to judge in an outright manner that international oil companies are largely to blame for the woes of residents in the Niger Delta, as found by Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231). It is perceivable for Nigeria to have an oil industry that leads it to growth and development, to the full benefit of its citizens – most especially Niger Delta residents, provided it works within a strong framework of regulations that impose vertical and horizontal accountability. Personal interests from political actors would, in turn, stop from interfering with the oil industry of Nigeria, as international oil companies would become more motivated to implement its CSR initiatives for the benefit of Nigerian citizens (Frynas, 2000, pp. 225-231).
The local economy and environment of the Niger Delta has sustained massive damaged for the longest time, since the discovery of oil there (Agbor, 2013, pp. 78-84). Speaking in agreement to Akpabio and Akpan (2010, pp. 111-121), and Omeje (2005, 321-334), Agbor (2013, pp. 78-84) noted that violent conflict, oftentimes triggered by the state and residents, has been flourishing in the Niger Delta mainly because of conflicting interests involving oil resources. International oil companies, which have since gained a foothold on the oil resources of the Niger Delta, have also been a source of hatred for residents. The abuse Niger Delta residents claim to have received from international oil companies have been the subject of multiple lawsuits. All the factors from the foregoing are affected by the fact that the Nigerian government has a loose regulatory framework for the oil industry, which has since led international oil companies to become abusive, rather than beneficial, to the lives of the Niger Delta residents. Oil exploration and exploitation activities are done to such an extent that hurts the interests of the Niger Delta residents, mainly through excluding them from the redistributive benefits of oil resources in the region – one that involves the Nigerian government as well (Agbor, 2013, pp. 78-84). Yet, Agbor (2013, pp. 78-84) found that the foregoing are merely symptoms of the real problem riddling the Niger Delta, which is the internal leadership in the region. Without a stable local politics in the Niger Delta, political actors and international oil companies would continue to abuse the potential of the region to contribute further to the growth of Nigeria – this time, in more tangible ways that would directly affect residents (Agbor, 2013, pp. 78-84). The looseness of the Nigerian regulatory framework does not just affect the Niger Delta region, but also the surrounding south-South geopolitical zone. Ukpong and Ikoh (2013, pp. 34-46) recommended that political and traditional leaders in the south-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria must mediate with one another on issues in order to prepare themselves for efforts to push for economic integration, which would generate greater benefits through the prominent oil industry in the area. As it stands, harmony between political actors and actions towards economic integration would make the oil industry in Nigeria more beneficial to its citizens (Ukpong & Ikoh, 2013, pp. 34-46).
Undoubtedly, extractive industries, which include the oil industry, is befitting of proper protection in the form of proper regulations – a concern that is duly recognized at a regional level via the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) of donors and governments of Western nations (Hilson & Maconachie, 2008, pp. 52-100). Consistent with the recommendations inferable from the findings of Frynas (2000, pp. 225-231), Akpabio and Akpan (2010, pp. 111-121), and Omeje (2005, 321-334), Hilson and Maconachie (2008, pp. 52-100) noted that good governance is the key to improving the woes of Nigeria in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. As a viable policy mechanism aimed at streamlining extractive industries, the EITI must prove to raise the profile of the Niger Delta region, given that it has long suffered from violent conflicts involving its residents, international oil companies and political actors (Hilson & Maconachie, 2008, pp. 52-100). Furthermore, worries surrounding the constant entry of investors in the Niger Delta region at a time when it is still wrought with troubles surrounding peace and order have become a matter of serious contention. Chinese state oil companies, for instance, have entered into the Niger Delta region to conduct their extractive operations, yet they face risks to their security given the historically troublesome nature of the area. As a matter of improving the Niger Delta region towards being a safe place for foreign investment, Hilson and Maconachie (2008, pp. 52-100) emphasized that there is a strong need to strengthen securitization in the area, perhaps within a context involving the Gulf states of the Middle East as an ideal model.
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