Motivational Egoistic Hedonism
Motivational hedonism is the belief that only pain or pleasure motivates us. Motivational egoistic hedonism is the belief that a person is motivated by his or her personal pain or pleasure. They are motivated ‘for pleasure’ and ‘against pain’. The aim is to produce pleasure and reduce pain. It can also be done so as to balance pain and pleasure and avoid either extreme. Human beings are also generally motivated to maximize what they believe to be of value to them. This value consists of finding the maximal balance for pleasure versus pain. Human beings are therefore motivated by what they regard to be the maximal balance of the two, with their own interests at heart.
An example of this is a situation where X and Y are both currently unemployed. X hears about a job opening in which both X and Y are qualified, but the open slots are limited. X chooses not to tell Y about this job so as to avoid competition for this limited opportunity. X is motivated by his personal interests and the desire to reduce pain (unemployment) and increase pleasure (employment) even if it is at the expense on Y. Another example of this is an identity thief who uses another person’s credit cards without considering the effect this has on their lives. Their only concern is to reduce their own suffering and give themselves a better life regardless of who gets hurt in the process.
Normative Non- Egoistic Hedonism
Normative hedonism is the belief that all and only pleasure has value or worth, and that all and only pain has only disvalue. It measures everything through the pleasure it brings and the pain it reduces. Normative non-egoistic hedonism also describes or attributes all human pursuits to their desire to maximize pleasure. This however, is different form motivational egoistic hedonism in that pleasure must not be sought if it is at the expense of another, or if it will bring pain to another. It can also be considered in relation to the greater good or morality. Normative non-egoistic hedonism seeks to fulfill what is right for all, that is, it seeks to be of value even to other people and not just to oneself. It tries to maximize collective happiness. This is what makes up moral behavior. Behavior should be considered immoral if it does not maximize the happiness of all parties affected by it. Only moral actions are right, and people ought to strive to do that which maximizes collective happiness.
An example of this is a fireman who risks his own life to save a young girl from a fire. Another example of this is a person who gives up a well-paying job opportunity in an organization involved in illegal business (for example, drug dealing) to preserve his own morals and also to prevent the destruction of the many lives affected by drug use and abuse. The person could take this a step further and report the organization to the relevant authorities, without necessarily putting into consideration the danger he could be putting himself into. This type of self-sacrifice is characteristic of normative non- egoistic hedonism.
Critique
I disagree with normative non-egoistic hedonism. First of all, human beings have other desires that do not necessarily have to do with increasing pleasure and reducing pain. Secondly, the concept of good and bad is, to some degree, relative. There are also those who find pleasure in doing what is evil. If pleasure is good, then even sadistic pleasures should be considered good. In a society of sadists, should their sadistic pleasure be considered part of the common good? Such ambiguities in the definition of good and evil make it difficult to fully accept this theory. The definition of good and bad is also culture based. For example, in some cultures, it is okay to chop off the hand that steals. This is considered to be part of the common good. In other cultures, this would be considered a violation of human rights and is not morally acceptable. This means that the theory of normative non-egoistic hedonism cannot be applied to all people equally in all cultures and is therefore not universal.
Difference between Motivational/Descriptive and Normative Theories
Descriptive theories tend to try and explain why things are the way they are. For example, a descriptive theory of ethics will try and explain why people make judgments on whether something is good or bad. Descriptive theories explain and describe, but they do not actually say how it ought to be done. Normative theories on the other hand argue for a particular theory. They seek to predict or explain what would happen under certain theoretical constraints, that is, what ought to be. They do not argue based on what is or what will be. For example, a normative theory of ethics will try and argue in defense of a particular ethical system and provide the rules that ought to be followed, even if not everyone will follow them. A descriptive theory will tell or explain to you why theft, for instance, is thought to be bad, while a normative theory will tell you whether and why you should consider it bad.
Descriptive theories are meant or supposed to describe reality. They do not make any value judgments or take any stand, whether good or bad. Normative theories give suggestions on which side one ought to pick. It gives the direction it considers right. It tries to convince the person to do things in a certain manner or to behave in a certain way.
Works Cited
Bentham, J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York, NY: Hafner, 1789. Print.
Bertram, Richard David. Thomas Hobbes' Egoistic Hedonism. New Orleans, LA: Tulane University, 1983. Print.
Brentano, Franz. Descriptive Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. Print.
Clark, John P. Max Stirner's egoism. New York, NY: Freedom Press, 1976. Print.
Feldman, Fred. Pleasure and the Good Life. Clarendon, TX: Clarendon Press, 2004. Print.
—. Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.
Frankena, William K. Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973. Print.
Gibbard, Allan. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992. Print.
Kagan, Shelly. Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Print.
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1871. Print.
Tännsjö, Torbjörn. Hedonistic Utilitarianism. George Square Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 1998. Print.
