Hegel took idealism to its most extreme point with his absolute idealism. This idea can be best understood in the established relationship between being and identity that he discusses. This relationship is essential in order for the individual to attain knowledge of the world. Furthermore, this knowledge is fundamentally predicated on the associations between subjective perceptions and established objective truth. The universalization of the particular through the lens of personal experience therefore becomes an essential aspect of his philosophic inquiry. Subject and object, codified by normative experience, are the source of idealism within Hegel's perspective.
Hegel's argument rests on the relationship between being and identity. He examined the purposes of self-identification and concluded that it is only through an absolute comprehensibility of the notion of being. In approaching the idea in this way it is possible to achieve a unity between being and the identification of thought. This is what allows the subject to perceive or understand the object. Without this capacity for identification of the self in order to determine the nature of the other then there would be no way to attain certainty of knowledge of the real world. This unification of being and identity of thought therefore helps to establish a framework for Hegel's approach to not only the interactions that people have at various levels, but of the individual's own perceptions of reality. This approach makes a person's sense of self or identity “conditional upon their recognition by others” (Redding 27). In assessing the other, the self forms an identification which has a profound effect on their basic conception of knowledge and the way that they perceive the real world. This conceptualization of reality presents the subject with the ability to assess their understanding of the world around them, as well as the way that they have come to understand this world. “Having achieved an explicitly conceptual form, philosophical thought can subject itself to the same sort of critical reflection to which thought can subject anything” (Redding 31). In understanding his position regarding the idealism that is inherent in modes of thought and understanding it is necessary to develop a more consistent perspective in regards to his conception of the human being and the conditions on which their conceptions of reality are created.
Hegel divorces his conception of the will and human condition from the old ideas of subjective experience that came before him. He essentially believed that the human will itself, unlike much of the natural world, is not subject to any causal factors. This older conception of subjectivity can be seen as “the lacking of previous conditions to movement or change in general, being it material or mental” (Huesca Ramón 311). His conception of the will is predicated on a separation between the natural processes and cause and effect and the capacity of the human mind, in tandem with rational inquiry, to overcome these processes in order to attain a higher form of knowledge. He therefore presents a basic dichotomy between two distinct states of being that can be attributed to humanity. The underlying nature of man is fundamentally based on the tension between his appetites, on the one hand, his subjective yearnings and desires that are based from his animal instincts and his rational capacity for understanding and achieving spirit and striving towards ideals on the other. However, rather than being fundamentally averse to one another, these two modes of thought can be brought together within Hegel's philosophy. The contradictions present in understanding the world in regards to such a dualism presents the , way in which the spirit emerges from the natural state of being within a person. Hegel argues that “it is not that the natural and the spiritual consist of different ontological realms, rather, the natural consists of a mode of being/thought of the spiritual, in such a way, that the natural mode of being, can be transformed or converted into the spiritual mode of being and vice versa” (Huesca Ramón 312). This transformative process demonstrates how spirit, within Hegel's philosophy, is the ultimate result or coalescence of the distillation of perceptions of objective reality by the subject. This transformation is predicated on the conception of the natural world and the ability to establish normative judgments regarding its reality. Spirit, therefore, does not exist in any material form, but instead, can be thought of in regards to a process of being instilled and the result of having been expressed. The act of the individual contemplating this reality is the channel through which the instilling of spirit is able to take place. This allows the creation of idealist conceptions of reality. In this sense, it is evident that “spirit is its own concept presented in and through thought, spirit is self-thinking thought, thought as subject and object as well, is spirit” (Huesca Ramón 314). This idea of spirit informs Hegel's understanding of idealism, which requires some basis in reality in order for the underlying principles to have the capacity to inform the judgments of those within the real world. This demonstrates the fundamental difference between man and nature. The fact that humanity possesses the capacity for invoking this sense of spirit in order to attain a higher ideal essentially removes him from the causal factors of the natural world. The ideologies and archetypal understandings that man holds constrains his actions in relation to his rational goals and the need to interact on some level with others. This interaction has a profound impact on the social relationships among people in society, the interpersonal relationships between individuals, and the relationship between the individual and reality, between subject and object. The implementation of a rational inquiry focused towards these interactions is therefore necessary for the establishment of principles that can be said to reflect the natural world. Human beings can therefore be seen to potentially “conceive a self-definition as agents, and a frame of acceptable social behavior” (Huesca Ramón 315). The human will can be understood in relation to three primary characteristics. First, the individual is able to abstract the content of their subjective experience. Second, they have the capacity to make the rational choice to act on that abstraction by moving beyond it. Finally, the capacity for these rational choices to be grounded in principles of universal design, which themselves have been abstracted from reality. These characteristics demonstrate the way in which human thought and interaction can be set apart from the sort of cognitive capacities that are evident in the natural world.
The particular, the universal, and the individual must be distinguished in order to establish a more thorough commitment to the realities of obtained knowledge. Through the establishment and use of a mode of pure formal logic, humanity is able to make a distinction between “what things are in themselves and what they are for consciousness or for another” (Brandom 165). In understanding these ideas it is possible to obtain a better grasp of how Hegel has conceived of empirically based conceptual knowledge. In doing so a more accurate representation of his understanding of idealism and the characteristics of the cognitive norms that have been discussed can be established. This is important in relation to the perspective that he provides in association with the variety of purposes with which an individual might attempt to perceive a specific reality. The correctness or incorrectness of knowledge can be understood in relation to the norms that an individual has committed themselves to in order to gain a more profound understanding of the ontological and deontological certainty by which these modes of knowledge have been established. This demonstrates the circumstances under which his understanding of the relationship between self and object can be conceived. His conception of this relationship presents a strong correlation between the actions that the individual takes in their will to perceive and the impact that those perceptions have on their will to act on circumstances in the future. Hegel therefore “aims at a conception of experience that does not distinguish two different kinds of activity, one of which is the application of concepts in judgement and action, and the other of which is the institution or discovery of those concepts” (Brandom 168). Experience is unified beneath the banner of Hegel's idealism in order to present a more profound importance for the natural world. This experiential treatment demonstrates the natural basis from which his philosophic arguments can be seen to extend. This demonstrates a profound distinction between the ideas of reason and understanding. The correctness of a concept becomes an important aspect of the choice that an individual makes in applying it within a particular context. In knowing a thing it is moved from being simply a potential concept to the object of a normative decision in regards to the relationship that that thing has with the greater body of knowledge that the individual is applying to it. Understanding nature can be seen to have an inherent need for responsible action on the part of the knower, who makes an objective decision in regards to the ontological status that is given to the objects of their perception. Existence is not only predicated on perceiving, but on being perceived as well. “Merely biological beings, subjects and objects of desires, become spiritual beings, undertakers of commitments, by being at once the subjects and the objects of recognitive attitudes” (Brandom 169). The self, the community, and the normative structures that societies are built upon are all subject to this process of recognition and judgment. The normative status of an object or individual being elevated from having a generalized nature to being given a particular identity is established through this process. “So when we talk about the structure and unity of the ‘I’ or of self-conscious selves according to Hegel, we are talking about the structure and unity produced by this process of reciprocal recognition, by which normative communities and community members are simultaneously institutions” (Brandom 170). The unification and understanding of concepts can therefore be understood as being predicated on this idealist mode of thought.
The achievement of a unification of understanding in relation to the conceptual understanding of reality seems to be the result of his commitment to the normative judgments of the human intellect. Through the application of rational inquiry and philosophic discourse the individual is able to temper their subjective judgments into objective norms. In doing so, these norms can be adopted by a greater social context, which can then apply them to an understanding of the objective world.
Works Cited
Brandom, Robert B. Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms. European Journal of Philosophy 7:2 ISSN 0966–8373 pp. 164. 1999. Print.
Huesca Ramón, Fernando. Hegel’s Concept of the Free Will: Towards a Redefinition of an Old Question. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics, 3 (1): 309–325. 2015. Print.
Redding, Paul. Hegel, Idealism, and God: Philosophy as the Self-Correcting Appropriation of the Norms of Life and Thought. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 3, nos. 2-3, 2007. Print.
