Criminal Justice
Goldstein moved police work from a reactive philosophy of maintaining law and order to a proactive philosophy of supporting democratic values and enhancing public safety through a problem solving approach to crime (Panzarella & Vona, 2013, p. 245). Goldstein’s approach to problem oriented policing became the core of community policing idea in the United States.
Accountability of the police has been executed by a number of means- through politicians, elected mayors, appointed councilors, and at various times, loosely and under a modicum of close supervision. Goldstein rejects the premise of the professional school of thought that the police are best placed to police themselves. Goldstein buttresses his argument with the logic that ‘much of what the police does has little to do with crime (Panzarella & Vona, 2013, p. 248) – facilitating movement of people and traffic, aiding lost and injured people, and providing security in public places. Goldstein, therefore, advocated that the police should be accountable and responsive to the public as any other government agency. In this context, Goldstein advocated that police department policies that incorporate discretionary decisions should be public knowledge. According to Goldstein, accountability as expected from the police includes much more than responsibility for determining policies in discretionary areas, but rather covers every aspect of administration, including aspects of operating efficiency, hiring and promotion practices and financial management (Goldstein, 1977, p. 251). Goldstein acknowledges that this accountability as expected form the police has numerous problems, for which he offers a few solutions as well.
Problems in Police Accountability
Decentralization of the Police Force
The police in the United States is highly decentralized, with 40,000 police departments, all but 250 of which are local agencies. At the local level, police are supposed to be controlled by sheriffs selected by popular election in most jurisdictions. The police chief at the municipal level is required to function under the directions of an elected mayor. Theoretically, the community is supposed to influence the police through the office of the mayor. However, there have emerged various devices to protect the police from political influences at the local level. Thus, the impetus for deriving accountability of the local police through the office of the mayor is at odds with the requirements to shield the police from political interference (Goldstein, 1977, p. 252). Various solutions have been attempted to solve the issue- independent administrative boards, bipartisan boards, state control over municipal police, and a single police executive to head the police agency duly protected from political influence through his tenure. Each option had inherent flaws on the continuum of being too intrusive of police operations or allowing the police too much of a leeway in conducting operations without public scrutiny and accountability (Goldstein, 1977, p. 253). Over a period of time, however, consensus had coalesced over the option of having a single police administrator, who can be appointed or elected based on local custom and convention. Even in the case of larger municipalities such as Chicago and Los Angeles where boards with varying degrees of accountability exist, there are provisions to provide necessary protection to police chiefs from unwarranted political influence. In effect, the requirement for police effectiveness and efficiency acts as a brake on the tenet of creating end to end public accountability of the police.
Lack of Concern with Ground Sensitivities
A major lacuna observed when the police have kept given relatively immune to political influences has been a distinct lack of awareness and responsiveness to local sensitivities. For instance, the police have often been found wanting in their actions as related to minorities, specially blacks. Instances of police firing, in which there have been casualties, have often been analyzed, and the accountability has remained vague, ranging with suggestions that the city council, the police chief or even the individual policemen would be to blame for actions that caused embitterment of communities. This apparent flaw in the framework of giving the police considerable freedom from political interference has resulted in substantial protest and campaigning for greater public oversight on actions and decisions of the police. Such pressures, once more, tend to swing the needle to the other extreme- incessant political oversight and resultant lack of police effectiveness.
Possible Solutions
Fixed Tenure of Police Chiefs for Insulation
One solution to the mutually incompatible forces of public oversight and police accountability has been found in a proposal to have police chiefs who are elected with tenure. During their tenure, the police chiefs are insulated from public scrutiny as they go about their duties. This ensures that police effectiveness is not compromised. However, the stipulation of a fixed tenure ensures that the police chief has to go back to the public to get re-elected. This results in a modicum of sensitivity to the needs of the local public (Goldstein, 1977, p. 253).
Pinpointed Responsibility
Even though the police were to be given the necessary latitude for their day-to-day functioning, Goldstein recommends pinpointing the ultimate responsibility for police functioning to a publicly elected official. In most local governments, the mayor is the elected official who becomes ultimately responsible for police functioning. Even when the mayor gives the police a wide berth in their day to day functioning, he remains ultimately responsible for the actions of the police (Goldstein, 1977, p. 266).
Conclusion
Goldstein acknowledges the diametrically opposite pressures that exist in regards to accountability of the police- on the one hand, the police become insensitive to the needs of the community if they are given a free hand, on the other, there is scope for intense corruption and loss of effectiveness if the police are subjected to intrusive political control. Goldstein therefore recommends a fixed tenure to police chiefs to provide a modicum of insularity for the police. At the same time, he recommends that the mayor bear the onus of single point public responsibility for the police, so that a necessary balance remains between accountability and effectiveness in police functioning.
References
Goldstein, H. (1977). Policing a free society. In Robert Panzarella & Daniel Vona (Eds.). Criminal Justice Masterworks. (pp. 251-266). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Panzarella, R., & Vona, D. (2013). Introduction to Herman Goldstein. Criminal Justice Masterworks. (pp. 245-250). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
