Abstract
This paper represents few particular set-backs on different levels of government in
response to Hurricane Katarina. This is paper is by no means written with intention to fault individuals. Rather, its purpose is to look and examine some of the issues that took place during and after Katrina. We can certainly assume that everyone involved in emergency response sincerely wanted to do their best. And I'm sure that many emergency responders made significant sacrifices to save lives. For anything if we make any judgments, it should be against those who hide, deny or devalues mistakes and so prevents society form learning to avoid such errors in the future.
Perhaps one of the most devastating natural disasters America faced was monstrous Hurricane Katrina, which made land fall on, August 29, 2005 at 8:00 a.m. Katarina stormed thought several states: Georgia, Florida, covering area which estimated around 90,000 square miles, claiming 1,836 lives with another 705 still missing to this day. States that suffered the
most collateral damage wore Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Katarina was one of the 5 most deadly ever recorded. This natural disaster cost the United States an estimated $110 billion in damages, which made it the costliest hurricane ever in US history. There is no doubt that Katarina was a massive storm which claimed many lives, and destroyed everything in its path. What I’m looking for is the answer and closure of what exactly took place during emergency response to this disaster. It was the failed response that followed which exposed several cracks that had developed in the nation’s emergency management system and its ability to respond to a catastrophic event (Bullock, 2008).
After reviewing The Federal Response to Hurricane Katarina, I have learned that there
were seventeen specific issues that the Federal government encountered with difficulty while trying to respond to Hurricane Katarina. I would like to cover a few topics a bit more in detail that stand out in my opinion. The National Preparedness System provides opportunities for all levels of government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens to work together to achieve priorities and capabilities outlined in the Guidelines(DHS). Despite the fact that our response system is typical for hurricane season, natural, and man-made disasters, our system undoubtedly has flaws.
Despite the fact that the federal government had been making preparations for a large scale disaster in New Orleans since 2002, there were four critical flaws in our national preparedness; unified management of the national response; command and control structures within the Federal government; knowledge of our preparedness plans; and regional planning and coordination. In order for the Federal government to react effectively to a nation’s call of a national crisis and assist state and local officials, unified management must be in place. As soon as Katarina made a landfall, state and local officials realized the seriousness of the situation. However, at this point it was too late. Communication ability was hindered due to the destruction of infrastructure and
response capabilities. Consequently, Federal responders struggled to preform responsibilities that are usually conducted by State and local officials.
Initially, I suspected that there was some communication issues, however, it never
downed on me that it was an almost complete communication failure. Perceptibly, State and local governments are better fit to react, in time of crises, but Federal government should assist if need be. Consequently, due to given situation the Federal government must plan and train together with State, having a contingency plan that will enable proper response to catastrophic events.
I believe that “Command and Control” is the most important phase of an operation, and it seems that after reading the facts of this operation, that the Command was out of control in a sense. Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often overlapping, roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed during this disaster (DHS). Furthermore, according to the Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana bureaucracy slowed down the search and rescue efforts. I understand that documentation is significant, but when there are lives at stake documentation should be at a minimal level.
Ultimately, if there is a mission to be executed, in order to achieve desired results, plan
should be studied then implemented, for the most part, however, that is not the case of what transpired in Louisiana. This brings me to say that one major set-back to suitable response, was in fact that at all levels of the government were not completely familiar with NRP ( National Response Plan) , due to the fact that this was a fairly new plan. It is completely understandable, that government needs to improve upon their methods and techniques. But why try to implement a NRP into action that is new and it has not been exercised properly. NIMS was also not as effective as it should have been during the aftermath of Katrina.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a national program created to respond to incidents at all jurisdictional levels, and across various disciplines. Some disasters can be responded to only on a local level but some disasters, like Katrina, require a national response involving multiple jurisdiction as well as various levels of government. The NIMS gives responders a means to effectively coordinate incident management activities when the disaster is large scale. When Katrina occurred, NIMS had only been created and implement for one year.
During Katrina, the devastation was so huge that national response was required and management of the response team was necessary. The NIMS was needed to create a clear chain of command for the assisting federal and state agencies. Many of the individuals were not trained in the basics of NIMS so training had to occur quickly after the disaster occurred. Although all efforts did result in a cohesive response team, tasks were assigned, work was monitored, and available resources were utilized, communication was the key ingredient. This key ingredient was missing in many areas. Training and preparedness also fell short when the need arose.
The Incident Command System (ICS), which is now a part of NIMS, was created and refined by leaders of the Federal, state and local governments however, the coordination was not successful during Katrina. The system was overwhelmed during the initial days following the Hurricane. The ICS is supposed to manage procedures, personnel, equipment, facilities and communication. ICS is actually designed to effectuate across all levels of government as well as include the private sector and other non-governmental organizations. With the proper use of NIMS and ICS, responders to large disasters like Katrina would be on the same page.
There have been many criticisms about NIMS and whether it is an effective tool. At Katrina, the first responders met complete chaos and had no effective means to establish order, command and communication immediately. NIMS was not aligned at all levels of government at the time of Katrina
I have pointed out just a small margin of issues that our government encountered before and after hurricane Katrina. Ultimately, the planning process between National, regional, and state-level is as important as the plan itself. It creates a framework for risk-based decision making to reduce damages to lives, property, and the economy from future disasters.
References and Information Resources;
Bullock, J., Haddow, G., Coppola, D., & Yeletaysi, S. (2008). Introduction to Homeland
Security, Third Edition: Principles of All-Hazards Response. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
United States., & United States. (2006). The federal response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons learned. Washington, D.C: White House
"Lessons Learned From Hurricane Katrina." FFIEC Home Page. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Feb.
2011. <http://www.ffiec.gov/katrina_les
A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina. (2006, March). Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-32_Mar06.pdf
