The following essay is a response paper to the book “Days of Rage” by Bryan Burrough. It mainly talks about the main concerns addressed by the author including the organized gangs in America during the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam War. In this response, I have brought together various sources. These sources include print resources, such as the book itself and other hard-copy journals. Online resources used include website articles such as the wall street journal and the New York Times. These sources have given conclusively concluded reviews that helped in writing this particular response.
Bryan Burrough is a former wall street journal reporter. Currently, he is a correspondent for Vanity Fair. In this book, he traces the birth of the underground militia to the late 1960s. One evening in New York, a young chap by the name Sam Melville, planted two bombs, each 40 joints of dynamite strong. He planted them on a sign that signified a united fruit pier. The explosions caused damage, but nobody was hurt. That same summer, a small faction broke off from the students for a Democratic Society. This group was the principle university arm of the New left. They were enraged by the draft, the Vietnam War, and police brutality against blacks. This group was growing increasingly radical but was not violent (WSJ).
In October 1969, the group called for crazies to pillage the gold coast of Chicago in huge numbers. However, only a few rioters turned up. Many of them were rounded up and jailed. The white leader’s primary goal was to support black panthers, but the Panther leader was against them. He claimed that, as the black panthers, they do not support opportunistic, anarchistic and custeristic people. Two months later, he was shot in his bed by the Chicago police.
The above analogy shows how the ideology of Secret gangs blossomed and gained momentum. However, the biggest factor in their uprising was the government actions. When the state acts in a manner that evokes anger, citizens get frustrated. At first, they voice their concerns by speaking out. In case their voices cannot be heard still, they form organizations and movements that advocate for change as well as certain civil rights. If this method fails, frustration and aggression increases. The groups and movements then resort to peaceful demonstrations which turn into violent riots. During such situations, the police come in and try to quell the melee through violent means. Many get arrested, and some get killed. As a result, the movements splinter into factions which might attempt to arm themselves. This armament leads to militant groups. Since such organizations are much weaker than militaries of the native countries, they operate in the underworld. They carry out their actions through bombings, kidnappings and other forms of civil disobedience. Government injustice further leads to the masses gaining sympathy and support for the groups.
Moving on, “Days of Rage” seems more like a journalistic marathon than a historical account. Burrough has read plenty of memoirs. Furthermore, he has followed down numerous key players. However, he never interviewed the likes of Sekou Odinga of the Black Liberation Army, Ron Fliegelman- Underground weather bomb-maker and Silvia Baraldini of white acolyte. These interviews might have been more insightful in telling their stories for purposes of publication. The same also applies to law enforcement officials, especially the ones who participated in the COINTELPRO anti-radical effort spearheaded by the FBI. They were among the lawbreakers since they conducted illegal searches and duped would-be revolutionaries through their dirty tricks.
Through conducting interviews with such participants, the world could have got firsthand information on the occurrences of that period. It is evident that the experiences of the police and key players would also have given crucial information on the internal matters that took place within the groups. Such information could have involved how secret meeting got conducted, how they managed their logistics and recruited members of the faction.
Another emerging fact is that the author has failed t to shed some light on what may be much greater than illumination. Weather Underground’s 1975 manifesto does not provide answers to various important questions. It fails to highlight the scenario in which the underground groups envisioned to jumpstart a Marxist-Leninist revolution within America. It also does not answer whether the new era would be ushered in through a referendum or arms. This manifesto only details the atrocities of imperialism but not the dynamics of its overthrow, even as its last statement warns: “Life itself depends on how to deal a swift blow to the monster.”(Wiener, 2007).
In early 1970, Weather Underground cells conducted bombings on police targets in Detroit, Cleveland, and Berkeley. Whereas in San Francisco, a police sergeant succumbed to excessive bleeding after a bomb explosion outside his window at midnight. A similar occurrence also took place in New York after a faction of the group threw three Molotov cocktails at John Muztagh’s home. Muztagh was the presiding Judge in the trial of "Panther 21." He was getting charged with conspiring to bombard public buildings and kill police officers. All the thirteen defendants under trial all got acquitted in 1971.
Taking a retrospective look forty years later, Cathy Wilkerson, a Weather Underground member attempted to give Mr. Burrough an explanation as to why the group resorted to lethal bombings. Wilkerson said that non-fatal attacks could not arouse government attention. This is why her cell in Manhattan, chose to attack a reserve soldiers dance held at Fort Dix. This occurrence took place in March 1970. In this onslaught, they used a bomb made of dynamite studded with flesh-tearing roofing nails.
The above actions show that sometimes, the government must be put under duress to respond to a call. Though it is not appropriate for groups to resort to extreme violence, as this will cause harm to individuals who are not involved in the war. On the other hand, when groups and movements do not show aggression, the state might not take them seriously. It might neglect their calls and pleas because it does not consider them a threat.
As the weather underground fizzled out, other groups sprang up. In 1971, the shadowy Black Liberation Army launched a surprise attack on NYPD police officers. These ambushes took part in two separate incidents. That same summer the group killed another officer in Atlanta, and more officers died in January 1972. They worked as NYPD patrolmen. The events show that the weather underground's ideology had already taken root in the country. They inspired other upcoming groups to stand up to the state and fights for their rights and beliefs (Ross & Gurr, 1989).
One fascinating fact about this book is the extent to which both the police and the FBI were unable to capture radicals. The reason for their disability was a result of the small size of these groups even at the height of their existence. Another factor was the reluctance of J Edgar Hoover to apply the uncouth methods used on the Panthers and white radicals. One can reasonably conclude that this was another case of FBI's racism. But the truth was much hidden as Burrough proves (Clark, 2016).
Some lessons can get drawn from the weathermen and their group. One of them is that terrorism can only thrive where states are faltering or are undergoing failure. However, this was not the case in the America of the 1970s. Another concerning issue is that bombing, to create an impact, must be on an extensive scale. Our violence-plagued society remains vulnerable to a degree even higher than that of the 1970s militia.
References
Book Review: ‘Days of Rage’ by Bryan Burrough - WSJ. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/book-review-days-of-rage-by-bryan-burrough-1429307327
Clark, J. R. (2016). Attack of the Wannabes: Bryan Burrough: Days of Rage: America's Radical Underground, the FBI, and the Forgotten Age of Revolutionary Violence Penguin Press, New York, 2015, 585 p., $29.95.International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 29(2), 415-422.
Ross, J. I., & Gurr, T. R. (1989). Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada and the United States. Comparative Politics, 21(4), 405-426.
Wiener, J. (2007). The Weatherman Temptation. Dissent, 54(2), 100-104.
