Problem statement
Intelligence analysis is given the mandate to apply all information sources, insights from experts, and trade crafts that are specialized to help prevent or reduce damages to US security through threats. Tactical warning seeks to know from afar and deter threats to US security interests. It aims at avoiding incident surprises. This is done by blocking and blunting damages. Strategic warning has its interests in perceived dangers. This informs policy makers on decisions to make for preparedness in order to limit damages or prevent the incident completely. National resources of the US are limited and warning cannot be relied upon as a preventive defense measure. It cannot provide notices on time of all menacing situations and attacks. The challenge is helping policy officials make decisions before any specific danger indications which in reality deserve solid defensive preparations. For it to be successful intelligence analysis has to be efficient in assessing prominent dangers and effective in facilitation of policy maker decisions and actions to prevent these dangers.
The central objective of intelligence analysis is to give warnings to US officials on impending dangers to national security. It can be an important force to US officials in limiting the likelihood of surprise incidents, and dealing with potential threats of high impacts. Incidents magnify damage but forehand knowledge reduces its impact. Not all the time though because intelligence services cannot manage to anticipate all damaging occurrences. They learn from past experiences on how to deal with surprise. Denial, innovations, and deceptions increase the possibility of surprise. It is not easy for analysts to convince policy officials to act on a perceived danger. It could be a false alarm. What role does analysis play then if surprise incidents are inevitable? And would they prevent the occurrence of an attack completely?
The 9/11 attack
Historical perspective
The 9/11 attack was an out of proportion event. America had suffered other surprise attacks like Pearl Harbor but this was more devastating yet it was carried out by a small group of people known to originate from an organization based in one of the least industrialized, poorest, and remote country. They were however highly educated. The government leaders did not seem to understand the threat. There had been an attack on World Trade Center in 1993 and another in East African embassies in 1998 (Heuer, 1999). They did not take the threat as serious as one would for a high ranked enemy. In 2000 and the first eight months of 2001, the need to address the issue on terrorism was not necessary as no polling organization bothered. It was not a topic of importance in the presidential campaigns. However there had been a prediction in 1995 on future terrorist attacks in America probably on the White House, the Capitol and congregation areas. It had been predicted that the attacks would increase in the following years. Warnings were given throughout the years but they could not comprehend the threats’ scale. The analysis head in counter terrorism center did not take the threats into account and argued that they would be making a mistake to redefine the counter terrorism unit since it was costly. By 2001 the government had not made a decision whether the al Qaeda threats were first order.
Unveiling of Events
In 2001 September 11, four planes were hijacked by militants associated with al Qaeda group. They carried out attacks against United States. Two planes were directed to New York City World Trade Centre, one to Washington DC and the fourth to Pennsylvania. The attacks caused massive destruction and deaths, over three thousand people including police officers and fire fighters. It was on a Tuesday morning when an American Airline Boeing 767 crashed in the tower on the north of World Trade Center in New York. The building was a sky scraper with 110 floors and the 80th floor was burning. Hundreds of people were killed instantly and several others trapped in the higher floors as there was no exit for them. A few minutes later as evacuation was underway, another plane, flight 175, appeared from the sky and hit the southern tower on the 60th floor. This collision was more intense as there was a massive explosion that scattered debris over the surrounding. It dawned on them that America was under attack (Attackks, 2004).
Attackers were 19 Islamic from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nationalities. It was reported that they were being financed by Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist group al Qaeda. Allegedly they were acting to retaliate on America for supporting Israel, getting involved in the Persian Gulf War, and continued presence of military in the Middle East. Some of these terrorists had lived amongst Americans for more than a year even taking classes at schools of commercial flights in America. Others had migrated illegally to mastermind the attacks. They smuggled knives and box cutters easily through East Coast airports security to board the four flights headed for California. These planes were chosen because they were fully loaded with fuel for the long journey. After takeoff, they took control of the planes.
Flight 77 was next. It slammed into the Pentagon military headquarters in Washington DC at around 9:45 a.m. jet fuel in the plane caused an inferno that made a part of the building collapse. Everyone aboard the airliner died and 125 military personnel in the pentagon. In less than fifteen minutes the southern tower of World Trade Centre collapsed. This was catastrophic. The other tower followed suit killing 3000 people including paramedics and firefighters. Only six people survived uninjured. Meanwhile, flight 93 had been delayed in takeoff. The passengers knew of the unfolding events in New York and some of them decided to do something about it despite the fact that they would still die. They fought the hijackers and it’s suspected that they used a fire extinguisher to attack the cockpit. The plane crashed at a field in Pennsylvania and all members aboard died, forty five of them. The planes intended target was never known but suspicions are on the US capitol, White House, nuclear power plant, or the camp in Maryland (Attackks, 2004).
At around 9pm the President, George W. Bush, returned to the white house and addressed the public on television claiming that America’s foundation was too strong to be shaken like the building that had been shuttered. He declared that no distinction would be made between the terrorists who had attacked and those harboring terrorists.
Effects of the attack
Economically the attack had a great impact on world markets. Stock exchange was closed until 17th September. Stocks in US lost 1.4 trillion dollars in valuation that week. Jobs were lost and several other billions in were lost in wages the following months (Attackks, 2004). Small businesses were not left out, they had been destroyed in the attacks and others misplaced leading to jobs and wages being lost. Air space in North America was shut down for several days and there was a general decrease in air travel resulting in financial struggles for the airline industries. Toxic debris was spread throughout lower sides of Manhattan because of the twin tower collapse. This debris contained various contaminants including carcinogens. Exposure to these contaminants led to fatal illnesses in the area. Approximately eighteen thousand people are said to have developed dust related illnesses.
Use of intelligence analysis techniques to warn and prevent
Intelligence analysis techniques are ways in which the government uses to identify, predict and warn a country on an impending danger. It helps in preparedness and may even prevent the damage or limit its impacts. Tactical warning and strategic warning are best used in counter terrorism. Tactical warning lays its focus on incidents that are a threat to US security interests like terrorism, illegal transactions, military attack, and political crisis. Its analysis involves looking for and evaluating diagnostic information concerning incidents, target, modalities, perpetrator, and timing. It aims at identifying in advance where, when and how potential incident will strike the US. Strategic warning deals with perception analysis and communicating effectively to policy officials on essential changes in the level of threats that may require re-evaluation of preparedness to avert, limit, or deter danger. The ultimate goal of the two warning analysis aspects is protection of US interests (Heuer, 1999).
The 9/11 terrorist attack was a tactical surprise and a reminder of the limitations of tactical warning. It is indicated in the public that communication was often months before the attack. It was known that the probability of al Qaeda attacking United States was high. Intelligence warning had done their part in warning and convincing policy officials that the vulnerability of the country to an attack had grown. Government and non-government recommended the averting of resources to protective measures; improved cooperation between law enforcing officials and intelligence, tighter scrutiny of air passengers, and enforcement of immigration laws made stricter. Even after warning was given, received, and believed the protective measures were not taken into account. Top policy officials were unwilling to incur economic and political costs of inconvenience, expenditures, and breaking bureaucratic bowls.
Critical examination of warning analysis should primarily aim at avoiding or limiting damages with a realistic aspect. Its ultimate goal should be maximization of damage limitation and not prediction of accuracy. Acquiring knowledge forehand should be treated with seriousness of the bigger challenge forthcoming. Readiness and awareness reduces the chances of extensive damage through erecting ways of defensive responses. The policy officials in 9/11 failed to put into place defensive measures since they did not to incur costs.
Intelligence failures in US
There were valid indications of warnings against the US. They were unfortunately overlooked terming it as unlikely to occur on the US soil. Policy officials failed to look at the warnings in the perspective of reliving the past in US. There was a blame game during the commission investigations even though it was clear that each policy official, agency, and heads of agencies had an adverse role in the output of a non- disseminated or wrongly assessed intelligence in US. Full of bureaucratic haziness, they pushed responsibility to each based on of warrant requests and acquisitions, information investigation, or information analysis and dissemination (Attacks, 2004).
The communication system within the Investigation Bureau (FBI) was broken and weak. Before 9/11 it was almost impossible for analysts to gain intelligence community’s access yet they were expected to analyze and give results of intelligence. Indeed before the attack few counter terrorism reports were completed. The FBI was unable to share information and make use of proper link analysis (Freedman, 2010). For example, before the attack field officers in the FBI gathered information on organizations and subjects which were suspected of funding al Qaeda from US soil. By the time of the attack they were aware of the existence of extremist organizations within US who fully supported jihad and al Qaeda. Electronic surveillance and investigation was done on links to al Qaeda and funding keeping a large number of web informants. However this information was not used to find possible clues and links to potential al Qaeda attacks against US. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had flaws in intelligence despite having a special unit on Bin Laden. Breakdown within CIA was mostly financial and power fights between Richard Clarke and directors of CIA. They were focused on rebuilding their staff and mission which took a lot of the money. Clarke was for the opinion that giving the CIA more money would help in counter terrorism but the directors in CIA funds should be given tor Bin Laden unit and counter terrorism as well as CIA as a whole (Clark, 2010). Budget complains were evident in CIA showing that they did not fully participate in the 2001 events. This was evident when the president requested for a potential attack analysis in spring and summer but did not get reports till August 2001.
Central Intelligence Agency had terrorists’ indication but did not give the information to other agencies. A 2007 CIA report showed that about 50 to 60 officers were aware of 9/11 hijackers by name; Hazmi Nawaf and Mihdhar Khalid but no official contacted FBI regarding a potential terror threat in US (Mazzetti, 2007).
Ways of strengthening intelligence analysis
Scholars argue that states who are not aware of an impending attack are but are fully equipped and prepared to face damaging events are able to limit damage than a government with warning and unprepared. Intelligence community and CIA believe that every analyst in the analytic offices is a warning official. In 1990 there was a downsizing of analytic resources due to the cold war which might have affected strategic warning analysis prior to 9/11 attacks. This could be improved through staffing level improvement, career incentives, doctrinal development, and trade craft training. Prior to 9/11, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called for an increase in efforts directed to avoiding strategic surprise. The Deputy however accused analysts of helping policy officials make decisions on seemingly improbable threats that did not need serious attention.
Strategic warning and sound estimative analysis should be strengthened. Analysts in the intelligence unit make convincing cases on likelihood of danger occurrence. They do this based on the strengths of the process; collaborative expertise, collection guidance mastery, all source information that is well structured, tradecraft for uncertainty dealings. They give a timely, convincing and prescient assessment on a looming danger. Strategic warning analysis can be effective if all information source that is determinative. Specific estimations on predictions lead to warnings failing. The expertise of the analysts is superseded by estimating hazards. Data available on a complex issue can be manipulated by deception and denial thus leading to misinterpretation. Better trained analysts increase will contribute positively towards the success record in regard to making the right call and informing policy makers for timely actions.
Strategic warning as alternative analysis should be strengthened too. Focus of efforts on effective strategic warning should be placed in threats to security that are even impenetrable uncertainty, impending threats that might mature or not.
Analysts address issues because they judge that the danger could be devastating, despite being unlikely, and has to be understood. Strategic warning is used as an alternative analysis in this case. Its trade craft emphasizes on value added and disciplined assessments of threats that are undetermined or unlikely. It is a kind of what if analysis. Alternative analysis should not be executed as an end in most cases. The aim of strategic warning is to support policy makers in their difficult decision making task on dealing with the threats before the actual indicators show up. In 1998 the secretary of defense asked analysts to expand efforts on dangers of high impact that were thought to be unlikely. He told policy officials to ensure quick dismissal of dangers did not happen because of lack of solid evidence.
Strategic warning efforts should be assigned to regular analytic units like production units as they are responsible for analytic deliverables and tactical warning. It should aim at increasing warning skills and number of analysts not the organizations complexity. Team work in colleagues provides an advantage to the analyst regarding policy officials’ contacts, expertise, and database. Production units open ancient danger of newest policy support analysis and drives out in depth analysis. Expansion of trade craft training and research because strategic warning analysis involves depicting future developments would be an added advantage for US. For execution to be effective special skills are required in alternative analysis trade craft. This comprises assessment of inference and evidence, probing of likely paths of future development, triggering developments or events, and indicators of increased or decreased danger. A research is needed to enable the expansion of trade craft. There have been cases showing causes of failures in warnings but the search for a theory or science for its success is beyond reach. Doctrinal developments and refinement of skills give the participants (collectors, analysts, and policy makers) in the process confidence in weighing, identification and tracking of threats. Trade crafts serve to advance the quality and utility of warning as an alternative analysis.
Strategic warning issues should be selected carefully in order to attain the goal of providing distinctive values in analysis. Analysis requires a range of analysts who are well connected to collectors and other colleagues in analysis agencies and policy makers. In 9/11 the CIA was not willing or did not share information on the terrorists who planned to attack US. They were not well connected and thus some information was left out in the analysis of the incident. Topics should be selected upon carefully putting national security threats in the fore front. CIA officials opted to deal with monetary matters ahead of the potential danger to United States (Mazzetti, 2007). Relations between contingency planning and strategic warning have varied in the past. To avoid this policy official roles should be expanded and well outlined. This would also prevent power fights and blame games in case something went wrong. Lines of communications should be outlined to ensure regular intelligence community assessment (Jack, 2003).
Conclusion
The mission of intelligence analysis is warning United States officials on potential dangers to national security and makes them aware of perceived openings to improve policy objectives. The 9/11 attacks happened as a surprise to the nation but most of it was due to improper coordination, assumptions, and unwillingness to carry out strategic analysis despite having source information. The 9/11 attacks impacts were horrifying but they could have been limited if the participants were willing to pay heightened costs of defense whether they were sure of the attacks likelihood to take place or not. They should assume limits of expenditure in preparation for plausible but seemingly improbable events. Tactical surprises are however inevitable and the attack could not have been prevented from taking place. This is because issues like economic crisis, internal strife and threats from friendly threats, and regional wars bar timely specific warnings. It is not easy for analysts who are so sure of themselves about a solid tactical warning case convince policy makers to take action on defensive measures yet they do not have solid evidence.
References
Clark, R. (2010). Intelligence Analysis. Washington DC: CQ Press.
Freedman, H. (2010, March 23). Assessing the Effectiveness of Post 9/11 Intelligence
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Heuer, R. J. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Washington DC: Center for Study of
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Jack, D. (2003). Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis. New York:
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Mazzetti, M. (2007). CIA Lays Out Errors it Made Before 9/11. New York Times, p. 22.
National Terrorist’s Attacks Commission. (2004). The 9/11 Report. New York: W.W. Norton &
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