Back in late 52 BC came the final pacification of the Aeduis, and then Arvernes expressed humility. Moreover, they returned to 20 thousand prisoners. With regard to the Aeduis, then they even maintained the status allies, who besides them had only loyal Lingones. Arvernes, though, had to give a large number of hostages, also received quite tolerable peace terms on which their independence in dealing with domestic issues was recognized. Now that the danger of united Gaul was eliminated. For Caesar, it was important to find support at least in the two most significant communities.
But is there any reason to believe that the danger of combining was completely eliminated? Caesar's actions in the campaign of 51 - 50 BC were directed first and foremost to ensure suppression of such aspirations in the bud. As always in such cases, he acted vigorously and rapidly. In the winter of 52/51 BC, he suddenly invaded with two legions a rich area of Bituriges and quickly brought them into submission. Then came the Carnutes. However Carnutes at the mere news of the approach of the Romans left their towns and villages, hiding in the woods, or even in neighboring communities. Since the winter was quite severe, the Caesar broke winter camp in Cenabum, city of Carnutes, which not for the first time saw the Roman armies. But here before the end of winter he had to make a new campaign - against Bellovaci.
Bellovaci had fame of warlike tribe. When at the request of Vercingetorix militia was formed and each community has exhibited a certain contingent of soldiers Bellovaci rejected this, saying that they are not willing to submit to draw power, but would make war with the Romans by themselves. Indeed, of all the Gallic communities still not participating directly in the uprising, Bellovaci were the most dangerous opponent (Walker, 124).
Except the Bellovaci in the fight against the Romans, were attended other tribes of the Belgians. At the head of the militia were experienced military leader of Bellovaci Corrie and sworn enemy of the Romans Commius. The last mentioned was even able to attract the German cavalry. As for Correia, he led the military operations skillfully using largely tactics of Vercingetorix.
Caesar first had four legions, and then he had to call two of the Legions. Nevertheless, he was not able to achieve a decisive victory, on the contrary, he experienced a number of sensitive failures, and the rumor of them even went to Rome. Finally, in one of the battles in which he took a personal interest, Bellovaci suffered a decisive defeat, and Corrie was killed. In the camp of the enemy was then convened a meeting and they decided to send ambassadors to the Romans and hostages. Ambassadors arrived to Caesar, asked him to show mercy and emphasized the fact that Corrie, the main culprit and mastermind of the war, was killed. Caesar, as that tells the author of eight books of "Notes on the Gallic War" Aulus Hirtius, replied that he was well aware of how convenient was to shift the blame for the dead, but nevertheless he had ready to be satisfied with the punishment that Bellovaci already had brought on themselves.
Pacification of Belgae tribes was crucial. Fire of rebellion was finally extinguished, leaving only scattered, barely smoldering. Caesar himself went to Eburones, and the country of unhappy fugitive Ambiorix was completely burned and looted. The rest was instructed legates: Labienus, Kanin, Fabius, who operated in the area of the Loire, as well as in Brittany and Normandy. Labienus led to the submission Treveri and Fabio Canino who operated successfully in Picton, where the surviving rebel troops assaulted the city Lemon (Poitiers). The last major operation was a struggle around the city and fortress Uxellodunum. It was captured by comrade of Vercingetorix Lucterius and Drappes who allegedly at the very beginning of the uprising attracted refugees from all communities and called for the freedom of slaves. Unfortunately, apart from this sketchy and hardly objective characteristics Girtius about Drappes nothing more is known.
Siege of Uxellodunum, great fortified by nature, lasted a long time. Although Caesar's legate Canino worked successfully and in one of the battles broke Drappes when he withdrew some troops from the city, but for the capture of the city in Caninius he was not strong enough. Then Caesar, who at the time rode Gallic community, did judgment and tried to bring calm, suddenly appeared under Uxellodunum. He found it necessary to continue the siege, but residents rendered desperate resistance, and the city surrendered only when a tunnel were cut last water sources. And here's how to explain Hirtius, Caesar, believing that its softness is known to all, had no reason to fear even now that some severe measure, they carried out, would consider it a manifestation of innate cruelty, but because all the inhabitants of the city, who only held in bear arms, he ordered to cut off his hands, but to save his life, to the clearer was the punishment for their crimes.
After this frightening example was followed by a series of peaceful acts. Caesar personally visited the Aquitaine region in which he had had not been yet, and had achieved full calm here. Then he went to Narbonne Gaul, and his legates were instructed to dissolve the troops into winter quarters, distributing them in such a way that no part of Gaul did not remain unoccupied by Roman forces. He himself, after spending a few days in the provinces and a generous reward for all those who gave him any services during the difficult tests, did not cross over the Alps, but returned to his legions in Belgium, taking as the main city Nemetocenna (Arras).
In 50 BC in Gaul, according to Hirtius already been no particularly important events in any case of such events, the description of which should be devoted to a particular book. Winter in Gaul, Caesar was occupied mainly by the preservation and strengthening of friendly relations with the communities. To do this, "he appealed to communities in flattering terms, their leaders showered with awards, did not impose a heavy burden, and generally tried to soften exhausted by so many battles Gauls with unhappy conditions of submission of Roman power." In late winter, Caesar traveled to all parts of the Middle Gaul, then returned to his troops in Nemetocenna called legions from winter quarters to the border of Treveries and there made a solemn parade of the whole army. As if this put the last point: the war in Gaul now was complete.
During this same winter of 50 BC Caesar laid the foundations of this new organization of Transalpine Gaul and settled his relationship with Rome. These relationships were by no means uniform and impersonal. Three of the most authoritative Gallic community - Aeduis, Lingones, as already mentioned, were in a privileged position, the rest had to pay a firmly established amount of tax (tribute). It is known that Transalpine Gaul (Gallia Comata) generally paid annually to 40 million sesterces. This total should not be surprised by its relatively small value: the country was exhausted and looted during the devastating war. Of course, the spoils of war, fell into the hands of the Romans in its most diverse forms, in dozens, if not hundreds of times greater than the relatively modest and feasible for the country digit tribute.
In purely administrative dimension Caesar conquered vast territories originally likely attached to Narbonne Gaul. The former system of governance in selected communities, so alledhe local "kings" or aristocratic "senates", survived, and after the conquest preserved as client relationships and dependencies of one community from another. Caesar did not try to change the system, such as the political and administrative orders, he was only concerned about the fact that the head of communities were now people of a certain orientation - the supporters of Rome and him personally. Here he did not skimp on generous reward wirh money confiscated estates and management positions. Very tolerant and respectful even was Caesar's attitude to the local religion and its priests, for instance, the Druids.
Although Caesar did not create, or rather, did not have time to create a completely finished and slender politico-administrative system in Gaul, however they entered the orders proved to be extremely stable and realistic. This is proved at least by the remarkable fact that when in Rome, civil war broke out and in Gaul there were almost no Roman troops, this newly conquered country was more loyal to Rome than some provinces seemingly with longer period of the Roman domination.
What are the overall results of the conquest of Gaul? It was an event of historic proportions and major significance. If to believe Plutarch, Caesar during nine years of military operations in Gaul stormed over 800 cities, won the 300 nationalities, fought with three million people, of which one million were killed and as many captured. Conquered and attached to the Roman possessions territory covers an area of 500 thousand square kilometers. The spoils of war - prisoners, livestock, precious jewel, gold - was truly incalculable. It is known that gold appeared in Rome as it was sold for pounds and dropped in value compared with silver twenty-five percent. Supreme commander also enriched; he not only completely restored, but also significantly increased its fortune; enriched his officers, and even soldiers. Suetonius, blaming Caesar's greed, explicitly said that in Gaul he "devastated temples and temples of the gods filled with offerings, and ravaged the city for more production than a punishment." (Gilliver, 177)
But apparently, the main outcome was not this one. The conquest of Gaul opened vast prospects for entry into the country of the Roman trade and monetary capital - businessmen, traders, moneylenders, created in the 50s extraordinary business activity in this new province and in Rome itself. Not by chance, some scientists with a light hand Mommsen believe that the accession of Gaul had on the Mediterranean world - mutatis mutandis - the same effect as the discovery of America to the medieval Europe. In addition, it is indisputable that intensively developed in the future the process of Romanization of Gaul, and proceeded multilaterally as in socio-economic, political and cultural aspects, taken its origin in the era of the Gallic Wars Caesar (Butler, 288).
Finally, there were the results of the war in relation to Caesar. There can be no doubt that his popularity in Rome had now reached the highest limit. Not to mention the demagogic politics of Caesar, to conduct which he could again with his usual generosity to spend huge sums, not to mention his reputation in the broadest layers of the Roman population, we should recognize that shine military and diplomatic victories in Gaul produced apparently irresistible impression even on those who were in any way not suspected in excessive sympathy for him. This did not mean, of course, that Caesar reconciled his most ardent political opponents, but these, for example, people like Cicero, though he believed Caesar was almost the main culprit of his exile, in a speech of early 56 BC pathetically exclaimed: "Could I be an enemy to whose letters, whose fame, whose envoys daily hit my ears hitherto completely unknown names of tribes, ethnic groups, places? I'm blazed, believe me, conscript fathers, by extreme love for the fatherland, and this long-standing and eternal love brings me back to Caesar, to peace with him and forces me to renew our good relations. " (Goldsworthy, 243) Or Valerio Catullo, which, according to Caesar himself, branded him in his poems with eternal stigma, calling and a scoundrel, yet, when it comes to victories in Gaul, was forced to make to the name Caesar quite different epithets, such as "famous"," glorious. " (Edwards, 77)
Nine years of military operations in Gaul brought to Caesar, of course, a great experience. Outstanding general reputation was firmly established with him. As commander, he had at least two remarkable qualities: speed and agility of action, to such an extent that, according to ancient historians, none of his predecessors could not compete with him. Almost all of the tactics of war in Gaul (and many strategic calculations) were based on these two principles, and it was not only the right, but also the only possible plan of action, on the balance of power that existed in Gaul, especially during the great Gallic uprising. If Caesar possessed by ten legions,, 60 thousand of people, the overall strength of the rebels reached 250 - 300 thousand people. Everything therefore depended on speed, agility, ultimately on the ability to divide the enemy forces.
Suetonius specifically notes that the longest transitions Caesar made with amazing speed, in a hired carriage, making a hundred miles a day. His stamina was incredible; in the campaign he moved always ahead troops, usually on foot, sometimes on horseback, bareheaded and in the heat and rain. It combines careful with desperate courage. For example, he never led the troops on the roads, convenient for an ambush, without prior intelligence. On the other hand, he could himself wade through enemy positions to surrounded forces, dressed in Gallic dress, going on a deadly risk (Meier, McLintock, 115).
As commander Caesar surpassed all his predecessors in another respect - the ability to deal with the soldiers, to find common language with them. It was repeatedly mentioned how could he successfully built and delivered on time speech to inspire the army, or to achieve a breakthrough in the mood. He personally knew and remembered many centurions and soldiers and spoke to them at the decisive moment of the battle by name. He could take part in regular heavy siege works, continuing day and night, and seeing as toil and how exhausted soldiers, offer them voluntarily to lift the siege, as he did this under Avaricum.
Sources
Edwards, H. J. The Gallic War. London: W. Heinemann ;, 1917. Print.
Walker, Arthur Tappan. Caesar's Gallic War,. A Revision of the ed. Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1907. Print.
Gilliver, Catherine. Caesar's Gallic Wars, 58-50 BC. New York: Routledge, 2003. Print.
Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. Caesar: Life of a Colossus. New Haven: Yale UP, 2006. Print.
Meier, Christian, and David McLintock. Caesar. New York: Basic/HarperCollins, 1995. Print.
Butler, Harold Edgeworth. Divus Julius. Bristol: Bristol Classical, 1982. Print.
