Introduction
In the American legal system, the rights afforded to a defendant who has been accused of a crime are fundamental and of paramount constitutional concern. The Framers were cognizant of the potential for government abuse and ensured that a criminal defendant’s rights were protected. The Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal proceedings, “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury” (U.S. Const. amend. VI). Thus, the Sixth Amendment safeguards the criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial and guarantees that defendant is entitled to a trial by a jury of his or her peers. While the Sixth Amendment sets forth a broad overview of what rights are protected, over the years, the Supreme Court has largely flushed out the details of how these important rights are protected.
Right to Speedy Trial
While the Sixth Amendment provides in plain language that a criminal defendant enjoys the right to a speedy trial, what exactly constitutes speedy is somewhat of a nebulous concept. As cases have come before the Supreme Court regarding this issue, the Supreme Court has characterized the idea of a speedy trial as “amorphous, “ relative,” and “slippery” (Garcia, 1992, p. 31). The right to a speedy trial, therefore, is not unqualified. While no bright-line test has been implemented to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo has adopted a four-factor test to consider: 1) the length of the delay, 2) the reason for the delay, 3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial, and 4) the prejudice resulting to the defendant (Barker v. Wingo, 1972, p. 533). Courts reviewing a defendant’s claim that his right to a speedy trial has been infringed upon will weigh these Barker factors on balance.
The US Constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy trial provides a floor, not a ceiling to the right to a speedy trial. States are free to adopt more protective measures than the federal Constitution in ensuring a defendant’s rights. For example, the Montana Supreme Court creates a rebuttable presumption that a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been violated if the delay exceeds 200 days (Valdes, 1994, p. 1135).
Right to Impartial Judge
In the American legal system, judges are key players in the administration of justice (Shaman, 1996, p. 605). The Judge’s role in a trial is to remain unbiased and ensure that both the prosecution and defense abide by the same rules and ensure the overall fairness of the proceedings. A judge is supposed to remain neutral and unattached from the outcome of the criminal proceeding. When a judge has a significant interest in the outcome of the matter, a judge’s neutrality is severely compromised.
While all lawyers are subject to Model Rules of Professional Conduct, there are special rules for judges because of the nature and power that accompanies the position. The Code of Judicial Conduct governs judges who sit on the bench in American courts (Shaman, 1996, p. 606). The Code of Judicial Conduct was derived from the Canons of Judicial Ethics that was passed in 1924 (Shaman, 1996, p. 606). The Code of Judicial Conduct places restrictions on judges for both in-court conduct and out-of-court conduct (Shaman, 1996, p. 608). For instance, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge who has a “personal bias or prejudice” against a particular party of lawyer to disqualify himself or herself from the proceedings (Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, R. 2.11). The overarching theme of the Code of Judicial Conduct is that judges must avoid any appearance of impropriety (Shaman, 1996, p. 608). In turn, the Code regulates certain types of extrajudicial activities of justices and limits activities the judge is permitted to partake in related to the judicial function (Shaman, 1996, p. 608).
Right to Impartial Jury
One of the essential guarantees of the Sixth Amendment is the right to an impartial jury. What this means is that a defendant has the right to be tried by a jury that is unbiased and not unfairly prejudiced against the defendant. The jury is not supposed to hear the evidence of both sides and then make a decision of guilt or innocence based on that evidence presented. Potential jurors can be excused from the panel for a number of reasons that go to question their impartiality of bias. If a jury has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, the juror can be excluded (Howe, 1995, p. 1184).
One thorny issue that has arisen in the context of jury impartiality is extensive media coverage of the specific case before the trial. For high-profile cases, it will be difficult to find jurors who have not seen, read, or heard any extrajudicial comments or information regarding the case. The danger is that jurors could make up their minds about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, based solely on the media coverage and information provided, before the trial. The Supreme Court in Mu’Min v. Virginia addressed this problem of pre-trial publicity and whether it impacted a juror’s impartiality at a constitutional level. The majority found that juror impartiality within the Sixth Amendment did not require jurors to be ignorant of the facts of the case, but only that the jurors would without fixed opinions of guilt or innocence which would prevent them from deciding the case impartially (Mu’Min v. Virginia, 1991, p. 920). This, the right to an impartial jury does not extend so far as to be able to screen out jurors who have seen or heard the case covered by the media unless the juror has already reached a decision as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence based on the facts imparted by the pre-trial publicity.
References
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Garcia, A. (1992). Speedy trial swift justice: Full-fledged right or “Second-class citizen?”
Southwestern University Law Review, 31-61.
Howe, S.W. Juror neutrality or an impartiality array A structure theory of the impartial jury
mandate. Notre Dame Law Review, 1173-1245.
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, R. 2.11.
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
Shaman, J.M. (1996). The impartial judge: detachment or passion? DePaul Law Review, 605-
632.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Valdes, J.G. (1994). A speedy trial. Rutgers Law Journal, 1134-1135.
